Showing posts with label Charles Hodge. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Charles Hodge. Show all posts

July 1, 2012

Charles Hodge (1797–1878) on “God is Love”

4. Positively [that "God is love," 1 John 4:18, 14], it means that love in God, as desire, complacency and benevolence, is essential, eternal and infinite. a. It is universal, extending to all his creatures. b. It is intelligent. c. It is holy. d. It is unfathomable. e. It is sovereign and discriminating. one creature is an angel, another a man, and another a brute, another an insect. Of rational creatures, some are preserved holy, some left to sin. Of the latter some are redeemed and others are not. f. It is affluent, rejoicing in enriching and adorning his creatures. g. It is immutable in all its forms, whether of simple benevolence or of electing saving love. h. It is manifold, manifesting itself in one form towards merely sentient creatures, in another towards rational beings, in another towards the unholy, and in another towards the redeemed, his peculiar ones, his יתידים (if that word can have a plural).
Charles Hodge, Princeton Sermons (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1879), 12.

In his Systematic Theology, he also wrote this:
Love in us includes complacency and delight in its object, with the desire of possession and communion. The schoolmen, and often the philosophical theologians, tell us that there is no feeling in God. This, they say, would imply passivity, or susceptibility of impression from without, which it is assumed is incompatible with the nature of God. “We must exclude,” says Bruch [Eigenschaften, page 240], “passivity from the idea of love, as it exists in God. For God cannot be the subject of passivity in any form. Besides, if God experienced complacency in intelligent beings, He would be dependent on them; which is inconsistent with his nature as an Absolute Being.” Love, therefore, he defines as that attribute of God which secures the development of the rational universe; or, as Schleiermacher expresses it, “It is that attribute in virtue of which God communicates Himself” [Christliche Glaube, § 166; Works, Berlin, 1843, vol. iv. p. 513]. According to the philosophers, the Infinite develops itself in the finite; this fact, in theological language, is due to love. The only point of analogy between love in us and love in the Absolute and Infinite, is self-communication. Love in us leads to self-revelation and communion; in point of fact the Infinite is revealed and developed in the universe, and specially in humanity. Bruch admits that this doctrine is in real contradiction to the representations of God in the Old Testament, and in apparent contradiction to those of the New Testament. If love in God is only a name for that which accounts for the rational universe; if God is love, simply because He develops himself in thinking and conscious beings, then the word has for us no definite meaning; it reveals to us nothing concerning the real nature of God. Here again we have to choose between a mere philosophical speculation and the clear testimony of the Bible, and of our own moral and religious nature. Love of necessity involves feeling, and if there be no feeling in God, there can be no love. That He produces happiness is no proof of love. The earth does that unconsciously and without design. Men often render others happy from vanity, from fear, or from caprice. Unless the production of happiness can be referred, not only to a conscious intention, but to a purpose dictated by kind feeling, it is no proof of benevolence. And unless the children of God are the objects of his complacency and delight, they are not the objects of his love. He may be cold, insensible, indifferent, or even unconscious; He ceases to be God in the sense of the Bible, and in the sense in which we need a God, unless He can love as well as know and act. The philosophical objection against ascribing feeling to God, bears, as we have seen, with equal force against the ascription to Him of knowledge or will. If that objection be valid, He becomes to us simply an unknown cause, what men of science call force; that to which all phenomena are to be referred, but of which we know nothing. We must adhere to the truth in its Scriptural form, or we lose it altogether. We must believe that God is love in the sense in which that word comes home to every human heart. The Scriptures do not mock us when they say, “Like as a father pitieth his children, so the LORD pitieth them that fear Him.” (Ps. 103:13.) He meant what He said when He proclaimed Himself as “The LORD, the LORD God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth.” (Ex. 34:6.) “Beloved,” says the Apostle, “let us love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God; for God is love. In this was manifested the love of God toward us, because that God sent his only-begotten Son into the world, that we might live through Him. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins. Beloved, if God loved us, we ought also to love one another.” (1 John 4:7–11.) The word love has the same sense throughout this passage. God is love; and love in Him is, in all that is essential to its nature, what love is in us. Herein we do rejoice, yea, and will rejoice.
Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Eerdmans, 1993), 1:428–429.

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Charles Hodge (1797–1878) on John 3:16 and the Design of God to Render the Salvation of All Men Possible

2. It is here [in John 3:16], as well as elsewhere taught, that it was the design of God to render the salvation of all men possible, by the gift of his Son. There was nothing in the nature, or the value, or the design of his work to render it available for any one class of men only. Whosoever believeth, etc. This is not inconsistent with other representations that it entered into God's design to render the salvation of his people certain by the death of his Son.
Charles Hodge, Princeton Sermons (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1879), 17.

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Charles Hodge (1797–1878) on Our Benevolent Sovereign

Who will have all men to be saved and to come unto the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim. 2:4).

God desires the salvation of all men. This means 1st, just what is said when the Scriptures declare that God is good; that he is merciful and gracious, and ready to forgive; that he is good to all, and his tender mercies over his works. He is kind to the unthankful and to the evil. This goodness or benevolence of God is not only declared but revealed in his works, in his providence, and in the work of redemption. 2nd, It means what is said in Ezekiel 33:11, ‘As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked’, and in Ezekiel 18:23. Also Lamentations 3:33, ‘For he doth not afflict willingly nor grieve the children of men.’ It means what Christ taught in the parable of the prodigal son, and of the lost sheep and the lost piece of money; and is taught by his lament over Jerusalem.

All these passages teach that God delights in the happiness of his creatures, and that when he permits them to perish, or inflicts evil upon them, it is from some inexorable necessity; that is, because it would be unwise and wrong to do otherwise. His relation is that of a benevolent sovereign in punishing crime, or of a tender judge in passing sentence on offenders, or, what is the familiar representation of Scripture, that of a father who deals with his children with tenderness, yet with wisdom and according to the dictates of right.1
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1. From Charles Hodge, Princeton Sermons. First published by the Trust in 1958 this fine volume of annotated sermon outlines was recently reprinted for the fourth time in 2011 (clothbound, 400pp., ISBN 978 0 85151 285 3, £15.50/ $26). J. I. Packer once wrote of this great book: ‘The Princeton Sermons of Charles Hodge, one of the greatest Christian teachers of the 19th century, and are extraordinarily suggestive and satisfying. Preachers who would teach, and Christians who would learn, will enjoy this book, though it will not yield much to lazy minds.’
“Our Benevolent Sovereign,” in Banner of Truth 584 (May 2012): 1.

Also in Charles Hodge, Princeton Sermons (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1879), 18–19.

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April 21, 2008

Charles Hodge (1797–1878) on God's Will, 1 Tim. 2:4, Ezek. 33:11, Matt. 23:37, etc.

Charles Hodge says this in his Systematic Theology:
In this place it is sufficient to remark, that the Greek word θέλω, and the corresponding English verb, to will, sometimes express feeling, and sometimes a purpose. Thus in Matt. xxvii. 43, the words έί θέλει αύτόν are correctly rendered, "if he delight in him." Comp. Ps. xxii. 8. It is in this sense the word is used, when it is said that God wills all men to be saved. He cannot be said to purpose or determine upon any event which is not to come to pass. A judge may will the happiness of a man whom he sentences to death. He may will him not to suffer when he wills him to suffer. The infelicity in such forms of expression is that the word "will" is used in different senses. In one part of the sentence it means desire, and in the other purpose. It is perfectly consistent, therefore, that God, as a benevolent Being, should desire the happiness of all men, while he purposes to save only his own people.
Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 1:405.

Observe the following from the above quote:

1) Hodge distinguishes between senses of God's will (between feeling, delight, desire as over against purpose or determination).
2) He associates 1 Tim. 2:4 with the former (feeling, delight, desire, etc.).
3) He illustrates the rationality of this by a judge who can will and nill the same thing in different senses.
4) Hodge affirms that God desires the happiness of all men, and "happiness" must include ultimate "salvation" since he attributes the idea to 1 Tim. 2:4.
5) He sees the above 4 points as being compatible with God's efficacious purpose to save only his own people.

Now compare the above with what he says elsewhere:
The second interpretation is that God desires the salvation of all men. This means 1st, just what is said when the Scriptures declare that God is good; that he is merciful and gracious, and ready to forgive; that he is good to all, and his tender mercies over all his works. He is kind to the unthankful and to the evil. This goodness or benevolence of God is not only declared but revealed in his works, in his providence, and in the work of redemption. 2d. It means what is said in Ezek. xxxiii. 11. “As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked,” and in Ezek. xviii. 23, “Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die, saith the Lord God, and not that he should return from his ways and live ?” Also Lam. iii. 33, “For he doth not afflict willingly nor grieve the children of men.” It means what Christ taught in the parable of the prodigal son, and of the lost sheep and the lost piece of money; and is taught by his lament over Jerusalem.

All these passages teach that God delights in the happiness of his creatures, and that when he permits them to perish, or inflicts evil upon them, it is from some inexorable necessity; that is, because it would be unwise and wrong to do otherwise. His relation is that of a benevolent sovereign in punishing crime, or of a tender judge in passing sentence on offenders, or, what is the familiar representation of Scripture, that of a father who deals with his children with tenderness, yet with wisdom and according to the dictates of right.

This is the meaning of the passage [1 Tim. 2:4]...
Charles Hodge, "'Who will have all men to be saved and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.' 1 Tim. 2: 4,” in Conference Papers (New York, Charles, Scribner’s Sons, 1879), 18–19.

Observe the following from the above quote:

1) Hodge says that God desires the salvation of all men, and begins by associating 1 Tim. 2:4 with God's attributes of goodness, mercy and grace.
2) He further associates this passage [1 Tim. 2:4] and those ideas [saving desire, goodness, mercy and grace] with Psalm 145:9.
3) He then associates God's universal kindness in providence to the unthankful and evil with God's saving desire.
4) Further, he cites Ezek. 33:11, Lam. 3:33 and Matt. 23:37 to illustrate his point about God's revealed nature.
5) Notice his use of "happiness" in this citation, which goes back to my fourth observation from the previous quotation.
6) He likens God to a tender judge, which was also used in the previous quotation to illustrate his point.
7) Again, he makes it quite plain that he's interpreting 1 Tim. 2:4 in a general sense.

Since it is a well-known fact that Charles Hodge impacted James Boyce, go back and read what Boyce said about 1 Tim. 2:4 and the sincerity of the external gospel call.

See also A. A. Hodge on these passages.

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September 25, 2006

Charles Hodge (1797–1878) on 1 John 2:2

What Paul teaches so abundantly of the sacrificial death of Christ is taught by the Apostle John (First Epistle, ii. 2). Jesus Christ "is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." The word here used is hilasmos, propitiation, expiation; from hilaskomai, to reconcile one's self to any one by expiation, to appease, to propitiate." And in chapter iv. 10, it is said, "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins." The inconsistency between love, and expiation or satisfaction for sin, which modern writers so much insist upon, was not perceived by men who spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. In chapter i. 7, this same Apostle says, "The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin." To cleanse, katharizein, kathairein, katharismon poiein, agiazein, louein (Revelation i. 5) are established sacrificial terms to express the removal of the guilt of sin by expiation.
Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 2:511.
This is what is meant when it is said, or implied in Scripture, that Christ gave Himself as a propitiation, not for our sins only, but for the sins of the whole world. He was a propitiation effectually for the sins of his people, and sufficiently for the sins of the whole world. Augustinians have no need to wrest the Scriptures. They are under no necessity of departing from their fundamental principle that it is the duty of the theologian to subordinate his theories to the Bible, and teach not what seems to him to be true or reasonable, but simply what the Bible teaches.
Ibid., 2:558–559.

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September 22, 2005

Scripture Over System

…it is the duty of the theologian to subordinate his theories to the Bible, and teach not what seems to him to be true or reasonable, but simply what the Bible teaches.
Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 2:559.

August 11, 2005

Norman F. Douty (1899–1993) Describes a Dualistic View of the Atonement

Douty wrote:
Inasmuch as Christ is an infinite Person, the value of His performance was infinite, and, therefore, superabundantly sufficient to provide for the sinning inhabitants of any number of worlds. Accordingly, the value of His redemptive work is far more than enough to take care of the need of the non-elect as well as those of the elect. It is evident, however, that if there had been no elect persons to be saved, the Son of God would not have come, and so there would have been no overplus existent for the non-elect. The provision for the latter class was contingent on the provision for the former one.

We observe, therefore, that Christ’s redemptive work was primarily for the elect, and only secondarily for the rest of men. It was mainly for those chosen unto salvation, and only subordinately for the non-elect. It was designed to make salvation sure to the former class, but only possible to the latter. In both cases, repentance and faith are required, but only in the first are they divinely induced. Whosoever will may come, but only the elect will do so. Thus God’s intention in the death of Christ was not the same with reference to the two groups.

But though God’s design in Christ’s death was dual, we must not think that the death itself was; for Christ did not die in one sense for the elect, and in another for the non-elect. He died in precisely the same sense for both companies – bearing the judgment of God against human sin – yet the value of that fact is appropriated by the elect, but not by the rest of sinners.

So the sense in which Christ died for the elect and non-elect was single, but His object in doing so was double. He aimed by His death to bring the elect infallibly to glory, but He never aimed by it to bring the non-elect there. All He purposed to do for them was to make it possible for them to get there, provided they repent and believe.

Consequently, we have no quarrel with those who insist that the atonement "had special reference to the elect," as [Charles] Hodge says. He asks:
Had the death of Christ a reference to the elect which it had not to other men? Did He come into the world to secure the salvation of those given Him by the Father, so that the other effects of His work are merely incidental to what was done for the attainment of that object?
If by "incidental" he means "subordinate," we reply to both questions in the affirmative.

What we deny is that God sovereignly decreed that His vast redemptive provision should be inapplicable to the non-elect, because He knew that they would not avail themselves of its saving worth. Instead, He authorized His servants to offer salvation to all men. Their sad state is their own fault, not His. He proffers them eternal life, but they stubbornly refuse to come unto Christ for it (John 5:40). This is quite different from saying that Christ died only for the elect. We grant, yes, we contend, that His death had a special reference to the elect, but we strongly deny that it had an exclusive reference to them.

We concur with Hodge when he says that Christ "did all that was necessary so far as a satisfaction to justice is concerned, all that is required, for the salvation of all men," and adds that "all Augustinians can join with the Synod of Dort in saying, No man perishes for want of an atonement." This is conceding the crucial point.
Norman F. Douty, Did Christ Die Only for the Elect? (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1998), 61–62. I reviewed the book on Amazon.

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July 26, 2005

R. L. Dabney (1820–1898) and Other Theologians on Volitional Complexity in God

R. L. Dabney was a brilliant theologian. He is particularly outstanding when it comes to grasping a sense of complexity in God's motives. He brings a sense of coherence to biblical passages that speak of God's will in different senses. Some Reformed and Calvinistic theologians tend to downplay God's preceptive will as if it is not an "active principle." It's as if it is not really expressing a desire or will in God. It's absolutely vital that we understand and adhere to the biblical teaching on this matter. It will also help us to begin to understand the problem of evil and suffering in the world. As Paul Helm said in the book The Providence of God:
The need to distinguish two (or more) wills in God is not simply a consequence of the idea that all events are directly under the providential guidance of God. Rather, any understanding of the relationship between divine activity and human activity which allows that God either wills or permits every action, which recognizes that there are in fact morally evil actions, and which defines some at least of such actions in terms of a breach of a divine command, must employ a distinction between the will of God as command, and the will of God in some other sense.

It is just because it is possible to conceive of two ‘wills’ in God that the problem of evil arises; the contrast is the familiar one between the omnipotence and the all-goodness of God.
Paul Helm, The Providence of God. Contours of Christian Theology, ed. G. Bray (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1994), 132–33.

Open Theism makes the same mistakes that Hyper-Calvinists make (they are polar opposites but similar in rationalism). They fail to properly understand complex motives in God because it does not "make sense" to them. Their systems won't allow it, therefore it can't be true. It is as J. C. Ryle said, "I have long come to the conclusion that men may be more systematic in their statements than the Bible, and may be led into grave error by idolatrous veneration of a system." One of those grave errors is misunderstanding God's will as expressed in scripture. The following are quotes that I have found to be helpful.

Here is R. L. Dabney on God's will:
4. God’s Volitions Arise out of a Complex of Motive.

The manner in which a volition which dates from eternity, subsists in the Infinite mind, is doubtless, in many respects, inscrutable to us. But since God has told us that we are made in His image, we may safely follow the Scriptural representations, which describe God’s volitions as having their rational relation to subjective motive; somewhat as in man, when he wills aright. For, a motiveless volition cannot but appear to us as devoid both of character and of wisdom. We add, that while God "has no parts nor passions," He has told us that He has active principles, which, while free from all agitation, ebb and flow, and mutation, are related in their superior measure to man’s rational affections. These active principles in God, or passionless affections, are all absolutely holy and good. Last: God’s will is also regulated by infinite wisdom. Now, in man, every rational volition is prompted by a motive, which is in every case, complex to this degree, at least that it involves some active appetency of the will and some prevalent judgement of the intelligence. And every wise volition is the result of virtual or formal deliberation, in which one element of motive is weighed in relation to another, and the elements which appear superior in the judgement of the intelligence, preponderate and regulate the volition. Hence, the wise man’s volition is often far from being the expression of every conception and affection present in his consciousness at the time; but it is often reached by holding one of these elements of possible motive in check, at the dictate of a more controlling one.

For instance a philanthropic man meets a distressed and destitute person. The good man is distinctly conscious in himself of a movement of sympathy tending towards a volition to give the sufferer money. But he remembers that he has expressly promised all the money now in his possession, to be paid this very day to a just creditor. The good man bethinks himself, that he "ought to be just before he is generous," and conscience and wisdom counterpoise the impulse of sympathy; so that it does not form the deliberate volition to give alms. But the sympathy exists, and it is not inconsistent to give other expression to it.

We must not ascribe to that God whose omniscience is, from eternity, one infinite, all-embracing intuition, and whose volition is as eternal as His being, any expenditure of time in any process of deliberation, nor any temporary hesitancy or uncertainty, nor any agitating struggle of feeling against feeling. But there must be a residuum of meaning in the Scripture representations of His affections, after we have guarded ourselves duly against the anthropopathic forms of their expression. Hence, we ought to believe, that in some ineffable way, God’s volitions, seeing they are supremely wise, and profound, and right, do have that relation to all His subjective motives, digested by wisdom and holiness into the consistent combination, the finite counterpart of which constitutes the rightness and wisdom of human volitions. I claim, while excersing the diffidence proper to so sacred a matter, that this conclusion bears us out at least so far: That, as in a wise man, so much more in a wise God, His volition or express purpose is the result of a digest, not of one, but of all the principles and considerations bearing on the case. Hence it follows, that there may be in God an active principle felt by him, and yet not expressed in His executive volition in a given case, because counterpoised by other elements of motive, which His holy omniscience judges ought to be prevalent.

Now, I urge the practical question: Why may not God consistently give some other expression to this active principle, really and sincerely felt towards the object, though his sovereign wisdom judges it not proper to express it in volition? To return to the instance from which we set out: I assert that it is entirely natural and reasonable for the benevolent man to say to the destitute person: "I am sorry for you, though I give you no alms." The ready objection will be: "that my parallel does not hold, because the kind man is not omnipotent, while God is. God could not consistently speak thus, while withholding alms, because he could create the additional money at will." This is more ready than solid. It assumes that God's omniscience cannot see any ground, save the lack of physical ability or power, why it may not be best to refrain from creating additional money. Let the student search and see; he will find that this preposterous and presumptuous assumption is the implied premise of the objection. In fact, my parallel is a fair one in the main point. This benevolent man is not prevented from giving the alms, by any physical compulsion. If he diverts a part of the money in hand from the creditor, to the destitute man, the creditor will visit no penalty on him. He simply feels bound by his conscience. That is, the superior principles of reason and morality are regulative of his action, counterpoising the amiable but less imperative principle of sympathy, in the case. Yet the verbal expression of sympathy in this case may be natural, sincere, and proper. God is not restrained by lack of physical omnipotence from creating on the spot the additional money for the alms; but He may be actually restrained by some consideration known to His omniscience, which shows that it is not on the whole best to resort to the expedient of creating the money for the alms, and that rational consideration may be just as decisive in an all-wise mind, and properly as decisive, as a conscious impotency to create money in a man’s.
R. L. Dabney, Systematic Theology (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 2002), 529–531.

God is not at odds with himself anymore than a judge who shows volitional complexity. As the Reformed theologian Charles Hodge said:
A judge may will the happiness of a man whom he sentences to death. He may will him not to suffer when he wills him to suffer. The infelicity in such forms of expression is that the word "will" is used in different senses. In one part of the sentence it means desire, and in the other purpose. It is perfectly consistent, therefore, that God, as a benevolent Being, should desire the happiness of all men, while he purposes to save only his own people.
Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 1:405.

Dabney, in God's Indiscriminate Proposals of Mercy, explains further in his illustration concerning George Washington:
A human ruler may have full power and authority over the punishment of a culprit, may declare consistently his sincere compassion for him, and may yet freely elect to destroy him. A concrete case will make the point more distinct. Chief-Justice Marshall, in his Life of Washington (Vol. 4., Chap. 6.), says with reference to the death-warrant of the rash and unfortunate Major André "Perhaps on no occasion of his life did the commander-in-chief (Washington) obey with more reluctance the stern mandates of duty and of policy." In this historical instance we have these facts: Washington had plenary power to kill or to save alive. His compassion for the criminal was real and profound. Yet he signed his death-warrant with spontaneous decision....Let us suppose that one of André's intercessors (and he had them, even among the Americans) standing by, and hearing the commanding general say, as he took up the pen to sign the fatal paper, "I do this with the deepest reluctance and pity," should have retorted, "Since you are supreme in this matter, and have full bodily ability to throw down that pen, we shall know by your signing this warrant that your pity is hypocritical." The petulance of this charge would have been equal to its folly. The pity was real; but was restrained by superior elements of motive. Washington had official and bodily power to discharge the criminal; but he had not the sanction of his own wisdom and justice. Thus his pity was genuine, and yet his volition not to indulge it free and sovereign.
R. L. Dabney, “God’s Indiscriminate Proposals of Mercy,” in Discussions: Theological and Evangelical, ed. C. R. Vaughn (Richmond, VA: Presbyterian Committee of Publication, 1890), 1:284–286.

God is not at odds with himself anymore than one who postpones his desire for an ice cream cone because of some greater motive. As John Frame said:
Someone might desire an ice-cream cone and have easy access to one, but voluntarily postpone fulfilling that desire until finishing a piece of work. He might value finishing the job more than eating the ice-cream cone, or perhaps not. Maybe he actually values the ice cream more, but believes he will get more enjoyment from it after the job is done. So, our decision-making process is often complicated. The relationships between our many desires, and between the various means of achieving them, are complex.

June 28, 2005

Some Wisdom from Charles Hodge (1797–1878) on the Double-Payment Argument

§ 2. Proof of the Augustinian Doctrine.
If the Atonement be limited in Design, it must be restricted in the Offer.

There is still another ground on which it is urged that Augustinians cannot consistently preach the gospel to every creature. Augustinians teach, it is urged, that the work of Christ is a satisfaction to divine justice. From this it follows that justice cannot condemn those for whose sins it has been satisfied. It cannot demand that satisfaction twice, first from the substitute and then from the sinner himself. This would be manifestly unjust, far worse than demanding no punishment at all. From this it is inferred that the satisfaction or righteousness of Christ, if the ground on which a sinner may be forgiven, is the ground on which he must be forgiven. It is not the ground on which he may be forgiven, unless it is the ground on which he must be forgiven. If the atonement be limited in design it must be limited in its nature, and if limited in its nature it must be limited in its offer. This objection again arises from confounding a pecuniary and a judicial satisfaction between which Augustinians are so careful to discriminate. This distinction has already been presented on a previous page (470). There is no grace in accepting a pecuniary satisfaction. It cannot be refused. It ipso facto liberates. The moment the debt is paid the debtor is free; and that without any condition. Nothing of this is true in the case of judicial satisfaction. If a substitute be provided and accepted it is a matter of grace. His satisfaction does not ipso facto liberate. It may accrue to the benefit of those for whom it is made at once or at a remote period; completely or gradually; on conditions or unconditionally; or it may never benefit them at all unless the condition on which its application is suspended be performed. These facts are universally admitted by those who hold that the work of Christ was a true and perfect satisfaction to divine justice. The application of its benefits is determined by the covenant between the Father and the Son. Those for whom it was specially rendered are not justified from eternity; they are not born in a justified state; they are by nature, or birth, the children of wrath even as others. To be the children of wrath is to be justly exposed to divine wrath. They remain in this state of exposure until they believe, and should they die (unless in infancy) before they believe they would inevitably perish notwithstanding the satisfaction made for their sins. It is the stipulations of the covenant which forbid such a result. Such being the nature of the judicial satisfaction rendered by Christ to the law, under which all men are placed, it may be sincerely offered to all men with the assurance that if they believe it shall accrue to their salvation. His work being specially designed for the salvation of his own people, renders, through the conditions of the covenant, that event certain; but this is perfectly consistent with its being made the ground of the general offer of the gospel. Lutherans and Reformed agree entirely, as before stated, in their views of the nature of the satisfaction of Christ, and consequently, so far as that point is concerned, there is the same foundation for the general offer of the gospel according to either scheme. What the Reformed or Augustinians hold about election does not affect the nature of the atonement. That remains the same whether designed for the elect or for all mankind. It does not derive its nature from the secret purpose of God as to its application.
Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 2:557–58.