Thomas Scott (1747–1821) on Natural and Moral Ability

But sinners cannot obey the call. This is a truth if truly understood. They are under a moral, not a natural inability. Is this distinction useless and unintelligible? Is there no difference betwixt a covetous wretch, who with a full purse hath no heart; and a compassionate man who hath no money, to relieve a fellow-creature in distress? Both are effectually prevented, but the one from himself, the other by an external hinderance. Every generous man at once indignantly condemns the one, and wholly justifies the other. When the case is put, divested of all false colouring, the one could if he would, and the other would if he could. It is said of God that he "cannot lie." But whence arises this impossibility? Surely not from external restraint, but from the perfection of his essential holiness. Satan cannot but hate his Maker. Not because of outward force put upon him, but through the horrid malignity of his disposition.*

*If there be no real difference betwixt the want of natural faculties, and the want of moral dispositions, there can be nothing culpable even in Satan's opposing God, and endeavouring the destruction of men; for it is as impossible at least that he should do otherwise, as that sinners should perfectly obey the law, or of themselves repent and believe the gospel; and if they are excusable, Satan is consequently so too. Indeed, on this supposition, all characters are reduced to a level; for in proportion to the degree of evil disposition, or moral inability to good, evil actions become excusable: and by parity of reasoning, in proportion to the degree of moral excellency of disposition, or of moral inability to evil, good actions being unavoidable, become less praise-worthy. Thus, the more inwardly holy any man is, the less esteem is his piety, justice, and charity entitled to; for he can scarcely do otherwise. An angel, as confirmed in holiness, is still less entitled to commendation; for in some sense it is impossible he should do otherwise than be holy. He cannot sin. And through necessary excellency of nature it is strictly impossible that God should do any thing inconsistent with the most consummate wisdom, justice, truth, and goodness. He cannot: and, shall we say, this inability (which is the incommunicable glory of his nature) renders him less entitled to our admiring, adoring, grateful love, than otherwise he would be?

Every one must see what confusion would be introduced into civil and domestic concerns, if no regard were paid to this distinction, and an inveterate propensity were allowed as an excuse for crimes: and it introduces equal perplexity into all our discourses on divine things; because it runs directly counter to all our rules of judging characters and actions. A good outward action without the least corresponding disposition, is in reality mere hypocrisy: as the disposition to good and aversion to evil increase, good actions have more genuine sincerity, and the character more amiableness. When we can say with the apostles, "We cannot but do" so and so—we are entitled to as much esteem and approbation as mere men can be. This moral inability to evil is much stronger in angels, and the spirits of just men made perfect; and therefore we are taught to look forward to such a holy state and temper as the summit of our wishes and desires: and God himself, who, being under no restraint, but doing his whole pleasure, cannot but be perfectly and unchangeably holy, is proposed as the object of supreme love, admiring gratitude, and adoring praise.

On the other hand a bad action, if done without intention, or the least disposition to such moral evil, is deemed purely accidental, and not culpable. When it is contrary to a man's general disposition and character, and the effect of sudden temptation, it is considered as more venial than when the effect of a rooted disposition; and for a criminal to plead, "I am so propense to theft and cruelty, that I could not help it," would be to condemn himself as the vilest miscreant, not fit to live, in the opinions of judge, jury, and spectators.

There can be no difficulty in proving, that this distinction is implied throughout the Bible, and has its foundation in the nature of things; and so far from being novel, it is impossible that a rational creature can be unacquainted with it. No man ever yet missed the distinction between the sick servant who could not work, and the lazy servant who had no heart to his work; that is, betwixt natural and moral inability; and no man could govern even his domestics in a proper manner, without continually adverting to it.

"But," say some, "human nature now must be laid low, and grace exalted." Now we ask, Which lays human nature lowest? To rank man among the brutes, who have no power, or among fallen spirits who have no disposition, to love and serve God? Or which most exalts grace? To save a wretch who could not help those crimes for which he is condemned to hell: or to save a rebel, who was willingly an enemy to his Maker, and persisted in that enmity, till almighty power, by a new creation, overcame his obstinacy, and made him willing to be reconciled?

Thomas Scott, “Sermon on Election,” in The Theological Works of the Rev. Thomas Scott (Edinburgh: Peter Brown and Thomas Nelson, 1830), 150.

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