October 28, 2023

William Dyer (d. 1696) on Christ’s General and Special Love

2. Secondly, Christ is a King that loves his subjects with a distinguishing love and a separating love; the general love of Christ is scattered and branched out to all the creatures in the world, but his special love is exceeding great, and rich love is only settled upon his Church. Now if you ask me what Christs distinguishing love is, I shall name it, and but name it to you.
First, ’Tis pardoning Love.
Secondly, ’Tis Redeeming Love.
Thirdly, Calling Love.
Fourthly, Justifying Love.
Fifthly, Adopting Love.
Sixthly, Sanctifying Love.
Seventhly, Glorifying Love.

This I say, is his peculiar Love; Christs Love is not only sweeter than Wine, but better than Life: he is most Lovely, he is always Lovely, he is altogether Lovely; Christ is nothing but love to those who are his Love.
William Dyer, Christ’s Famous Titles, and a Believers Golden-Chain […] (London: Printed for the Author, and now divulged for the good of private Families, especially his Friends in the County of Devon, 1666), 33–34. Credit to Dale W. Smith, ed., Ore from the Puritans’ Mine: The Essential Collection of Puritan Quotations (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2020), 64.

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June 26, 2023

Petrus van Mastricht (1630–1706) on Universal and Common Grace

What is universal grace and what sort is it?

XV. Now we would not repeat concerning grace what we just above taught concerning love, if a manifold controversy, one that has been in every age most vexing, did not urge us to do so. There is, then, first, universal grace, by which God dispenses natural things to each and every creature and is thus named the Savior of all (1 Tim. 4:10), the one who saves beasts and men (Ps. 36:6) and takes cares that his sun rises over the field of the just and the unjust (Matt. 5:45), concerning which see above [§IX]. This grace particularly confers to man his free choice and whatever sort of strength he has for natural good, and also stirs up and encourages that strength by its influence. And all these things, although they come forth from the gratuitous love of God, and thus from grace, yet in the use of Scripture, and also of all ancient orthodoxy, rarely and less properly are they called grace. For the latter tradition cautiously distinguished nature from grace against the Pelagians.

What is common grace and what sort is it?

XVI. There is, second, common grace, by which he dispenses moral goods, particularly to men, but indiscriminately, to the elect and the reprobate. To this kind of grace belong the virtues of the intellect, such as ingenuity, wisdom, and prudence (Ex. 31:3), as well as the virtues of the will, the ethical virtues (Luke 18:11), of which kind are all the virtues of pagans and unbelievers. In this number should be reckoned those things that appear more closely to approach saving things, such as are mentioned in Hebrews 6:4–5; Isaiah 58:2, and 1 Corinthians 13:1. To this pertains external calling to participation in Christ through the proclamation of the Word (Ps. 147:19–20; Matt. 20:16), and also internal calling through some sort of illumination, and all those good things which are conspicuous in temporary believers (Matt. 13:20–21).
Petrus van Mastricht, Faith in the Triune God, ed. Joel R. Beeke, trans. Todd M. Rester and Michael T. Spangler, vol. 2 of Theoretical-Practical Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2019), 353–354.
The Reformed commonly acknowledge a universal grace concerning natural things and a common grace concerning moral things, but saving grace concerning things that accompany salvation they do not allow, except as a grace proper to the elect: they acknowledge no saving grace that extends equally to each individual, not even that grace that they call objective.
Petrus van Mastricht, Faith in the Triune God, ed. Joel R. Beeke, trans. Todd M. Rester and Michael T. Spangler, vol. 2 of Theoretical-Practical Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2019), 367.

Note: Observe that van Mastricht said he believed in a sense of “universal grace,” and associated it with the “natural things” God dispenses to each and every creature. He also associated it with “the gratuitous love of God.” However, he insightfully also observed that “ancient orthodoxy,” meaning from the days of Augustine, “rarely and less properly” called such things “grace.” As he noted, “the latter [orthodox] tradition cautiously distinguished nature from grace against the Pelagians.” “Universal grace,” therefore, should not be dismissed outright, but simply and carefully distinguished (as van Mastricht did) from the aberrant meaning of the Pelagians. See Richard A. Muller, s.v. “gratia communis; gratia particularis sive specialis; and gratia universalis,” in Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic: A Division of Baker Publishing Group, 2017), 142, 143–44, 145. Some recent Reformed theologians (e.g., Jan van Genderen and Willem Hendrik Velema (Concise Reformed Dogmatics) and Robert Letham (Systematic Theology) have had no problem teaching a kind of “universal grace.” Hypothetical Universalists taught what was called a “universal objective grace,” which was deemed within the boundaries of Reformed orthodoxy.
The objection of the Lutherans

I do not see what they could show in favor of this their Helen—set on fire as she was by their own Luther, and also thoroughly condemned by his hypotheses in his Bondage of the Will,40 though the modern Lutherans, every time we have to contend with them on this issue, are desperately in love with her and kiss her passionately—except that experience itself shouts that those who are still unregenerate, equipped with nothing but their free choice, can attend to holy things, pour out prayers, and use the sacraments and other external things. But (1) we do not deny that such things can be performed by the unregenerate; rather, we deny only that this can happen by the strength of their choice, since such things are done by the aid of common grace. Next (2) we deny that this can be done by the unregenerate with the result that they do not resist the Holy Spirit. For this is nothing other than to show oneself compliant to the Holy Spirit, to desire or to embrace the grace of regeneration, which cannot come from one who is dead in sin.
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40 On the allusion to Helen, note that not only was Helen alluringly attractive, but the result of an improper love for her was preventable war. In part 1, section 12 and part 2, section 1 of De servo arbitrio (lit. “On the enslaved choice”), Martin Luther mentions the destruction of Troy in connection with commitment to free choice.
Petrus van Mastricht, Faith in the Triune God, ed. Joel R. Beeke, trans. Todd M. Rester and Michael T. Spangler, vol. 2 of Theoretical-Practical Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2019), 372–373.

Neele added the following interesting historical note. During the CRC dispute with Hoeksema, et al, both parties apparently appealed to van Mastricht (and Calvin a well). From the above information, it seems the CRC was correct to do so, as van Mastricht did in fact teach common grace, and connected it with God’s love, his providential bounties, and restraining operations. As usual, the PRC historiography is seriously flawed.
The twentieth century, furthermore, witnessed appeals to Mastricht’s theology in controversy, as well as continuing interest by systematic theologians. In matters of theological controversy, Mastricht’s authority is sometimes noted, as it was in eighteenth-century New England; in addition, at the Synod of 1924, the Christian Reformed Church in North America referenced Mastricht concerning the doctrine of common grace. The Synod differed with the Revs. Hoeksema and Danhof, who appealed to Mastricht more than to Calvin, to assert the Reformed understanding of the doctrine.193 In the works of systematic theology from Dutch theologians such as Herman Bavinck, Louis Berkhof, E. C. Gravemeijer, Herman Hoeksema, and G. H. Kersten, but also from the Swiss Karl Barth, the TPT [Theoretico-Practica Theologia] is cited favorably, but usually only in the footnotes.194
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193 Acta der Synode 1924 van de Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk. Gehouden van 18 Juni tot 8 Juli, 1924 te Kalamazoo, Mich., U.S.A, 127–29 (Calvin), 128, 130, 133–34 (Mastricht).
194 Karl Barth, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik (Zürich: EVZ-Verlag, 1970), I/1:5, 199; I/2:310; II/1: 369f., 373, 404, 508, 516, 592, 601, 646, 731f.; II/2:83, 122, 142, 150, 371; III/2:456; III/3:72, 75, 107, 118, 178, 186, 333; IV/2:115; IV/3:17. Works with no reference index will be cited with page number; Herman Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: Kok, 1921); Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, with a new preface by Richard A. Muller (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996); E. C. Gravenmeijer, Leesboek over de Gereformeerde Geloofsleer (Utrecht: H. Ten Hove, 1896), 1:118, 194, 254, 256, 263, 283, 293, 319, 334, 338, 342, 344, 349, 351, 362, 368, 370, 374, 376, 379, 393, 402, 408, 410, 414, 421, 422, 455; Herman Hoeksema, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids: Reformed Free Publishing Association, 1966), 61, 287, 447; G. H. Kersten, De Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Utrecht: De Banier, 1988, zesde druk), I:15, 25, 43, 94, 96, 97, 100, 110, 148, 150, 164, 179, 197, 207, 216, 228, 230, 244, 251, 326, 394, 412, 415; II:5, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 25, 26, 28, 29, 34, 39, 42, 45, 56, 237, 255, 301, 346.
Adriaan C. Neele, “Petrus van Mastricht (1630–1706): Life and Work,” in Prolegomena, ed. Joel R. Beeke, trans. Todd M. Rester, vol. 1 of Theoretical-Practical Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2018), lxi.

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May 22, 2023

R. C. Sproul (1939–2017) on God’s Will of Disposition

God’s Will of Disposition

While we understand that the decretive will and the preceptive will of God are part of His overall will, other aspects of the mystery of His sovereignty remain. One such aspect is [p 21] “the will of disposition.” It is tied up with the ability of man to disobey God’s preceptive will.

This aspect of the will of God refers to what is pleasing and agreeable to God. It expresses something of the attitude of God to His creatures. Some things are “well pleasing in his sight,” while other things are said to grieve Him. He may allow (but not via moral permission) wicked things to transpire, but He is by no means pleased by them.

To illustrate how these differing aspects of the will of God come into play in biblical interpretation, let us examine the verse that says the Lord is “not willing that any should perish” (2 Peter 3:9, KJV). Which of the above-mentioned meanings of will fits this text? How is the meaning of the text changed by the application of the nuances?

Try first the decretive will. The verse would then mean, “God is not willing in a sovereign decretive sense that any should perish.” The implication would then be that nobody perishes. This verse would be a proof text for universalism, with its view that hell is utterly vacant of people.

The second option is that God is not willing in a preceptive way that any should perish. This would mean that God does not allow people to perish in the sense that He grants His moral permission. This obviously does not fit the context of the passage.

[p 22] The third option makes sense. God is not willing in the sense that He is not inwardly disposed to, or delighted by, people’s perishing. Elsewhere, Scripture teaches that God takes no delight in the death of the wicked. He may decree what He does not enjoy; that is, He may distribute justice to wicked offenders. He is pleased when justice is maintained and righteousness is honored, even though He takes no personal pleasure in the application of such punishment.

A human analogy may be seen in our law courts. A judge, in the interest of justice, may sentence a criminal to prison and at the same time inwardly grieve for the guilty man. His disposition may be for the man but against the crime.

However, God is not merely a human judge, working under the constraints of the criminal justice system. God is sovereign—He can do what He pleases. If He is not pleased or willing that any should perish, why then does He not exercise His decretive will accordingly? How can there be a hiatus between God’s decretive will and His will of disposition?

All things being equal, God does desire that no one should perish. But all things are not equal. Sin is real. Sin violates God’s holiness and righteousness. God also is not willing that sin should go unpunished. He desires as well that His holiness should be vindicated. It is dangerous to [p 23] speak of a conflict of interests or of a clash of desires within God. Yet, in a certain sense, we must. He wills the obedience of His creatures. He wills the well-being of His creatures. There is a symmetry of relationship ultimately between obedience and well-being. The obedient child will never perish. Those who obey God’s preceptive will enjoy the benefits of His will of disposition. When the preceptive will is violated, things are no longer equal. Now God requires punishment while not particularly enjoying the application of it. Yet does this not beg the ultimate question? Where does the decretive will fit in? Could not God originally have decreed that no one ever would be able to sin, thus ensuring an eternal harmony among all elements of His will: decretive, preceptive, and dispositional?

Often the answer to this question is superficial. Appeals are made to the free will of man, as if by magic man’s free will could explain the dilemma. We are told that the only way God could have created a universe guaranteed to be free from sin would have been to make creatures without free will. It is then argued that these creatures would have been nothing more than puppets and would have lacked humanity, being devoid of the power or ability to sin. If that is the case, then what does it suggest about the state of our existence in heaven? We are promised that when our [p 24] redemption is complete, sin will be no more. We will still have an ability to choose, but our disposition will be so inclined toward righteousness that we will, in fact, never choose evil. If this will be possible in heaven after redemption, why could it not have been possible before the fall?

The Bible gives no clear answer to this thorny question. We are told that God created people who, for better or for worse, have the ability to sin. We also know from Scripture that there is no shadow of turning in the character of God, and that all of His works are clothed in righteousness. That He chose to create man the way He did is mysterious, but we must assume, given the knowledge we have, that God’s plan was good. Any conflict that arises between His commandments to us, His desire that we should obey Him, and our failure to comply does not destroy His sovereignty.
R. C. Sproul, Can I Know God’s Will?, vol. 4 of The Crucial Questions Series (Lake Mary, FL: Reformation Trust Publishing, 2009), 20–24.

May 14, 2023

James Ussher (1581–1656) on 1 Peter 3:18–20 and Christ’s Preaching Through Noah

But touching the words of St. Peter, is the main doubt, whether they are to be referred unto Christ’s preaching by the ministry of Noah unto the world of the ungodly, or unto his own immediate preaching to the spirits in hell after his death upon the cross. For seeing that it was the spirit of Christ which spake in the prophets, as St. Peter (1 Pet 1:11) sheweth in this same epistle, and among them was “Noe (2 Pet 2:5) a preacher of righteousness,” as he declareth in the next, even as in St. Paul, Christ is said to have “come (Eph 2:17) and preached to the Ephesians,” namely, by his spirit in the mouth of his apostles; so likewise in St. Peter may he be said to have gone and preached to the old world, by (Neh 2:30; Zech 7:12; 2 Sam 23:2) his spirit in the mouth of his prophets, and of Noah in particular, when God having said that his “Spirit (Gen 6:3) should not always strive with man, because he was flesh,” did in his long suffering wait the expiration of the time which he then did set for his amendment, even an hundred and twenty years. For which exposition the Ethiopian translation maketh something, where the Spirit, by which Christ is said to have been quickened and to have preached, is by the interpreter termed መኒፋስ ፡ ቅዱስ Manephas Kodus, that is, the Holy Spirit: the addition of which epithet we may observe also to be used by St. Paul in the mention of the resurrection, and by St. Luke in the matter of the preaching of our Saviour Christ; for of the one we read (Rom 1:4), that he was “declared to be the Son of God, with power, according to the Spirit of holiness,” or, the most holy Spirit, “by the resurrection from the dead;” and of the other (Acts 1:2), that he “gave commandments to the apostles by the holy Spirit.”
James Ussher, “Of Limbus Patrum; and Christ’s Descent into Hell,” in The Whole Works of the Most Rev. James Ussher, D.D., 17 vols., ed. Charles Richard Elrington (Dublin: Hodges, Smith and Co., 1864), 3:306–307.

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