Petrus van Mastricht (1630–1706) on Universal and Common Grace

What is universal grace and what sort is it?

XV. Now we would not repeat concerning grace what we just above taught concerning love, if a manifold controversy, one that has been in every age most vexing, did not urge us to do so. There is, then, first, universal grace, by which God dispenses natural things to each and every creature and is thus named the Savior of all (1 Tim. 4:10), the one who saves beasts and men (Ps. 36:6) and takes cares that his sun rises over the field of the just and the unjust (Matt. 5:45), concerning which see above [§IX]. This grace particularly confers to man his free choice and whatever sort of strength he has for natural good, and also stirs up and encourages that strength by its influence. And all these things, although they come forth from the gratuitous love of God, and thus from grace, yet in the use of Scripture, and also of all ancient orthodoxy, rarely and less properly are they called grace. For the latter tradition cautiously distinguished nature from grace against the Pelagians.

What is common grace and what sort is it?

XVI. There is, second, common grace, by which he dispenses moral goods, particularly to men, but indiscriminately, to the elect and the reprobate. To this kind of grace belong the virtues of the intellect, such as ingenuity, wisdom, and prudence (Ex. 31:3), as well as the virtues of the will, the ethical virtues (Luke 18:11), of which kind are all the virtues of pagans and unbelievers. In this number should be reckoned those things that appear more closely to approach saving things, such as are mentioned in Hebrews 6:4–5; Isaiah 58:2, and 1 Corinthians 13:1. To this pertains external calling to participation in Christ through the proclamation of the Word (Ps. 147:19–20; Matt. 20:16), and also internal calling through some sort of illumination, and all those good things which are conspicuous in temporary believers (Matt. 13:20–21).

Petrus van Mastricht, Faith in the Triune God, ed. Joel R. Beeke, trans. Todd M. Rester and Michael T. Spangler, vol. 2 of Theoretical-Practical Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2019), 353–354.

The Reformed commonly acknowledge a universal grace concerning natural things and a common grace concerning moral things, but saving grace concerning things that accompany salvation they do not allow, except as a grace proper to the elect: they acknowledge no saving grace that extends equally to each individual, not even that grace that they call objective.

Petrus van Mastricht, Faith in the Triune God, ed. Joel R. Beeke, trans. Todd M. Rester and Michael T. Spangler, vol. 2 of Theoretical-Practical Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2019), 367.

Note: Observe that van Mastricht said he believed in a sense of “universal grace,” and associated it with the “natural things” God dispenses to each and every creature. He also associated it with “the gratuitous love of God.” However, he insightfully also observed that “ancient orthodoxy,” meaning from the days of Augustine, “rarely and less properly” called such things “grace.” As he noted, “the latter [orthodox] tradition cautiously distinguished nature from grace against the Pelagians.” “Universal grace,” therefore, should not be dismissed outright, but simply and carefully distinguished (as van Mastricht did) from the aberrant meaning of the Pelagians. See Richard A. Muller, s.v. “gratia communis; gratia particularis sive specialis; and gratia universalis,” in Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic: A Division of Baker Publishing Group, 2017), 142, 143–44, 145. Some recent Reformed theologians (e.g., Jan van Genderen and Willem Hendrik Velema (Concise Reformed Dogmatics) and Robert Letham (Systematic Theology) have had no problem teaching a kind of “universal grace.” Hypothetical Universalists taught what was called a “universal objective grace,” which was deemed within the boundaries of Reformed orthodoxy.

The objection of the Lutherans

I do not see what they could show in favor of this their Helen—set on fire as she was by their own Luther, and also thoroughly condemned by his hypotheses in his Bondage of the Will,⁴⁰ though the modern Lutherans, every time we have to contend with them on this issue, are desperately in love with her and kiss her passionately—except that experience itself shouts that those who are still unregenerate, equipped with nothing but their free choice, can attend to holy things, pour out prayers, and use the sacraments and other external things. But (1) we do not deny that such things can be performed by the unregenerate; rather, we deny only that this can happen by the strength of their choice, since such things are done by the aid of common grace. Next (2) we deny that this can be done by the unregenerate with the result that they do not resist the Holy Spirit. For this is nothing other than to show oneself compliant to the Holy Spirit, to desire or to embrace the grace of regeneration, which cannot come from one who is dead in sin.
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40 On the allusion to Helen, note that not only was Helen alluringly attractive, but the result of an improper love for her was preventable war. In part 1, section 12 and part 2, section 1 of De servo arbitrio (lit. “On the enslaved choice”), Martin Luther mentions the destruction of Troy in connection with commitment to free choice.

Petrus van Mastricht, Faith in the Triune God, ed. Joel R. Beeke, trans. Todd M. Rester and Michael T. Spangler, vol. 2 of Theoretical-Practical Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2019), 372–373.

Neele added the following interesting historical note. During the CRC dispute with Hoeksema, et al, both parties apparently appealed to van Mastricht (and Calvin a well). From the above information, it seems the CRC was correct to do so, as van Mastricht did in fact teach common grace, and connected it with God’s love, his providential bounties, and restraining operations. As usual, the PRC historiography is seriously flawed.

The twentieth century, furthermore, witnessed appeals to Mastricht’s theology in controversy, as well as continuing interest by systematic theologians. In matters of theological controversy, Mastricht’s authority is sometimes noted, as it was in eighteenth-century New England; in addition, at the Synod of 1924, the Christian Reformed Church in North America referenced Mastricht concerning the doctrine of common grace. The Synod differed with the Revs. Hoeksema and Danhof, who appealed to Mastricht more than to Calvin, to assert the Reformed understanding of the doctrine.¹⁹³ In the works of systematic theology from Dutch theologians such as Herman Bavinck, Louis Berkhof, E. C. Gravemeijer, Herman Hoeksema, and G. H. Kersten, but also from the Swiss Karl Barth, the TPT [Theoretico-Practica Theologia] is cited favorably, but usually only in the footnotes.¹⁹⁴
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193 Acta der Synode 1924 van de Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk. Gehouden van 18 Juni tot 8 Juli, 1924 te Kalamazoo, Mich., U.S.A, 127–29 (Calvin), 128, 130, 133–34 (Mastricht).
194 Karl Barth, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik (Zürich: EVZ-Verlag, 1970), I/1:5, 199; I/2:310; II/1: 369f., 373, 404, 508, 516, 592, 601, 646, 731f.; II/2:83, 122, 142, 150, 371; III/2:456; III/3:72, 75, 107, 118, 178, 186, 333; IV/2:115; IV/3:17. Works with no reference index will be cited with page number; Herman Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: Kok, 1921); Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, with a new preface by Richard A. Muller (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996); E. C. Gravenmeijer, Leesboek over de Gereformeerde Geloofsleer (Utrecht: H. Ten Hove, 1896), 1:118, 194, 254, 256, 263, 283, 293, 319, 334, 338, 342, 344, 349, 351, 362, 368, 370, 374, 376, 379, 393, 402, 408, 410, 414, 421, 422, 455; Herman Hoeksema, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids: Reformed Free Publishing Association, 1966), 61, 287, 447; G. H. Kersten, De Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Utrecht: De Banier, 1988, zesde druk), I:15, 25, 43, 94, 96, 97, 100, 110, 148, 150, 164, 179, 197, 207, 216, 228, 230, 244, 251, 326, 394, 412, 415; II:5, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 25, 26, 28, 29, 34, 39, 42, 45, 56, 237, 255, 301, 346.

Adriaan C. Neele, “Petrus van Mastricht (1630–1706): Life and Work,” in Prolegomena, ed. Joel R. Beeke, trans. Todd M. Rester, vol. 1 of Theoretical-Practical Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2018), lxi.

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R. C. Sproul (1939–2017) on God’s Will of Disposition

God’s Will of Disposition

While we understand that the decretive will and the preceptive will of God are part of His overall will, other aspects of the mystery of His sovereignty remain. One such aspect is [p 21] “the will of disposition.” It is tied up with the ability of man to disobey God’s preceptive will.

This aspect of the will of God refers to what is pleasing and agreeable to God. It expresses something of the attitude of God to His creatures. Some things are “well pleasing in his sight,” while other things are said to grieve Him. He may allow (but not via moral permission) wicked things to transpire, but He is by no means pleased by them.

To illustrate how these differing aspects of the will of God come into play in biblical interpretation, let us examine the verse that says the Lord is “not willing that any should perish” (2 Peter 3:9, KJV). Which of the above-mentioned meanings of will fits this text? How is the meaning of the text changed by the application of the nuances?

Try first the decretive will. The verse would then mean, “God is not willing in a sovereign decretive sense that any should perish.” The implication would then be that nobody perishes. This verse would be a proof text for universalism, with its view that hell is utterly vacant of people.

The second option is that God is not willing in a preceptive way that any should perish. This would mean that God does not allow people to perish in the sense that He grants His moral permission. This obviously does not fit the context of the passage.

[p 22] The third option makes sense. God is not willing in the sense that He is not inwardly disposed to, or delighted by, people’s perishing. Elsewhere, Scripture teaches that God takes no delight in the death of the wicked. He may decree what He does not enjoy; that is, He may distribute justice to wicked offenders. He is pleased when justice is maintained and righteousness is honored, even though He takes no personal pleasure in the application of such punishment.

A human analogy may be seen in our law courts. A judge, in the interest of justice, may sentence a criminal to prison and at the same time inwardly grieve for the guilty man. His disposition may be for the man but against the crime.

However, God is not merely a human judge, working under the constraints of the criminal justice system. God is sovereign—He can do what He pleases. If He is not pleased or willing that any should perish, why then does He not exercise His decretive will accordingly? How can there be a hiatus between God’s decretive will and His will of disposition?

All things being equal, God does desire that no one should perish. But all things are not equal. Sin is real. Sin violates God’s holiness and righteousness. God also is not willing that sin should go unpunished. He desires as well that His holiness should be vindicated. It is dangerous to [p 23] speak of a conflict of interests or of a clash of desires within God. Yet, in a certain sense, we must. He wills the obedience of His creatures. He wills the well-being of His creatures. There is a symmetry of relationship ultimately between obedience and well-being. The obedient child will never perish. Those who obey God’s preceptive will enjoy the benefits of His will of disposition. When the preceptive will is violated, things are no longer equal. Now God requires punishment while not particularly enjoying the application of it. Yet does this not beg the ultimate question? Where does the decretive will fit in? Could not God originally have decreed that no one ever would be able to sin, thus ensuring an eternal harmony among all elements of His will: decretive, preceptive, and dispositional?

Often the answer to this question is superficial. Appeals are made to the free will of man, as if by magic man’s free will could explain the dilemma. We are told that the only way God could have created a universe guaranteed to be free from sin would have been to make creatures without free will. It is then argued that these creatures would have been nothing more than puppets and would have lacked humanity, being devoid of the power or ability to sin. If that is the case, then what does it suggest about the state of our existence in heaven? We are promised that when our [p 24] redemption is complete, sin will be no more. We will still have an ability to choose, but our disposition will be so inclined toward righteousness that we will, in fact, never choose evil. If this will be possible in heaven after redemption, why could it not have been possible before the fall?

The Bible gives no clear answer to this thorny question. We are told that God created people who, for better or for worse, have the ability to sin. We also know from Scripture that there is no shadow of turning in the character of God, and that all of His works are clothed in righteousness. That He chose to create man the way He did is mysterious, but we must assume, given the knowledge we have, that God’s plan was good. Any conflict that arises between His commandments to us, His desire that we should obey Him, and our failure to comply does not destroy His sovereignty.

R. C. Sproul, Can I Know God’s Will?, vol. 4 of The Crucial Questions Series (Lake Mary, FL: Reformation Trust Publishing, 2009), 20–24.

James Ussher (1581–1656) on 1 Peter 3:18–20 and Christ’s Preaching Through Noah

But touching the words of St. Peter, is the main doubt, whether they are to be referred unto Christ’s preaching by the ministry of Noah unto the world of the ungodly, or unto his own immediate preaching to the spirits in hell after his death upon the cross. For seeing that it was the spirit of Christ which spake in the prophets, as St. Peter (1 Pet 1:11) sheweth in this same epistle, and among them was “Noe (2 Pet 2:5) a preacher of righteousness,” as he declareth in the next, even as in St. Paul, Christ is said to have “come (Eph 2:17) and preached to the Ephesians,” namely, by his spirit in the mouth of his apostles; so likewise in St. Peter may he be said to have gone and preached to the old world, by (Neh 2:30; Zech 7:12; 2 Sam 23:2) his spirit in the mouth of his prophets, and of Noah in particular, when God having said that his “Spirit (Gen 6:3) should not always strive with man, because he was flesh,” did in his long suffering wait the expiration of the time which he then did set for his amendment, even an hundred and twenty years. For which exposition the Ethiopian translation maketh something, where the Spirit, by which Christ is said to have been quickened and to have preached, is by the interpreter termed መኒፋስ ፡ ቅዱስ Manephas Kodus, that is, the Holy Spirit: the addition of which epithet we may observe also to be used by St. Paul in the mention of the resurrection, and by St. Luke in the matter of the preaching of our Saviour Christ; for of the one we read (Rom 1:4), that he was “declared to be the Son of God, with power, according to the Spirit of holiness,” or, the most holy Spirit, “by the resurrection from the dead;” and of the other (Acts 1:2), that he “gave commandments to the apostles by the holy Spirit.”

James Ussher, “Of Limbus Patrum; and Christ’s Descent into Hell,” in The Whole Works of the Most Rev. James Ussher, D.D., 17 vols., ed. Charles Richard Elrington (Dublin: Hodges, Smith and Co., 1864), 3:306–307.

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William Ames (1576–1633) on Christ’s Love for the Human Race

For in this respect, Christ was a scandal to the Jews and folly to the Greeks [1 Cor. 1:23], but if we carefully and rightly weigh within ourselves that Christ suffered everything He suffered, not out of constraint or any other necessity or external force, but out of the obedience of love towards the human race so that He might exhibit to us the most perfect model of obedience in His own person, then whatever scandal or folly may be found in those sufferings is so far removed that nothing can be devised that may be more worthy of the Savior of the world.

William Ames, A Sketch of the Christian’s Catechism, ed. R. Scott Clark, trans. Todd M. Rester, vol. 1 of Classic Reformed Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2008), 82; Lord’s Day 15, Lesson 3.

Note: See also Lord’s Day 10, Lesson 1, Reason 2, as well as Lesson 3, Reasons 1, 2, and 5, where Ames said God has a “care for” all things he has made, and, insofar as his providence extends to all things, “God is in some sense also called the Father of all He has made.” Ames, A Sketch, 56, 58. For Ames’s affirmation of God’s beneficence [or merciful clemency, sparing patience, long-suffering, and kindness] toward all mankind, even on sinners, see William Ames, The Marrow of Theology, trans. John Dykstra Eusden (United Church Press, 1968; repr., Durham, NC: The Labyrinth Press, 1983), 118; Medulla theologica, 1.12.21–27: “27. Beneficence lies in his being so rich in goodness that he pours forth many good things even on sinners, Matt. 5:45.” Observe his proof-text, which is a text describing God’s love. Beneficence is good-giving love.

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Geerhardus Vos (1862–1949) on Common Grace

12. What is the relationship between the operations of common grace and the special grace of the Holy Spirit?

To understand correctly the difference between these two in connection with the preceding distinction, we must move out of the sphere of nature into the sphere of revelation. This revelation is itself the product of a wholly supernatural act of grace. The announcement of the truth of God and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit lie both beyond and above nature. At the same time, however, that truth is given in natural forms. It is expressed in words written with letters, words that can be heard by the natural ear and read by the natural eye. As we hope to see, it is not the most proper and highest end of the truth to accomplish its work outwardly in this way; rather, it reaches its proper goal only when an entirely supernatural work of the Holy Spirit accompanies it. That it works in this way as well, however, no one can doubt. The only question, though, is how? If it were simply directed to man and nothing more, this encounter would only result in opposition and reaction from a soul that is sinful and hostile to God. That this nevertheless does not occur, but that even in those who are not regenerate the moral power of the truth is manifested, shows that there is an accompanying working of God’s Spirit. That working of the Spirit is given to all in greater or lesser degree. It comes down, then, to separating it sharply from special grace, in which only the elect share. So that the distinction would already appear in the term, it has been called common grace, and what contrasts with it, special or particular grace. One further needs to give attention to making distinctions on the following points:

a) Common grace brings about no change in the nature of man as special grace does. Whatever may also be its external manifestations, it does not regenerate man.
b) A second distinction is connected with this. Common grace is also limited to making man receptive to the influence of the truth that works on him from his consciousness. It works persuasively, by offering motives to the will and by making use of inclinations that are already present, not by creating new habits in man. It can certainly bring the external good still present in man to development, but it cannot produce what is spiritually good from that. It can cause a seed of external righteousness to germinate, but it is not capable of implanting the seed of regeneration.
c) All that works in this manner can also be resisted. Since it is directed toward individual motives from outside, the possibility always exists that the unrenewed nature will overrule all these motives and render common grace powerless. It is otherwise with efficacious grace. It does not offer motives for doing good to a will that in its nature is evil, but transforms the will itself from the innermost recesses of its nature, not by countering it but by re-creating it. Hence, common grace is termed resistible; efficacious grace, with a somewhat oblique label, irresistible.

13. Does one sometimes also speak of “common grace” in a still broader sense?

Yes, one sometimes also applies the word to the restraining action of the Holy Spirit that, where revelation is not known, is joined with the natural knowledge of God and hinders the breaking out of sin in its most dreadful extremes.

14. From what may we discern in some measure what should be ascribed to the operation of this common grace?

We have seen in the doctrine of election that God’s Word rightly ascribes the hardening of sinners to the withdrawal of common grace. It calls this being given over to a perverse mind and shows from experience what dreadful dimensions sin assumes where this hardening sets in. On the other hand, it also describes for us the fate of the lost who are devoid of common grace. Consequently, everything that hinders the process of death that sin brings in producing the complete dissolution of moral and social life for the individual and for society is to be ascribed to gratia communis in the broadest sense of the word.

15. Can you show that Scripture teaches such an operation of the Holy Spirit?

Yes, it is said of the generation that lived before the flood that God’s Spirit contended with them and contended in vain, that the patience of God at the time of this contending held back His punishment, but that finally this operation of grace ceased since it was resisted and scorned (Gen 6:3; cf. 1 Pet 3:19–20; 4:6). Stephen cried out to the Jews, “You always resist the Holy Spirit; as your fathers did, so do you” (Acts 7:51). Also, Isaiah 63:10 mentions a grieving of the Holy Spirit.

16. How far can this common operation of the Holy Spirit go?

We must assume that it always remains distinguished specifically from regenerating grace. So, concerning the operation itself, one really cannot speak of it approaching the grace of regeneration. What lies between these two is not a gradual but a principial difference. Whatever else one may do to a dead person, one cannot say that actions are performed on him that bring him close to life. Since, however, the infusion of life eludes our sight and we can judge it only by its outward manifestation, so the possibility always continues to exist that common grace reveals itself in forms that are hardly to be distinguished from the actions of the regenerate. Temporary faith, of which Scripture speaks in very strong terms, must be counted among these cases. And often the sole criterion for recognition lies in the passing of time itself.

17. Are the effects of common grace divorced from any connection with regenerating grace, which works only in the elect?

No; if by common grace someone has received a certain measure of insight into the truth prior to his regeneration, be it then also in a nonsaving way, its fruits are not lost. When saving grace comes upon us, it imparts new worth to all the old that was already present with us earlier. It only must be maintained that it never is the old as such that continues to work after regeneration, but the old is placed in a new light and with completely new qualities. The knowledge of saving faith is very much connected with historical knowledge that someone gained prior to his regeneration, but it would still certainly be wrong to maintain that a regenerate person does not know, in his faith, in an essentially different way than the unregenerate person.

18. Has the doctrine of common grace also been misused?

Yes, some have wished to find in it a solution to the question why saving grace befalls only some and not all—in other words, an explanation of God’s sovereign election. Shedd says the following: “The nonelect receives common grace, and common grace would incline human will if it were not defeated by the human will. If the sinner should make no hostile opposition, common grace would be equivalent to saving grace. To say that common grace if not resisted by the sinner would be equivalent to regenerating grace is not the same as to say that common grace if assisted by the sinner would be equivalent to regenerating grace. In the first instance, God would be the sole author of regeneration; in the second He would not be.” Yet in another place he maintains, “Regeneration rests upon God’s election … upon special grace and not upon common grace.” Thus it is not very clear what he intends. If, of themselves, all sinners already resist common grace, then it makes no sense to say that it would regenerate them if they did not resist it, for nonresisting means the same as being no longer sinful. If, on the other hand, a sinner is able to resist and not resist common grace, and some are really in the latter category, then for them, according to this conception, regenerating grace becomes completely superfluous. Common grace should work on them and regenerate them. This idea is completely false. God’s election lies above every consideration of the use of common grace. One can only go this far: Those who resist common grace such that God withdraws it do not belong to the elect. They are then abandoned to the hardening from which salvation is no longer possible. On the other hand, it cannot be maintained that a good use of common grace always leads to receiving saving grace or is even a characteristic of election. Certainly in a negative sense, if someone resists common grace, then this is a bad sign. But we may not go further.

Geerhardus Vos, Reformed Dogmatics, 5 vols., ed. and trans. Richard B. Gaffin Jr. (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2012–2016), 4:12–15.

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Wilhelmus à Brakel (1635–1711) on the Love of God

The Love of God

Love is an essential attribute of God by which the Lord delights Himself in that which is good, it being well-pleasing to Him, and uniting Himself to it consistent with the nature of the object of His love. The love of God by definition is the loving God Himself, for which reason John states that “God is love” (1 John 4:8). When we view the love of God relative to its objects, however, several distinctions need to be made. We call this love natural when it refers to the manner in which God delights in Himself as the supreme manifestation of goodness. “For the Father loveth the Son” (John 5:20). We call this love volitional when it refers to the manner in which God delights in His creatures. And thus this love is either the love of benevolence or the love of His delight.

The love of His benevolence is either general as it relates to the manner in which God delights in, desires to bless, maintains, and governs all His creatures by virtue of the fact that they are His creatures (Psa. 145:9), or it is special. This special love refers to God’s eternal designation of the elect to be the objects of His special love and benevolence. This finds expression in the following texts, “For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life” (John 3:16); “As Christ also loved the church, and gave Himself for it” (Eph. 5:25).

The love of God’s delight has the elect as its object as they are viewed in Christ, being clothed with His satisfaction and holiness perfect and complete in Him (Col. 2:10); “According as he hath chosen us in Him … according to the good pleasure of His will … wherein He hath made us accepted in the Beloved” (Eph. 1:4–6). This also applies to the believer in his present state, having the principle of holiness within him. “For the Father Himself loveth you, because ye have loved Me, and have believed that I came out from God” (John 16:27).

This love of benevolence precedes all good works of man, whereas the love of God’s delight concerns itself with men who presently either are partakers of or perform that which is good.

Wilhelmus à Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service, 3 vols., ed. Joel R. Beeke, trans. Bartel Elshout (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 1992), 1:123–24.

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David Clarkson (1622–1686) on God’s Common and Special Love

4. The love of Christ appears by what he has given us; his love-tokens. Whatever we have, for being or well-being, spring from his love. It is love that opens those infinite treasures of goodness, which had else been eternally locked up from the creatures. And though, in these showers of mercy, some drops fall upon the wicked, and so seem common, yet the fountain of love, from whence they issue, is not common. There is a vast difference betwixt the provision which a man makes for his wife, and for his servants. Every mercy we enjoy is a drop from the ocean of his special love. Let us ascend, by some degrees, to the height of this bounteous love.

David Clarkson, “The Love of Christ (Eph. 5:2),” in The Works of David Clarkson, 3 vols. (Edinburgh: James Nichol, 1864), 3:8.

Quest. 1. Whether Christ’s love be universal, extended to all men; or particular, restrained to some?
Ans. No. The Scripture holds forth a restrained, a distinguishing love. The contrary opinion is against the stream of Scripture, and makes Christ’s love less endearing, less free, less engaging. The text evinces this; he loves only those who are washed in his blood; all are not washed; those who are made kings and priests, all are not such.
Besides, Christ only loves his own, John 13:1, those that are given him by his Father. All are not his; he knows his, and is known of them, John 10:14, 27; but some he professes he knows not, Luke 13:27. It is the church that he loves, Eph. 5:25; but all belong not to the church, the most are not in the church, the greatest part in it are not of it. He gives his life for those he loves, Eph. 5:2; but he lays not down his life for all. This act of love is restrained to those whom he calls his sheep, John 10:11. All are not sheep, for who are those that will be found at Christ’s left hand? Christ’s flock is a little flock; he intercedes for all whom he loves, John 16:26, 27, and 17:20. He prays not for all; there is a world that he prays not for, John 17:9; he expresses it when he loves, gives love-tokens; manifests himself, John 14:21–23, not to all, ver. 22, draws near them, abides with them, gives consolation, good hope, peace, 2 Thes. 2:16, victory, Rom. 8:37. The Lord hates some, Ps. 5:5, Hos. 9:15, Mal. 1:3. There is a common love, which bestows common favours, outward and spiritual; and a special love.

David Clarkson, “The Love of Christ (Eph. 5:2),” in The Works of David Clarkson, 3 vols. (Edinburgh: James Nichol, 1864), 3:37.

See also David Clarkson on God’s Goodness and Love.

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Donald John MacLean on John Knox (c.1514–1572), the Gospel Offer, Common Grace, and God’s Universal Love

The Gospel Offer, Common Grace, and God’s Universal Love

Knox’s strong articulation of double predestination was accompanied by a belief in a gospel offer genuinely made to all who hear it, and a love and grace of God that was common to all. He clearly stated that the gospel offer extends beyond the elect.⁹⁶ He noted that the word of God works ‘diversly in the heartes of those to whom it is offered’.⁹⁷ God ‘of his great mercie’ had ‘of late yeares offered againe to the unthankfull world’ the ‘light of salvation’, but instead of being received that light had enflamed the hearts of men with ‘rage and crueltie’.⁹⁸ The reprobate who had grace offered to them ‘oppugned and obstinately refused’ it.⁹⁹ This gospel offer is to be identified with the ‘Generall vocation, by the which the world by some manor of meanes is called to the knowledge of God’. Knox distinguished this ‘generall vocation’ from the ‘vocation of purpose, which apperteineth to God’s children onely’.¹⁰⁰ He acknowledged that while few were ultimately chosen, ‘many are called’.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, there were qualifications Knox placed on the gospel offer. First, those who were within the visible church heard its teachings and exhortations in a degree those outside the Kirk did not.¹⁰² All within the visible church had the external call to salvation.¹⁰³ Second, and perhaps somewhat inconsistently, Knox appeared to restrict the external call to the penitent. He held the gospel call in Isa. 55 was not to ‘all indifferently’ but only to ‘such as do thirst’.¹⁰⁴ He limited the call to repentance to ‘those that thirst, that hunger, that mourne, that are laden with sinne’.¹⁰⁵ There seems an undeniable tension, even disjunction, between this limitation and his clear teaching that the reprobate despise and reject what is offered to them.¹⁰⁶

Knox ‘constantly denied’ that electing love was common to all.¹⁰⁷ However, he also held that ‘God both blesseth and loveth in bestowing temporall benedictions, upon such as in his eternall counsell he hath rejected, and therefore hateth’.¹⁰⁸ Allied to this was his clear teaching ‘that the most wicked men are participant of God’s mercie in temporall felicitie’.¹⁰⁹ These ‘graces’ and ‘mercies’ which were ‘common to all’ had to be sharply distinguished from the mercy and grace that was shown only to the elect in Christ Jesus, but that was not to deny there was such a category as common grace and mercy.¹¹⁰ These temporal mercies included the restraining operations of God’s Holy Spirit.¹¹¹ Knox argued that grace and mercy were shown to the reprobate for two reasons. The first was for the good of the elect. Common gifts, for example, however they were abused by the reprobate, ultimately produced some benefit for the Church. The second reason was for ‘God’s goodnes to be praised’. That God was good to even his enemies ultimately brought glory to his name.¹¹²

Again, Scottish federal theologians held similar views on these matters. So, for example, Rutherford articulated very clearly his belief in a common grace and a common love of God for all distinct from God’s electing love and grace. He held that ‘it is a state of common grace to be within the visible church’.¹¹³ Simply to be in an external covenant with God was a favour from God, expressive of his common grace and mercy.¹¹⁴ Rutherford also maintained a universal love for all. He believed that God in some sense loved all his rational creatures, ‘yea, even his enemies’.¹¹⁵ One evidence of this love was that God ‘sends the gospel to many reprobates, and invites them to repentance, … with longanimity and forbearance’.¹¹⁶ But this love was not electing love and was not ultimately intended to secure the salvation of any.¹¹⁷

In regard to the gospel offer the federal theologians were, if anything, more expansive than Knox. They clearly held that, in Durham’s words, ‘where the gospel comes, it makes offer of Jesus Christ to all that hear it’.¹¹⁸ Such a belief was reflected in their preaching: ‘we earnestly exhort you … to receive this gospel, to submit to the righteousness of faith, to open to him that is knocking at the door, to yield to him, and to give him the hand, that bygone quarrels may be removed, and taken out of the way.’¹¹⁹ Indeed, while Knox appeared to limit the gospel offer to those who are ‘thirsty’ (Isa. 55.1), James Durham explicitly refused to follow suit. In his own comments on Isaiah he pointed out that God directly invites those ‘without money’ to come; if ‘thirsting’ were required before coming, he reasoned, that would imply the possession of some ‘money’ on the part of the sinner. Thirst, then, was better attributed to those likely to come, rather than identified as a prerequisite to coming.¹²⁰ He noted further that no church could be as devoid of ‘preparations’ for grace as the Church of Laodicea described in Rev. 3, yet it received the full and free gospel offer.¹²¹

Just as Scottish federal theologians did not go beyond Knox in their teachings on reprobation, so they articulated a gospel offer, a common love and a grace that extended beyond the elect, and which was no less expansive than it was in Knox’s doctrine. Here again there is no evidence of a betrayal of his teachings or a hardening of earlier (Knoxian) predestinarian doctrine into something reprehensible and incompatible with his thought.
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96. Macleod correctly notes that ‘Knox … regarded the Free Offer as an axiom’. Macleod, ‘Dr T. F. Torrance and Scottish Theology’, p. 58. See also McDonald, John Knox, p. 100.
97. Knox, Works, vol. 5, p. 21.
98. Ibid., p. 23.
99. Ibid., p. 42. See also pp. 45, 71, 164–5, 260, 330, 401.
100. Ibid., p. 117.
101. Ibid., p. 128. Knox simply responds to the charge that God, by outwardly calling to salvation those whom he does not intend to save, acts hypocritically by calling it an ‘impudent lie’ (p. 128).
102. Ibid., p. 270.
103. Ibid., p. 285.
104. Ibid., p. 118.
105. Ibid., p. 404.
106. This is perhaps the only ground for justification of [Richard] Kyle’s exaggerated assertion [in “The Concept of Predestination in the Thought of John Knox,” WTJ 46.1 (Spring 1984): 53–77] that Knox was ‘by no means consistent with himself ’ in On Predestination; Kyle, ‘The Concept of Predestination’, p. 56.
107. Knox, Works, vol. 5, p. 61.
108. Ibid., pp. 284–5. For other, slightly more oblique references to God’s universal love, see pp. 58, 151, 270–1. Thus it is incorrect to say without clarification, as Kyle does, that Knox ‘denied God loved all human beings’; Kyle, ‘The Concept of Predestination’, p. 66.
109. Ibid., p. 86. See also pp. 86–7, 257. Ultimately the reprobate’s despising of the common grace and mercy of God undergirds the judgement of God on the reprobate. However, far from diminishing the reality of that goodness, it is only because genuine goodness, mercy and grace were shown to them that their condemnation is justly increased. See ibid., p. 262.
110. Ibid., p. 87.
111. Ibid., p. 255.
112. Ibid., p. 258.
113. Samuel Rutherford, The Covenant of Life Opened (Edinburgh: Andrew Anderson, 1655), p. 107.
114. Ibid., pp. 107, 340. He explicitly includes here ‘all within the Visible Church, whether Elect or Reprobate’.
115. Samuel Rutherford, Christ Dying and Drawing Sinners to Himself (repr., Edinburgh: T. Lumisden and J. Robertson, 1727), p. 550.
116. Ibid., p. 550.
117. Ibid., p. 550.
118. James Durham, Christ Crucified Or the Marrow of the Gospel in Seventy-Two Sermons on the Fifty-Third Chapter of Isaiah (Chris Coldwell, ed.; Dallas: Naphtali Press, 2001), p. 122.
119. Ibid., pp. 100–1.
120. Ibid., p. 80.
121. Ibid., p. 80.

Donald John MacLean, “Knox Versus the Knoxians? Predestination in John Knox and Seventeenth-Century Federal Theology,” in Reformed Orthodoxy in Scotland: Essays on Scottish Theology 1560–1775, ed. Aaron Clay Denlinger (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015), 22–24.