*This post will continue to be updated regularly, as new sources are discovered, and as more of each section of the outline continues to be filled in. For now, it is still under construction and should be considered a rough draft. In addition to the material found below, one should also check what Augustine said about Christ’s death
here (click),
here (click), and
here (click). See also Augustine’s name in the name index
here (click). All of this information will eventually be incorporated in the material below.—Tony, 11/17/26
Here is a temporary working outline of what is found below:
I. Introduction and Some History
A. Examples of Those Who Think Augustine Denied God’s Universal Salvific Will
1. The Late Modern Era
2. The Contemporary Era
B. Examples Those Who Think Augustine Did Not Deny God’s Universal Salvific Will
1. The Early Modern Era
2. The Late Modern Era
3. The Contemporary Era
II. The Primary Sources Dealing with the Will of God in Mostly Chronological Order
A. From the Exposition of the Psalms (AD 396–420) B. From De Catechizandis Rudibus (AD 400)
C. From the Tractates on John’s Gospel (AD 406–430)
D. From the Letters (Epistulae)
E. From The Spirit and the Letter (AD 412)
F. From Contra Julianum (AD 420)
G. From the Enchiridion (AD 421–422)
III. The Primary Sources on the Death of Christ in Mostly Chronological Order
IV. The Issue of His Interpretation of 1 Timothy 2:4
V. An Analysis of Jean Daillé’s Case
VI. The Views of Augustine’s Early Disciples Considered
VII. The Views of Augustine’s Later Disciples Considered
I. Introduction and Some History
Did Augustine ever believe in God’s universal salvific will? What about his later years? Did he then deny that God wills the salvation of all men? There is likely no dispute that the early Augustine believed God wills the salvation of all men, but there is some scholarly doubt about his later years. Some maintained that there was some categorical change in his views at some point. But if so, when? There is no question that the later Augustine taught that God’s will is
ultimately invincible, and that God only wills to effect the eternal salvation of those he has predestined to final perseverance. But, in addition to that, did he yet maintain that there is a sense in which God wishes or wills the salvation of all men, even to the end of his writings?
Here is some of the history regarding the dispute.
A. Examples of Those Who Think Augustine Denied God’s Universal Salvific Will
Some scholars have maintained that Augustine, and even surprisingly Prosper of Aquitaine, did not believe God wills the salvation of all men.
1. The Late Modern Era
Odilo [Otto] Rottmanner (1841–1907), a German Benedictine, librarian, theologian and monastery preacher, toward the end of his book Der Augustinismus. Eine dogmengeschichtliche Studie (München, 1892), presents Augustine as denying God’s universal salvific will and supplies many quotes. However, he does not deal with Augustine’s view on the extent of Christ’s death, nor does he consider any of the quotes below that present contrary evidence.
Prudent De Letter (1904–1988), a Belgian Jesuit priest, said that Augustine denied God’s universal salvific will. See Prosper of Aquitaine, Defense of St. Augustine, trans. P. De letter (New York: Newman Press, 1963), 201n72, 203n6, 225n47, 224n21.
John Norman Davidson Kelly (1909–1997) thought that because Augustine believed “The number of the elect is strictly limited, being neither more nor less than is required to replace the fallen angels [De civ. dei 22, 1, 2; enchir. 29; 62], Augustine “has to twist [De corrept. et grat. 44; enchir. 103] the text ‘God wills all men to be saved’ (1 Tim. 2:4), making it mean that He wills the salvation of all the elect, among whom men of every race and type are represented. See J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, Fifth, Revised (Bloomsbury, 1977), 368–69. This seems to suggest that, in his view, Augustine, at least at some point, categorically abandoned the view that God wills the salvation of all men.
2. The Contemporary Era
While in several places William G. Most (1914–1999) dogmatically claims that Augustine denied God’s universal saving will (see Grace, Predestination, and the Salvific Will of God: New Answers to Old Questions [Christendom Press, 1997], 279 [§206], 280 [§206], 281 [§206], 282–83 [§206], 284 [§206]), elsewhere he is less dogmatic and says, “Augustine was predisposed to deny the salvific will” (Most, Grace, Predestination, and the Salvific Will of God, 284 [§206]; emphasis mine). On some passages, Most even grants that “Augustine seems to suppose that the salvific will is really sincere and universal” (Most, Grace, Predestination, and the Salvific Will of God, 298, n. 128 [§211]). Most’s presentation amounts to this: Augustine’s view seems to entail a denial of God’s universal saving will, so he did deny it, even though there are no places where Augustine repudiates it categorically or explicitly, or ever retracts prior affirmations of God’s voluntas salvifica universalis. In other words, since Most thinks Augustine’s various P-statements imply a denial of Q, it must be (or it is at least highly plausible) that Augustine actually denied Q. It is just the case that Most did not put it in that obviously fallacious manner.
Henry Chadwick (1920–2008) suggests that the later Prosper of Aquitaine changed from being a “hyper-Augustinian enthusiast,” and so later “modified the stern rigour of his doctrine.” He thinks that perhaps under the moderating influence of Pope Leo I, Prosper “withdrew from the full-blooded predestinarianism of Augustine’s later years,” so that, “By 450 Prosper appeared as an advocate of the doctrine that when St Paul said ‘God wills all men to be saved’ he meant what he said.” And so he pits the later Prosper against the later Augustine on that topic. See Henry Chadwick, The Early Church (Eerdmans, 1968), 234.
For others who say Augustine denied God’s universal salvific will, see Mathijs Lamberigts, “Predestination,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encylopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Eerdmans, 1999), 679, claiming that about Augustine; and see D. F. Wright, “Semi-Pelagianism,” in New Dictionary of Theology, eds. S. B. Ferguson, D. F. Wright, and J. I. Packer (IVP, 1988), 636, claiming that about both Augustine and, surprisingly, even Prosper; J. Patout Burns, The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace (Études Augustiniennes, 1980), 178; Thomas P. Scheck, “Introduction,” in St. Jerome, Exegetical Epistles, trans. Thomas P. Scheck, vol. 1, The Fathers of the Church (The Catholic University of America Press, 2023), 48, who opposes Jerome’s affirmation of it to Augustine’s alleged denial; William J. Collinge, “Introduction,” in Augustine of Hippo, “On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Gift of Perseverance,” in Four Anti-Pelagian Writings, ed. Thomas P. Halton, trans. John A. Mourant and William J. Collinge, vol. 86, The Fathers of the Church (The Catholic University of America Press, 1992), 191, who puts Prosper in agreement with Cassian as over against Augustine.
These scholars make that claim mostly—if not entirely—because of Augustine’s later interpretation of 1 Tim 2:4.
B. Examples Those Who Think Augustine Did Not Deny God’s Universal Salvific Will
Other scholars claim otherwise.
1. The Early Modern Era
Some early modern examples include Denis Pétau (Dionysius Petavius, S.J.; 1583–1652), Jean Daillé (1594–1670), and Robert Baron (1596–1639).
Denis Pétau (Dionysius Petavius; 1583–1652), a French Jesuit theologian, covered a lot of Augustine’s teachings in his De Theologicis Dogmatibus, which was, according to the 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica, “the first systematic attempt ever made to treat the development of Christian doctrine from the historical point of view.” After previously noting all of the places where Augustine strongly taught predestination and viewed 1 Tim 2:4 as having a number possible readings, he then sought to show that Augustine still maintained that God wills the salvation of all men. He observes this Augustine’s work On the Spirit and the Letter.
VII. Quid quod Augustinus ipse, qui alias generalem omnium salvandorum voluntatem inficiari videtur, ac tot modis illud Apostoli dictum exponit; in libro de Spiritu & littera superioribus assentitur illis, & Pauli sententiam eodem sensu accipit? Vult [Aug. lib. de Spir. & lit. c. 33], inquit, Deus omnes homines salvos fieri, & in agnitionem veritatis venire, non sic tamen, ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene, vel male utentes justissime judicentur. Quibus verbis indicat, non solùm intra se occultam habere voluntatem Deum qua vult omnes fieri salvos, etsi reipsa salvi non fiant, liberi illorum arbitrii culpa, sed etiam extrinsecus aliquam eam significat, effectosque prodere, quae est invitans, alliciensque gratia. Nam si nihil reprobis proponetur, quod vel amplecti libero arbitrio possent, vel rejicere, non possent in eo bene vel male uti libero suo arbitrio, nec ob illud, quod oblatum erat, repudiatum, ac rejectum, justissime judicari. Quae vera est, & seria voluntas illa salvandorum, quantum est in Deo. Sed quia non est absoluta, verum conditione temperata, libera hominum obsistente voluntate, exitum non habet. Hanc autem ejusmodi esse voluntatem; eique sine omnipotentiae detrimento homines resistere, demonstrat subinde aptissimo exemplo, quod ad rem nostram magnopere conducit. Ita voluntas Dei semper invicta est, ait: vinceretur autem si non inveniret quid de contemptoribus faceret, aut nullo modo possent evadere quod de illis constituit. Ita voluntas Dei semper invicta est, ait: vinceretur autem si non inveniret quid de contemptoribus faceret, aut nullo modo possent evadere quod de talibus ille constituit. Quis enim dicit, verbi gratia: Volo ut hi omnes servi mei operentur in vinea, & post laborem requiescentes epulentur, ita ut quisquis eorum hoc noluerit, in pistrino semper moretur, videtur quidem quicumque contempserit, contra voluntatem domini sui facere, sed tunc eam vincet, si & pistrinum contemnens effugerit, quod nullo modo fieri potest sub Dei potestate. Si ergo similis est voluntas illa Dei, qua vult omnes salvos facere, voluntati isti, qua pater familias servos suos epulari vult, & à labore quiescere: profusè generalis est, & ad omnes pertinet. nec tamen absoluta est, uti nec illa, qua pater familias, nullo excepto, labori servos omnes vult incumbere, quiescere verò, ac lætari, nonnisi conditionatè.
Dionysii Petavii,
Opus De Theologicis Dogmatibus: In quo de Deo uno, Deíque proprietatibus agitur, vol. 1 (Pavinus, 1721), 404, col. 1–2 (lib. 10, c. 4, sec. 7); italics original. After quoting two of Augustine’s disciples affirming God’s universal salvific will, Prosper and Primasius, Pétau (
on page 405, col. 1) said, “But it is characteristic of writers of commentaries of this kind, especially those who lived after Augustine, to introduce a certain mixture of different and sometimes contradictory interpretations, which they had hastily selected from various authors and found scattered among their writings” (Verum, familiare est commentariorum istiusmodi Scriptoribus, praesertim Augustino posterioribus, miscellam quandam instituere diversarum, ac nonnunquam contrariarum interpretationum; quas ex variis auctoribus tumultuarie selectas in adversariis suis repererant).
AI (ChatGPT) translation:
VII. But what about Augustine himself, who otherwise seems to deny a universal will for the salvation of all and explains the Apostle’s statement in so many ways. In his book On the Spirit and the Letter [Aug. lib. de Spir. & lit. c. 33], mentioned above, he agrees with those who understand Paul’s statement in this same sense [as other church fathers, such as Jerome and Ambrose]. He says: “God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth; nevertheless, He does not deprive them of free will, by which they may use it either for good or for evil, and according to which they are most justly judged.” By these words he indicates that God not only has within Himself a hidden will by which He wills all men to be saved, even though they are not actually saved because of the fault of their own free will, but also, from without, offers them a certain grace, which is effectual in its operation and is accompanied by an invitation and an enticement. For if nothing were offered to the reprobate which they could either embrace or reject, they could not make good or evil use of their free will, nor could they be justly judged on account of having spurned and rejected what had been offered to them. It is therefore true, and a serious matter, that the will of God to save all men, insofar as it depends upon God, is efficacious. But because it is not absolute, but is qualified by a condition—the freely exercised will of human beings—it does not attain its end. That this is indeed the nature of such a will, and that human beings resist it to its own detriment through their own impotence, is demonstrated most clearly by an example that is highly relevant to our present subject: “Thus the will of God is always invincible,” he says, “but it would be overcome if it did not find something to accomplish among those whom it has contemptuously regarded, or if they could in any way escape what He has determined concerning the wicked. For who says, by the grace of the Word: ‘I will that all my servants be employed in the arts, and be able to labor as required, and be nourished by their work; so that whoever among them refuses this, let him always grind at the mill’? Whoever refuses this appears indeed to act contrary to the will of his master; but that will is nevertheless fulfilled if those who remain at the mill are compelled to grind. This cannot in any way happen without the power of God.” If, therefore, the will of God is similar to this—that He wills all men to be saved—it is like the will of a master who wishes all his servants to feast and rest from their labor. It is, indeed, universal and extends to all; nevertheless, it is not absolute, just as the master’s will that all his servants, without exception, should devote themselves to work, rest, and enjoy themselves is not absolute, but conditional.
Charles Joseph Tricassin (Tricassinus in Latin; 1610–1681) expounded the doctrines of Saint Augustine and Saint Bonaventure against the Jansenists in numerous works in Latin. According to Émile Amann (1880–1948), a French Catholic priest, church historian, and academic who took over the editorial direction of the massive
Dictionnaire de théologie catholique (DTC) following the deaths of its original founders, we have no biographical information concerning Tricassin. “In his works, he styles himself Capuchin preacher (
concionator capucinus), and the series of his printed works extends from 1669 to 1681.” Amann said, “Very much concerned with the support that Jansenism thought it could find in Saint Augustine, he [Tricassin] set about scrutinizing the work of the Bishop of Hippo and endeavored to rank him among the adherents of what, for the sake of brevity, we shall call the doctrine of Molina. He did not succeed, as will readily be understood, without giving Augustine’s ideas some distortion.” See E. Amann,
“TRICALET Pierre-Joseph,” in in Dictionnaire de thâeologie catholique: contenant l'exposâe des doctrines de la thâeologie catholique, leurs preuves et leur histoire, 30 vols. (Paris: Letouzey et Anâe, 1908), 15/1:1540–43. Tricassin wrote at length to show that Augustine believed in God’s universal salvific will and tried to explain how that was the case given what Augustine said on 1 Tim 2:4 and his other later interpretations.
PUNCTUM V.
Quo sensu dixerit Augustinus non omnes Deum velle salvos fieri.
Restat ergo dicere cur Augustinus loquens de illo textu Apostoli, Deus vult omnes salvos fieri, explicaverit illum de multis, & non de omnibus & singulis, imo negat intelligi de omnibus & singulis: quod videtur esse contra praedicta.
Sed respondeo, Augustinum id non dixisse ad dandam veram hujus loci interpretationem: sed ad dissolvendam pravam interpretationem, quam dabant huic textui Pelagiani, & Semipelagiani dicentes, Ideo Deum non omnes salvos facere velle, quia ipsi nolebant salvi fieri, ut patet ex lib. 4. contra Julian. cap. 8. ubi ait Augustinus ad Julianum: Sed ponis Apostolicum testimonium, & ab eo dicis pulsantibus aperiri, qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri, & in agnitionem veritatis venire, ut videlicet intelligamus docentibus vobis, ideo non omnes salvos fieri, & in agnitionem veritatis venire, quia ipsi nolunt petere, cum Deus velit dare; nolunt quaerere, cum Deus velit ostendere; nolunt pulsare, cum Deus velit aperire. Ex qua prava interpretatione videbat Augustinus duo oriri incommoda, contra fidem Catholicam, quae oportebat dissolvere; unum erat directe contra doctrinam gratiae, cum ibi supponerent esse in potestate hominis velle salvari, priusquam Deus daret ei hanc potestatem & voluntatem: quod erat ponere actionem arbitrii ante gratiam, & facere quod gratia daretur illi tanquam debita, seu propter ejus meritum, ut ait Augustinus ibidem, his verbis: Ibi vos, ut video, ponere jam cepistis merita gratiam præcedentia, quod est petere, quærere, pulsare, ut his meritis debita illa reddatur, ac sic gratia inaniter nuncupetur. Et hoc erat primum inconveniens dissolvendum ab Augustino; alterum erat contra omnipotentiam divinam, & simul contra gratiam, quia ideo hanc dabant isti errantes illi textui interpretationem, quia non credebant posse Deum convertere aversa & adversa corda, seu aversas voluntates hominum per gratiam aliquam prævenientem sine eo quod imponeret eis necessitatem; sed credebant necessarium esse ut homo haberet ex se aliquod initium bonæ voluntatis, & bene se haberet ad Deum, petendo, quærendo, pulsando ut postea gratia adveniens, salvos illos faceret, libere, & connaturaliter, aliter rem non posse libere fieri: Et hoc ipsum est quod dicit ibidem Augustinus contra eos: Frustraque, inquit, sit scriptum, misericordia ejus præveniet me: Frustra etiam nos pro inimicis nostris jubeat orare, si non est ejus aversa & adversa corda convertere: Unde & ipsi Pelagiani dicebant Augustinum per suam gratiam prævenientem fatum inducere, ut ipsemet refert Augustinus lib. 2. ad Bonifacium cap. 6. Itane, inquit, filii superbiae, inimici gratiæ Dei, ô novi hæretici Pelagiani! quisquis dicit gratiam Dei omnia prævenire bona hominis merita, nec gratiam Dei meritis dari, ne non sit gratia, si non gratis datur: Sed debita merentibus redditur: fatum vobis videtur asserere? Et hæc igitur erant incommoda, quæ debebat Augustinus dissolvere, confutando prædictam pravam quam Pelagiani dabant interpretationem huic loco Apostoli, Deus vult omnes salvos fieri, & ad agnitionem veritatis venire.
At noluit Augustinus disputare; qualis illa voluntas esset, an complacentiæ, & conditionata, an vero absoluta (quia mos illius erat novas quæstiones non excitare, sed subortas compescere & dissolvere, quam brevissime poterat, * ut infra notabimus, cum loquemur de quæstionibus incidentibus respectu Augustini) sed manendo in eorum suppositione, scilicet quod voluntas illa esset absoluta: Ostendit etiam hoc admisso eorum consequentiam non esse necessariam: scilicet, quod ideo Deus non salvat aliquos, quia ipsi nolunt salvari, seu quia nolunt petere, quærere, & pulsare, ut salventur: Et ratio ejus erat, quia per omnes, non est necesse intelligere omnes omnino homines, sed sufficit intelligere omnes qui salvantur, non autem etiam eos qui actu non salvantur: Præterea per omnes, potest intelligi omnes genus hominum, quia ex omni gente, conditione & ætate hominum, sunt aliqui qui salvantur: Præterea quia per omnes, potest sumi pro multis, quod probat etiam aliquibus textibus Scripturæ, ubi omnes sumitur pro multis: Et tandem ait, Ipsam Dei voluntatem de qua ibi, posse sumi pro ea, quæ inspirat sanctis ut velint, seu quæ efficit ut sancti velint omnes homines salvos fieri: Sicut, inquit, misit spiritum Filii sui clamantem, Abba Pater, id est nos clamare facientem: & ita per diversas illas interpretationes quas ostendebat, textum illum posse recipere, probabat eis interpretationem illorum non esse necessario veram; & sic infringebat hæreticas eorum consequentias supranotatas, contra gratiam Christianam mere gratuitam, & contra omnipotentiam divinam, † quod erat totum illius intentum; non autem dare veram & germanam loci illius interpretationem, ut clare patet ex duobus locis, in quibus magis urget illas interpretationes Augustinus. Quorum primus est Epist. 107. ad Vitalem Semipelagianum, ubi sic ait: Sicut illud quod dictum est, Omnes in Christo vivificabuntur, cum tam multi æterna morte puniantur; ideo dictum est, quia omnes quicumque vitam æternam percipiunt, non percipiunt nisi in Christo: Ita quod dictum est: Omnes homines vult Deus salvos fieri, cum tam multos nolit salvos fieri (id est nolit absoluta voluntate in sensu adversariorum) ideo dictum est, quia omnes qui salvi fiunt, nisi ipso volente non fiunt, & si quo alio modo illa verba Apostolica intelligi possunt, ut tamen huic apertissimæ veritati in qua videmus tam multos (intelligit parvulos de quibus ante locutus fuerat) volentibus hominibus, sed Deo nolente salvos non fieri, contraria esse non possint. Ubi manifeste apparet, per hæc verba: Et si quo alio modo verba Apostolica intelligi possunt, ut tamen huic apertissimæ veritati (quæ est de gratia mere gratuita) contraria esse non possint, Augustinum ibi non quærere, nec velle dare verum sensum illius loci (quandoquidem non curat quomodo intelligatur, & relinquat eum cuivis interpretandum, modo non sit contrarius veritati illi quam defendit, quæ est de gratia Christi mere gratuita) sed tantum velle illum locum defendere contra pravas adversariorum interpretationes, & consequentias, quibus gratiam mere gratuitam oppugnabant.
Alter sancti Doctoris locus est, ex Enchiridio cap. 103, ubi cum varie, ut supra relatum est, interpretatus esset verba supradicta Apostoli, sic ait: Et quocumque alio modo intelligi potest. Dum tamen credere non cogamur, aliquid omnipotentem Deum voluisse fieri, factumque non esse: qui sine ullis ambiguitatibus, si in cælo & in terra, sicut & veritas cantat, Omnia quæcumque voluit, fecit, profecto facere noluit (scilicet absoluta voluntate ut supra notatum est) quodcumque non fecit. Et sic patet adhuc ex isto loco Augustinum noluisse ibi dare veram interpretationem istius loci Apostolici, sed tantum dare solutiones ad repellendam pravam adversariorum interpretationem contra eum, ostendendo illam non esse necessariam, cum prædictus locus possit alias interpretationes recipere: Per hoc enim quod liberum relinquitur cujusvis arbitrio locum illum aliter interpretari, modo nihil contineat quod sit contrarium omnipotentiæ Dei, qua contendit Augustinus contra adversarios posse Deum per gratiam prævenientem aversa & adversa corda convertere, & homines ex nolentibus volentes facere: Satis demonstrat se nulli prædictarum interpretationum à se datarum adhærere, sed tantum per illas voluisse locum illum eripere è manibus adversariorum, ne quid concluderent contra illum, & contra gratiam prævenientem quam defendebat contra illos.
Is enim, ut dixi, erat mos & mens Augustini in ejusmodi quæstionibus incidentibus, dicere solum breviter quod necessarium erat ad confutandum errorem, & non quæ necessaria erant ad solvendam quæstionem, ut ipse fatetur lib. de dono Persever. cap. 11. ubi loquens de modo quo tractaverat aliquas quæstiones incidentes, cum ageret contra Manichæos, sic ait: Quæstiones operosissimas incidentes enucleate solvere nolui (nota valde) ne nimium longum opus esset, ubi me adversus tam perversos adversarios testimoniorum divinorum non adjuvabat auctoritas, & poteram sicut feci, quodlibet eorum verum esset, quæ non definite interponebam, certa tamen ratione concludere in omnibus Deum esse laudandum sine ulla necessitate credendi duas, sicut illi volunt, coæternas boni & mali permixtas esse substantias: Et infra: In his, inquam, libris (scilicet de libero arbitrio contra Manichæos) ita multa disserta sunt, ut incidentes nonnullæ quæstiones quas vel enodare non poteram, vel longam sermocinationem in præsenti requirebant, ita differrentur, ut ex utraque parte, vel ex omnibus earundem quæstionum partibus, in quibus non apparebat quid potius congrueret veritati, ad hoc ratiocinatio nostra concluderetur ut quodlibet eorum verum esset, laudandus crederetur, vel etiam ostenderetur Deus. Et libro de prædestinatione Sanct. cap. 9. sic ait de simili aliqua quæstione incidenti: Illud autem quod in opusculo meo quodam contra Porphyrium, sub titulo de tempore Christianæ Religionis me dixisse recolitis, ita dixi, ut hanc diligentiorem & operosam disputationem de gratia præterirem, non sane omissa significatione, quod eam loco illo explicare noluissem quæ posset alias vel ab aliis explicari. Et postquam adduxit locum illum prolixissimum, sic ait: Certissime me sine præjudicio latentis consilii Dei aliarumque causarum hoc de præscientia Christi, dicere voluisse, quod convincendæ Paganorum infidelitati, qui hanc objecerant quæstionem, sufficere videretur. Quid enim est verius quam præscisse Christum, qui & quando & quibus locis in eum fuerant credituri, sed utrum prædicato sibi Christo a seipsis habituri essent fidem, an Deo donante sumpturi, id est utrum tantummodo eos præscierit, an etiam prædestinaverit Deus, quærere, ac disserere tunc necessarium non putavi, proinde quod dixi, &c....... Sed quoniam si ita diceretur, Lectorem faceret intentum ad ea requirenda, quæ tunc ex admonitione Pelagiani erroris, necesse est copiosius & laboriosius disputari: Visum mihi est quod tunc satis erat breviter esse dicendum, excepta ut dixi altitudine sapientiæ & scientiæ Dei, & † sine præjudicio aliarum causarum de quibus non tunc, sed alias opportunius disputandum putavi.
Et sic manifestat Augustinus, quomodo ipse se habebat ad quæstiones incidentes in suis scriptis, scilicet designando eas, quantum fieri posset rationabiliter, & non enucleate solvens illas, sed tantum dicens ea quæ sufficerent ad solvendam principalem quæstionem, idque quantum poterat brevissime, dimittendo sibi, aut aliis aliquando de illis plura dicere, si necessarium foret. Et hoc est profecto quod fecit in prædictis solutionibus loco Apostolico supradicto datis contra Pelagianos & Semipelagianos: Noluit namque movere hanc quæstionem an ibi loqueretur Apostolus de voluntate Dei absoluta, an de voluntate complacentiæ & conditionata; sed manens in eorum suppositione, quod scilicet esset absoluta, dixit ea quæ necessaria erant ad solvendam eorum falsam interpretationem contra gratiam: sine præjudicio tamen veræ interpretationis, quæ est de voluntate complacentiæ & conditionata: nam ea quæ ibi dicit de voluntate Dei efficaci, non contrariantur iis quæ ipse dixit lib. de Spir. & Litt. c. 33. & quæ dicenda forent de voluntate complacentiæ, seu conditionata, cum bene stet quod Deus nolit efficaciter salvare aliquos propter eorum scelera, & tamen habeat voluntatem affectivam & complacentiæ ad illos ipsos salvandos, & omnes generaliter: Unde Augustinus, dicendo quod Deus nolit omnes efficaciter salvare, nihil præjudicat sanæ doctrinæ, quæ est de voluntate complacentiæ, & affectu salvandi omnes, quam ipsemet loco mox citato tradiderat, quandoquidem illæ voluntates non sunt sibi invicem oppositæ, cum sint in diverso genere, & in diversa suppositione: Per hoc tamen infringebat Augustinus prædictas pravas & falsas adversariorum consequentias contra gratiam: Nam cum ibi supponeret omnes sumi solum pro multis, & non pro omnibus & singulis, & sumi solum pro salvandis, & non etiam pro non salvandis: Non bene amplius inferebatur ex prædicto loco Apostoli, quod Deus vellet absolute salvare eos qui non salvabantur: quod solum inferebatur ex universalitate propositionis, quæ videbatur omnes complecti, & proinde nec etiam bene inferebatur ideo Deum non salvare eos qui non salvabantur, quia ipsi nolebant salvari, seu quia nolebant quærere, petere, & pulsare, prout necessarium erat secundum eos ad hoc ut libere converterentur, & salvarentur: quia nempe ipsi non amplius continebantur in prædicta propositione: Et sic per istas solutiones funditus evertebat & evacuabat inanes eorum argutias contra prævenientem gratiam, quod principaliter intendebat Augustinus; imo vero totaliter: Cum idcirco non curaret quæ interpretatio daretur huic textui, & paratus esset quamlibet admittere, modo huic gratiæ suæ prævenienti non præjudicarent, ut patet evidenter ex his verbis: Et si quo alio modo illa verba Apostolica intelligi possunt, ut tamen huic apertissimæ veritati (quæ est de gratia præveniente) contraria esse non possint, aut ut ait in altero loco: Et quocumque alio modo intelligi potest (scilicet prædictus Apostoli locus) dum tamen credere non cogamur, &c.
Ex quibus manifestum est, Augustinum per prædictas diversas suas solutiones, vel interpretationes, quæ sunt de voluntate Dei absoluta & efficaci, nullomodo voluisse præjudicare veræ interpretationi, quæ est de voluntate complacentiæ & conditionata, circa omnes omnino homines; sed tantum voluisse repellere pravam adversariorum interpretationem contra gratiam, & ostendere illam interpretationem non esse necessariam, cum etiam in eorum suppositione, scilicet quod illa voluntas, de qua loquitur ibi Apostolus, esset absoluta & efficax, aliæ possent interpretationes afferri: Non enim abhorret ab Augustino, quod multæ & diversæ legitimæ, seu congruæ expositiones, possint dari uni & eidem loco sacræ Scripturæ, ut patet ex lib. 3. de doctrina Christiana cap. 27., circa initium.
Sed dicam adhuc amplius, scilicet non solum in illis locis non præjudicare Augustinum nostræ interpretationi, quæ est de omnibus & singulis, sed eam potius admittere, cum admittat illam omnem, quæ non contraria est suæ gratiæ prævenienti: At nostra nullomodo ei contraria est, sed maxime ei congruit, cum supponat gratiam esse ante actionem arbitrii, & sic illam prævenire arbitrium: Et supponat etiam omnipotentem Deum posse aversa & adversa corda convertere, & ex nolentibus volentes facere, cum nullam supponat in homine dispositionem necessariam ante gratiam, ut volebant Pelagiani, per quam quærat, petat, aut pulset ante gratiam; sed fateatur, ipsam gratiam prævenire arbitrium, & proprium illius esse disponere & præparare corda & voluntates hominum, excitando & alliciendo eas ad Dominum, ut convertat & sanet eas. Nam quod reprehendebat Augustinus in interpretatione adversariorum, id omnino erat, quod volebant, seu dicebant sequi ex prædicto textu, quod arbitrium humanum inciperet, per se quærendo, petendo & pulsando: Et Deus postea sanaret, & non posset salvare eos, qui non sic inciperent, ut supra declaratum est: At nos è contra dicimus Deum ipsum incipere per istam bonam voluntatem generalem circa omnes omnino homines salvandos, dando eis gratias vere sufficientes, quibus si cooperentur & consentiant cum gratia adjuvante eis ab eo parata, tunc Deus salvabit eos efficaciter: Non sic tamen (ut bene ait Augustinus) ut adimat eis liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene vel male utentes justissime judicentur.
Breviter itaque respondeo ex dictis, objectioni allatæ: Dicendo quod ideo negavit Augustinus in prædictis locis textum illum Apostoli, Deus vult omnes salvos fieri, intelligi de omnibus & singulis; quia ibi respondit secundum mentem adversariorum, sumendo illam voluntatem, de qua ibi Apostolus, pro absoluta & efficaci, nos autem sumimus eam ut complacentiæ, unde non contrariantur, 2. quod nullam suarum interpretationum dedit ut veram & certam, sed tantum ut probabilem, relinquens libentissime locum aliis, modo non essent contrariæ veritati gratiæ, quam defendebat contra Pelagianos, ut patet ex his verbis supra relatis: Et si quo alio modo verba Apostolica intelligi possunt, ut tamen huic apertissimæ veritati non sint contraria: Et ex his aliis: Et quocumque alio modo, dum non cogamur, &c. per quæ verba dicimus non solum non excludi nostram interpretationem, sed potius includi, cum illa non sit contraria, sed valde congruens Augustinianæ gratiæ omnia opera prævenienti, ut supra explicatum est; illam tamen Augustinum non attulisse, quia noluit illam quæstionem incidentem movere: qualis scilicet esset illa Dei voluntas de qua loquebatur Apostolus, an complacentiæ & conditionata; an vero absoluta & efficax: quia nempe alia via expeditiori, & manendo in suppositione adversariorum, poterat sufficienter solvere falsam eorum interpretationem, ut supra etiam declaratum est; Unde non est mirum quod hanc viam potius elegerit, quam aliam secundum morem suum, & consuetudinem supra declaratam: quia quæstiones illas incidentes declinabat, ut citius & expeditius ad suum principale convolaret. Unum exemplum dabo pro corollario istius nostræ solutionis, in quo Augustinus negat Dei voluntatem in aliquo casu, de quo negari non potest secundum Fidem Catholicam, quia nempe sumebat voluntatem illam pro voluntate absoluta & efficaci, occasione prædictæ difficultatis; Scriptura autem sumebat pro voluntate complacentiæ, in quo non erat contrarius Scripturæ: Istud exemplum est in Enchiridio cap. 97. ubi & agitat nostram quæstionem, & prædictum locum Apostoli; ubi sic ait: Dominus in Evangelio compellans impiam civitatem. Quoties, inquit, volui colligere filios tuos, sicut gallina pullos suos, & noluisti: Tanquam (inquit Augustinus) Dei voluntas superata sit hominum voluntate, & infirmissimis nolendo impedientibus, non potuerit facere Potentissimus quod volebat (ibi videtur negare Scripturam) & ubi est illa omnipotentia quæ in cælo & in terra omnia quæcumque voluit fecit, si colligere filios Hierusalem voluit, & non fecit; an potius & illa quidem filios suos ab ipso colligi noluit, sed ipsa quoque nolente filios ejus collegit ipse, quos voluit. Ibi diceres Augustinum negare id quod dicit Scriptura, imo & asserere omnino oppositum: Unde & aliqui reprehendunt eum, sed immerito, quia ille negabat de absoluta voluntate, (de qua ibi agebat contra Pelagianorum errores) quod Scriptura afferebat de voluntate complacentiæ, quæ non sunt inter se contraria. Quisquis ergo recte voluerit Augustinum interpretari, non attendat solum ad nuda illius verba, sed ad mentem & intentionem ipsius.
Et hæc de bona voluntate Dei circa salutem omnium, secundum Augustinum.
P. F. Carolojoseph Triccassino,
De praedestinatione hominum ad gloriam disputatio theologica in qua clare demonstrantur, praedestionem illam factam esse post praeuisa merita: idque potissimum ex doctrina d. Augustini, & angelici doctoris (Paris: Edmond Couterot, Rue Jacob, 1689), 171–77; italics original.
Here is an AI (ChatGPT) translation:
Point V
In what sense Augustine said that God does not will all men to be saved.
It therefore remains to explain why Augustine, when speaking about that passage of the Apostle, “God wills all men to be saved,” explained it as referring to many, and not to all men individually; indeed, he denies that it should be understood as referring to all men individually. This seems to be contrary to what has been said above.
But I answer that Augustine did not say this in order to give the true interpretation of this passage, but rather to refute the erroneous interpretation that the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians gave to this text. They said that God does not will to save all men because they themselves were unwilling to be saved, as is evident from Book 4 of Against Julian, chapter 8, where Augustine says to Julian:
“But you bring forward the testimony of the Apostle, and you say that the door is opened to those who knock by Him who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. You would have us understand, then, according to your teaching, that all men do not come to be saved and to the knowledge of the truth because they themselves are unwilling to ask, although God is willing to give; they are unwilling to seek, although God is willing to show; and they are unwilling to knock, although God is willing to open.”
From this erroneous interpretation, Augustine saw that two difficulties arose which were contrary to the Catholic faith and which had to be refuted.
The first was directly contrary to the doctrine of grace, since they supposed that it was within man's power to will to be saved before God gave him this power and this will. This amounted to placing an act of free will before grace and making grace something given to him as though it were owed, or granted on account of his merit. Augustine says this in the same place, in these words:
“There, as I see, you have already begun to place merits that precede grace, namely, asking, seeking, and knocking, so that by these merits that grace might be rendered to you as something owed, and thus it would be called grace in vain.”
This was the first difficulty Augustine had to refute.
The second was contrary to divine omnipotence and, at the same time, to grace. For these erring men gave this interpretation to the passage because they did not believe that God could convert hearts that were turned away and hostile, or the perverse wills of men, through some prevenient grace without imposing necessity upon them. Rather, they believed that it was necessary for man to have within himself some beginning of a good will and to dispose himself favorably toward God by asking, seeking, and knocking, so that afterward, when grace came, it might save them freely and in a manner consonant with their nature. Otherwise, they thought, the matter could not be accomplished freely.
This is precisely what Augustine says against them in the same place:
“And in vain,” he says, “would it be written, ‘His mercy shall prevent me.’ In vain, too, would He command us to pray for our enemies, if it were not His to convert hearts that are turned away and hostile.”
Hence the Pelagians themselves said that Augustine, through his doctrine of prevenient grace, was introducing fate, as Augustine himself reports in Book 2 of To Boniface, chapter 6:
“Do you therefore, O sons of pride, enemies of the grace of God, O new heretics, the Pelagians! Does whoever says that the grace of God precedes all the good merits of man, and that the grace of God is not given on account of merits—for it would not be grace if it were not given freely, but rather something owed and rendered to those who merit it—appear to you to be asserting fate?”
These, then, were the difficulties Augustine had to resolve by refuting the aforementioned erroneous interpretation that the Pelagians gave to this passage of the Apostle: “God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.”
But Augustine did not wish to debate what kind of will this was, whether it was a will of good pleasure and conditional, or rather an absolute will. (For it was his custom not to introduce new questions, but to restrain and resolve those that had arisen, as briefly as he could, as we shall note below when we speak of incidental questions in relation to Augustine.) Instead, he remained within their own supposition, namely, that this will was absolute.
He showed that, even if this were admitted, their conclusion did not necessarily follow: namely, that God does not save certain people because they themselves are unwilling to be saved, or because they are unwilling to ask, seek, and knock in order to be saved.
His reasoning was that by the word all, it is not necessary to understand absolutely all men, but it is sufficient to understand all [as] those who are saved, and not also those who are not actually saved.
Furthermore, by all, one can understand all classes of mankind, because there are some who are saved from every nation, condition, and age of men.
Moreover, all can be taken to mean many. He proves this also from certain passages of Scripture in which all is used to mean many.
Finally, he says that the very will of God spoken of in that passage can be understood as the will that inspires the saints to will, or that causes the saints to will, that all men be saved. As he says:
“Just as He sent the Spirit of His Son, crying, ‘Abba, Father,’ that is, causing us to cry out.”
And so, through the various interpretations that he showed this passage could receive, he demonstrated to them that their interpretation was not necessarily true. In this way, he undermined the heretical conclusions mentioned above, which were directed against the entirely gratuitous grace of Christianity and against divine omnipotence. This was the whole purpose he had in mind, not to provide the true and proper interpretation of that passage.
This is clearly evident from two passages in which Augustine presses these interpretations more strongly. The first is Letter 107 to Vitalis, a Semi-Pelagian, where he says:
“Just as what was said, ‘All shall be made alive in Christ,’ was said because all who receive eternal life receive it only in Christ, even though so many are punished with eternal death; so also what was said, ‘God wills all men to be saved,’ was said because all who are saved are saved only by His will, even though He does not will so many to be saved (that is, He does not will this by an absolute will, in the sense maintained by our adversaries). And if those apostolic words can be understood in any other way, provided that they cannot be contrary to that most evident truth in which we see that so many people (he means infants, of whom he had spoken previously) are not saved because men will it, but God does not will it.”
Here it is manifestly apparent from these words, “And if those apostolic words can be understood in any other way, provided that they cannot be contrary to that most evident truth,” which concerns entirely gratuitous grace, that Augustine was not seeking to establish, nor did he intend to provide, the true meaning of that passage. For he does not care how it is understood, and he leaves it to anyone to interpret, provided that it is not contrary to the truth he is defending, namely, that the grace of Christ is entirely gratuitous.
Rather, he only wishes to defend that passage against the erroneous interpretations and conclusions of his adversaries, by which they attacked entirely gratuitous grace.
The second passage of the holy Doctor is found in the Enchiridion, chapter 103. After having interpreted the aforementioned words of the Apostle in various ways, as was related above, he says:
“And it can be understood in any other way, provided that we are not compelled to believe that Almighty God willed something to happen which nevertheless did not happen. For if, as the Truth proclaims, He did in heaven and on earth whatever He pleased, He certainly did not will to do whatever He did not do.”
(That is, He did not will it by an absolute will, as was noted above.)
And thus it is still evident from this passage that Augustine did not wish to give the true interpretation of this passage of the Apostle, but only to provide solutions for refuting the erroneous interpretation of his adversaries. He showed that their interpretation was not necessary, since the aforementioned passage could receive other interpretations.
For by leaving it to the judgment of anyone to interpret that passage in another way, provided that it contains nothing contrary to the omnipotence of God—which Augustine contends against his adversaries enables God, through prevenient grace, to convert hearts that are turned away and hostile, and to make willing those who are unwilling—he sufficiently demonstrates that he does not adhere to any of the aforementioned interpretations that he himself supplied. Rather, through them he merely wished to wrest that passage from the hands of his adversaries, lest they draw any conclusion against it and against the prevenient grace that he was defending against them.
For, as I have said, it was Augustine's custom and intention in questions of this incidental kind to say only briefly what was necessary to refute an error, and not what was necessary to resolve the question itself. He admits this in On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 11, where, speaking about the manner in which he had treated certain incidental questions while arguing against the Manichaeans, he says:
“I did not wish to resolve in detail the exceedingly laborious incidental questions” (note this well), “lest the work become excessively long, especially since, in arguing against such perverse adversaries, I was not assisted by the authority of divine testimonies, and I could conclude, as I did, by a certain reasoning, that whatever might be true among the alternatives that I did not definitively introduce, God must nevertheless be praised in all things, without any necessity of believing that there are, as they wish, two substances, one good and the other evil, mixed together and coeternal.”
And further on:
“In these books, I say” (namely, On Free Will, against the Manichaeans), “many things were discussed in such a way that certain incidental questions, which I either could not unravel or which required a lengthy discussion at that time, were so deferred that our reasoning was brought to this conclusion: that, whether any one of those positions, or any of the various positions concerning those questions, in which it was not evident what was more consistent with the truth, might be true, God should nevertheless be believed, and even shown, to be worthy of praise.”
And in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 9, he says the following concerning a similar incidental question:
“But that which you recall me to have said in a certain little work of mine against Porphyry, under the title On the Time of the Christian Religion, I said in such a way that I passed over this more careful and laborious discussion concerning grace, without, however, omitting to indicate that I did not wish to explain it in that place, and that it could be explained elsewhere or by others.”
And after quoting that lengthy passage, he says:
“Most certainly, without prejudice to the hidden counsel of God and to other causes, I wished to say this concerning the foreknowledge of Christ, because it seemed sufficient for refuting the unbelief of the pagans who had raised this question.”
For what is more true than that Christ foreknew who would believe in Him, when they would believe, and in what places they would believe? But whether, after Christ had been preached to them, they would obtain faith from themselves or receive it as a gift from God—that is, whether God merely foreknew them or also predestined them—I did not then consider it necessary to inquire into and discuss. Accordingly, what I said, etc.
“But since, if it were said in this way, it would make the reader attentive to seeking out those things which, at that time, in view of the warning against the Pelagian error, necessarily had to be discussed more fully and laboriously, it seemed to me that what was then sufficient should be stated briefly, excepting, as I have said, the depth of the wisdom and knowledge of God, and without prejudice to other causes, concerning which I thought it more appropriate to discuss not then, but on another occasion.”
And thus Augustine makes clear how he approached incidental questions in his writings: namely, by indicating them as far as could reasonably be done, but not resolving them in detail. Rather, he said only those things that were sufficient to resolve the principal question, and did so as briefly as he could, leaving it to himself or to others to say more about them at some later time, if it should prove necessary.
And this is certainly what he did in the aforementioned solutions that he gave concerning the previously mentioned passage of the Apostle, against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians.
For he did not wish to raise the question of whether the Apostle was speaking there of God’s absolute will or of His will of good pleasure and conditional will. Instead, remaining within their supposition, namely, that the will was absolute, he said those things that were necessary to refute their false interpretation against grace, yet without prejudicing the true interpretation, which concerns the will of good pleasure and conditional will.
For the things he says there concerning God’s efficacious will are not contrary to what he himself said in On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 33, nor to what ought to be said concerning the will of good pleasure, or conditional will. For it is entirely consistent that God should not will efficaciously to save certain people because of their wicked deeds, and yet should have an affective will and a will of good pleasure toward saving those very same people, as well as all men generally.
Hence, when Augustine says that God does not will to save all men efficaciously, he does not prejudice the sound doctrine concerning the will of good pleasure and the affection for the salvation of all, which he himself had taught in the passage just cited. For these wills are not opposed to one another, since they belong to different kinds and operate under different suppositions.
Nevertheless, by this means Augustine undermined the aforementioned erroneous and false conclusions of his adversaries against grace.
For since he there supposed that all was taken to mean only many, and not all men individually, and that it referred only to those who are saved, and not also to those who are not saved, it could no longer rightly be inferred from the aforementioned passage of the Apostle that God absolutely willed to save those who were not saved.
That conclusion could be drawn only from the universality of the proposition, which appeared to embrace everyone. Consequently, neither could it rightly be inferred that God did not save those who were not saved because they themselves were unwilling to be saved, or because they were unwilling to seek, ask, and knock, as they maintained was necessary in order for them to be freely converted and saved.
For those who were not saved were no longer included within the aforementioned proposition.
And thus, through these solutions, he completely overturned and nullified their empty arguments against prevenient grace. This was what Augustine principally intended—indeed, it was his entire intention. For he did not care which interpretation was given to this text, and he was prepared to admit any interpretation, provided that it did not prejudice his doctrine of prevenient grace, as is evident from these words:
“And if those apostolic words can be understood in any other way, provided that they cannot be contrary to that most evident truth” (which concerns prevenient grace).
Or, as he says in the other passage:
“And it can be understood in any other way,” namely, the aforementioned passage of the Apostle, “provided that we are not compelled to believe,” etc.
From these words, we maintain that our interpretation is not merely not excluded, but is rather included, since it is not contrary to Augustine's doctrine of grace but is highly consistent with it. For, as was explained above, it is entirely in keeping with Augustinian grace, which precedes all works.
From all these considerations, it is manifest that Augustine, through his various solutions or interpretations concerning God’s absolute and efficacious will, in no way intended to prejudice the true interpretation, which concerns the will of good pleasure and conditional will toward absolutely all men. Rather, he only wished to refute the erroneous interpretation of his adversaries against grace and to demonstrate that their interpretation was not necessary, since even on their own supposition—that the will of which the Apostle speaks in that passage was absolute and efficacious—other interpretations could be offered.
For it is not foreign to Augustine’s thought that many different legitimate or appropriate interpretations can be given of one and the same passage of Sacred Scripture, as is evident from Book 3 of On Christian Doctrine, chapter 27, near the beginning.
But I shall go further still. I say that Augustine not only does not prejudice our interpretation in those passages, which is that the text concerns all men individually, but rather admits it, since he admits every interpretation that is not contrary to his doctrine of prevenient grace.
Our interpretation is in no way contrary to that doctrine; on the contrary, it is entirely consistent with it. For it presupposes that grace comes before the act of free will and thus precedes free will itself. It also presupposes that Almighty God can convert hearts that are turned away and hostile, and make willing those who are unwilling. For it presupposes no disposition in man that is necessary before grace, as the Pelagians maintained, by which man might seek, ask, or knock before receiving grace. Rather, it acknowledges that grace itself precedes free will, and that it is the proper work of grace to dispose and prepare the hearts and wills of men by stirring them and drawing them toward the Lord, so that He may convert and heal them.
For the very thing that Augustine criticized in his adversaries’ interpretation was this: they wished, or claimed, that it followed from the aforementioned text that human free will must make the beginning by itself, through seeking, asking, and knocking, and that God would afterward heal them, and could not save those who did not make such a beginning, as was explained above.
But we, on the contrary, say that God Himself makes the beginning through this general good will concerning the salvation of absolutely all men, by giving them truly sufficient graces. If they cooperate and consent with the assisting grace that He has prepared for them, then God will save them efficaciously.
Nevertheless, this does not happen in such a way—as Augustine rightly says—that their free will is taken away, since it is by using that free will either well or badly that they are most justly judged.
I therefore answer the objection briefly on the basis of what has been said.
I say, first, that Augustine denied in the aforementioned passages that the text of the Apostle, “God wills all men to be saved,” should be understood as referring to all men individually because he was answering according to the understanding of his adversaries, taking the will of which the Apostle speaks there to be absolute and efficacious, whereas we take it to be a will of good pleasure. Consequently, the two interpretations are not contrary to one another.
Second, Augustine did not offer any of his interpretations as the true and certain interpretation, but only as probable ones, leaving the passage quite willingly open to others, provided that their interpretations were not contrary to the truth of grace that he was defending against the Pelagians.
This is evident from the words quoted above:
“And if those apostolic words can be understood in any other way, provided that they are not contrary to that most evident truth.”
And from these other words:
“And it can be understood in any other way, provided that we are not compelled,” etc.
By these words, we maintain that our interpretation is not only not excluded but is rather included, since it is not contrary to Augustine’s doctrine of grace, which precedes all works, but is highly consistent with it, as was explained above.
Nevertheless, Augustine did not put forward this interpretation because he did not wish to raise that incidental question, namely, what kind of will of God the Apostle was speaking about: whether it was a will of good pleasure and conditional will, or rather an absolute and efficacious will.
For he could sufficiently resolve their false interpretation by another, more expedient method, while remaining within the supposition of his adversaries, as was also explained above. It is therefore not surprising that he chose this method rather than another, in accordance with his custom and practice explained above. For he avoided such incidental questions so that he might proceed more quickly and directly to his principal objective.
I shall give one example, as a corollary to this solution of ours. In it, Augustine denies God’s will in a certain case in which, according to the Catholic faith, it cannot be denied. This is because he was taking that will to mean an absolute and efficacious will, on the occasion of the aforementioned difficulty, whereas Scripture was taking it to mean a will of good pleasure. In this respect, therefore, he was not contrary to Scripture.
This example is found in the Enchiridion, chapter 97, where he also discusses our question and the aforementioned passage of the Apostle. There he says:
“The Lord, addressing the impious city in the Gospel, says: ‘How often would I have gathered your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you would not.’”
As though, Augustine says, God’s will had been overcome by the will of men, and the Most Powerful One had been unable to accomplish what He willed because the weakest of men, through their unwillingness, had prevented Him.
“And where,” he asks, “is that omnipotence by which He has done whatever He pleased in heaven and on earth, if He willed to gather the children of Jerusalem and did not do so? Or is it rather the case that Jerusalem itself was unwilling for her children to be gathered by Him, but that He nevertheless gathered her children, whom He willed, even though she herself was unwilling?”
Here, you might say, Augustine appears to deny what Scripture says, and indeed to assert precisely the opposite. Some people therefore criticize him, but unjustly. For he denied it with respect to the absolute will (which was the will he was discussing there against the errors of the Pelagians), whereas Scripture was affirming it with respect to the will of good pleasure. These two are not contrary to one another.
Whoever, therefore, wishes to interpret Augustine correctly should not attend merely to his bare words, but rather to his mind and intention.
And this concludes what is to be said concerning the good will of God regarding the salvation of all men, according to Augustine.
*Some additional early modern names are listed below.
2. The Late Modern Era
In the late modern era, Carlo Passaglia (1812–1887), an Italian Jesuit and theologian, said that Augustine affirmed God’s universal salvific will. See Karoli Passaglia,
Commentariorum theologicorum: Pars tertia, De partitione divinae voluntatis in primam et secundam deque universali reparati ordinis amplitudine (Romae: Ex typ. Bonarum Artium, 1850–1851),
XXX,
XXXII,
XXXVI,
XLVI,
LIV,
LIX,
LXII,
LXIII,
LXVIII, and
CV. Against Pasquier Quesnel’s (1634–1719) view and in support of his own perspective, Passaglia lists Denis Petau (
De Deo lib. X), Juan Martínez de Ripalda (1594–1648;
De ente supernat. T. II. disput. CXI), Joseph Tricassinus (d. 1681;
De necessaria ad salutem gratia omnibus et singulis data), Alphonse Le Moyne (b. c.1596–1659;
De dono orandi, sive de gratia ad orandum sufficiente, cap. II), Scipione Maffei (1675– 1755;
Hist. Theolog. de gratia, lib XVI), Bernardus Désirant (1656–1725; In opere inscripto,
s. Augustinus vindicatus contra centum et unam damnatas Paschalis Quesnelli propositiones), and Jean Le Porcq (1636–1722; In opere, cui titulum fecit,
Les sentiments de saint Augustin sur la grâce opposez à ceux de Jansenius). See Passaglia,
Commentariorum theologicorum: Pars tertia,
113 (LIV).
Matthias Joseph Scheeben (1835–1888) was a German Catholic priest and theologian. He studied at the Gregorian University at Rome under Carlo Passaglia. In §266, he wrote on “The universal intention of the deed of Redemption with regard to all sinners and all sins in mankind, and the restoration of the general order of salvation for all mankind that is thereby established.” In paragraph 1358 he discussed Augustine’s view:
{1358} For the best discussion of St. Augustine’s position against the Semipelagians in this question, see Tricassin, De praedestinatione, part. 1, sect. 7, punct. 4 ff., esp. pp. 171 ff.; see also Franzelin, op. cit., th. 32. The relevant interpretations of 1 Tim 2 in Augustine’s writings show—partly by the differences between them, partly through the Saint’s explicit declaration about the intent of his interpretation (“it can be understood in many ways, in whatever other way it can be understood, let us nevertheless not be compelled to believe that Almighty God willed to do something [with His absolute will] and it was not done,” Enchiridion n. 103)—that he intended only to address the Pelagian misinterpretation and by no means to determine definitively and exclusively the positive meaning of the Apostle’s words. This polemical-apologetic perspective prevails also in the writings of his disciples, although of course Fulgentius (Epist. 17) De incarnatione et gratia ad Petrum diaconem, 56 ff.) seems to let himself be carried away from it to a positive and exclusive explanation of the passage also. The polemical-apologetic explanation itself appears in Augustine’s writings in two forms. The first form of explanation takes up a position with the Pelagians on the common ground of the absolute will (in the sense explained above) and then interprets “all men” in such a way that it fits the absolute will, namely either in the sense of an accommodated logical division, whether a negative division (“all who are saved are saved by God’s will, and no one is saved except by the saving God”) or else a positive division for kinds of individuals, not for individuals of [various] kinds (“every kind of human, by whatever differences they may be classified”). The second form of explanation, on the other hand, intends to pull the rug out from under its opponents entirely, in that it reinterprets the expression “wants them to be saved” to mean: “wants and makes us want all men to be saved,” whereby naturally all conclusions about the efficacy of the salvific will are cut off in advance. These explanations were by no means advanced with the intention of ruling out the universality of the antecedent will in the Catholic sense, nor can they be justified materially and exegetically without presupposing that universality, and hence upon closer inspection, they include the latter. Cf. Franzelin, loc. cit.
Matthias Joseph Scheeben,
Handbook of Catholic Dogmatics 5.2, trans. Michael J. Miller (Emmaus Academic, 2021), §266, 1358. This was translated from
Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik, Fifth Book: Erlösungslehre. Second edition. Edited by Carl Feckes (Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1954). Or see
Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik (Herder’sche Verlagshandlung, 1882), 3:363 (§266, 1358).
Eugène Portalié (1852–1909), a French Jesuit who was admittedly very eager to argue that Augustine was mostly in line with Catholic teaching, stated that,
It is regarded as incontestable today that the system of Augustine was complete in his mind from the year 397—that is, from the beginning of his episcopate, when he wrote his answers to the “quæstiones Diversæ” of Simplician. It is to this book that Augustine, in his last years, refers the Semipelagians for the explanation of his real thought. This important fact, to which for a long time no attention was paid, has been recognized by Neander and established by Gangaut, and also by recent critics, such as Loofs, Reuter, Turmel, Jules Martin (see also Cunningham, St. Austin, 1886, pp. 80 and 175). It will not, therefore, be possible to deny the authority of these texts on the pretext that Augustine in his old age adopted a system more antagonistic to liberty.
He said that Augustine’s view that “the eternal choice of the elect by God … does not destroy the Divine will to save all men, which, moreover, is not realized except by the human liberty that leaves to the elect full power to fall and to the non-elect full power to rise.” Portalié, “Teaching of St. Augustine of Hippo,” in The Catholic Encyclopedia, 2:97.
This decree falls in line with the Catholic dogma or with “the very sincere will of God to give to all men the power of saving themselves and the power of damning themselves.” Indeed,
According to Augustine, God, in his creative decree, has expressly excluded every order of things in which grace would deprive man of his liberty, every situation in which man would not have the power to resist sin, and thus Augustine brushes aside that predestinationism which has been attributed to him. Listen to him speaking to the Manichæans: “All can be saved if they wish”; and in his “Retractations” (I, x), far from correcting this assertion, he confirms it emphatically: “It is true, entirely true, that all men can, if they wish.” But he always goes back to the providential preparation. In his sermons he says to all: “It depends on you to be elect” (In Ps. cxx, n. 11, etc.); “Who are the elect? You, if you wish it” (In Ps. lxxiii, n. 5).
Portalié, “Teaching of St. Augustine of Hippo,” in The Catholic Encyclopedia, 2:98. Again,
The doctrine of the Divine will to save all men and the universality of redemption was thus consecrated by the public teaching of the Church. In the Middle Ages these two truths are developed by the great Doctors of the Church. Faithful to the principles of Augustinism, they place in especial relief his theory on Divine Providence, which prepares at its pleasure the determinations of the will by exterior events and interior inspirations.
Portalié, “Teaching of St. Augustine of Hippo,” in The Catholic Encyclopedia, 2:100. While admitting some shortcomings in Augustine about this matter, Portalié said,
Secondly, such consoling and fundamental truths as God’s desire to save all men, and the redeeming death of Christ which was really offered and accepted for all peoples and all individuals—these truths, which Augustine never denied, but which he left too much in the background and as it were hidden under the terrible formulas of the doctrine of predestination, have been placed in the full light, have been developed [by the Roman Catholic Church], and applied to infidel nations, and have at last entered into the ordinary teaching of theology.
Portalié, “Teaching of St. Augustine of Hippo,” in
The Catholic Encyclopedia, 2:101. In his very extensive entry on Saint Augustine in the DTC, Portalié documents that Augustine taught universal redemption.
f) L’étendue de la rédemption du Christ, d’après Augustin, est universelle et ne souffre pas d’exception: Sanguis innocens fusus delevit OMNIA PECCATA nocentium, pretium tantum datum redemit OMNES CAPTIVOS… In Ps. CXXIX, n. 2, P. L., t. XXXVII, col. 1697. Ainsi: a. Tous les péchés sont expiés, même ceux commis après le baptême, qui, d’après Scheel, op. cit., p. 313, ne seraient point compris dans la rédemption.—b. Tous les captifs sont rachetés, même les enfants qui meurent sans recevoir le baptême. Augustin l’affirme expressément. Cont. Jul., l. III, c. XXV, n. 58, P. L., t. XLIV, col. 732. Il faut même remarquer l’argumentation d’Augustin qui ferme toute échappatoire aux jansénistes. Au l. VI Cont. Jul., c. IV, n. 8, ibid., col. 825, et dans l’Op. imperf. cont. Jul., l. II, n. 175, ibid., col. 1217, il raisonne ainsi: Jésus-Christ est mort pour tous sans exception, donc tous sans exception sont pécheurs: omnes itaque mortui sunt in peccatis, NEMINE PRORSUS EXCEPTO, et pro omnibus mortuis vivus mortuus est unus. De civit., l. XX, c. VI, P. L., t. XLI, col. 665. Voilà la pensée des dernières années d’Augustin. On sera donc bien forcé, quand il restreindra aux élus les effets de la rédemption, de l’entendre des grâces efficaces qui ne sont pas données à tous. Les sermons de saint Augustin ne peuvent laisser aucun doute; après le R. P. O. Rottmanner, Scheel l’a remarqué, op. cit., p. 455. Serm., CCCXLIV, n. 4, P. L., t. XXXIX, col. 1515: Sanguis Domini tui, SI VIS, datus est pro te, SI NOLUERIS esse, non est datus pro te… Hoc est magnum quia semel et PRO OMNIBUS DEDIT. Sanguis Christi volenti est salus, nolenti supplicium. Serm., CCXCII, n. 4, P. L., t. XXXVIII, col. 1322: APOSTOLICA ET VERA SENTENTIA EST, QUA CHRISTUS SALVATOR OMNIUM HOMINUM. Cf. J.-B. Faure, ad cap. XLVII Enchir.; Stentrup, De Verbo incarnato, Soteriologia, th. XXXIII, t. I, p. 387–416. Voir plus loin la doctrine de la grâce.—Quant aux anges, Augustin eût craint de favoriser la croyance origéniste au salut final des démons, s’il ne les laissait en dehors de la rédemption. Il signale seulement, Enchirid., c. LXI–LXII, P. L., t. XL, col. 260–261, que la mort du Christ a réuni hommes justes et bons anges en une même cité de Dieu, dans laquelle les élus remplaceront les anges déchus.
AI (Google) Translation:
f) According to Augustine, the extent of Christ’s redemption is universal and admits of no exception: “The innocent blood that was shed blotted out ALL THE SINS of the guilty; the price that was paid redeemed ALL THE CAPTIVES…” (On Psalm 129, no. 2, Patrologia Latina, vol. 37, col. 1697). Thus: a. All sins are expiated, even those committed after baptism, which, according to [Otto] Scheel (op. cit., p. 313), would not be included in redemption. b. All captives are redeemed, including children who die without receiving baptism. Augustine expressly affirms this (Against Julian, Book III, ch. 25, no. 58, Patrologia Latina, vol. 44, col. 697). 732. We must also take note of Augustine’s argument, which leaves the Jansenists no avenue of escape. In Book VI of Against Julian, Chapter IV, No. 8 (ibid., col. 825), and in Unfinished Work against Julian, Book II, No. 175 (ibid., col. 1217), he reasons as follows: “Therefore, ALL HAVE DIED IN SINS, WITHOUT ABSOLUTELY ANYONE BEING EXCLUDED, and the One who was alive died for all those who had died.” (The City of God, Book XX, ch. 6, Patrologia Latina, vol. 41, col. 665). This represents the thinking of Augustine’s later years. We shall therefore be compelled, when he restricts the effects of redemption to the elect, to understand him as referring to efficacious graces, which are not given to everyone. The sermons of Saint Augustine leave no room for doubt on this matter. Father O[dilo] Rottmanner had already observed this, and [Otto] Scheel subsequently noted it as well (op. cit., p. 455). Sermon 344, no. 4, Patrologia Latina, vol. 39, col. 1515: “The blood of your Lord was given for you, IF YOU WISH; if you do not wish to belong to Him, it was not given for you.… This is the great thing: that He gave it once and FOR ALL. The blood of Christ is salvation for the one who wills it, but punishment for the one who does not will it.” Sermon 292, no. 4, Patrologia Latina, vol. 38, col. 1322: “IT IS AN APOSTOLIC AND TRUE DECLARATION THAT CHRIST IS THE SAVIOR OF ALL MEN.” Compare J.-B. [Ioanne Baptista] Faure, commentary on Chapter XLVII of the Enchiridion; [Ferdinand Alois] Stentrup, On the Incarnate Word, Soteriology, Thesis XXXIII, vol. I, pp. 387–416. See further below on the doctrine of grace. As for the angels, Augustine would have feared giving support to the Origenist belief in the final salvation of demons had he not excluded them from redemption. He merely observes, in the Enchiridion, Chapters LXI–LXII, Patrologia Latina, vol. 40, cols. 260–261, that Christ’s death united righteous men and good angels in the same City of God, in which the elect will take the place of the fallen angels.
Eugène Portalié,
“AUGUSTINE (SAINT),” in The Dictionnaire de théologie catholique: contenant l'exposé des doctrines de la théologie catholique, leurs preuves et leur histoire, ed. Jean Michel Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot, and Émile Amann, 15 vols. (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1899–1950 [1909]), 1/2:2370.
Joseph Pohle (1852–1922), a member of the founding faculty of the Catholic University in America and a frequent contributor to the
Catholic Encyclopedia (wherein he wrote 21 articles), argued for Augustine’s affirmation of God’s universal saving will. He even gave an explanation of how Augustine’s reading of 1 Tim 2:4 can be read along the lines of the ancient distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will. See Joseph Pohle,
Grace, Actual and Habitual: A Dogmatic Treatise, ed. Arthur Preuss, 6th ed. (B. Herder, 1955), 160–62.
Joseph Tixeront (1856–1925), a French Sulpician theologian, educator, and patrologist, said that Augustine by no means denied God’s universal salvific will, and that in a good many passages he assumes it to be evident, especially when he affirms that Jesus Christ died for all and offers sufficient graces to all. Referencing Denis Pétau, Tixeront lists Augustine’s
De catechizandis rudibus, 52;
Epistula CLXXXV, 49;
Enarratio in psalmum LXXIII,
sermo II, 11;
Retractationes, I, 10, 2;
Contra Iulianum, VI, 8;
Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum, II, 174, 175, with the classic passage being found in
De spiritu et littera, 58. See Joseph Tixeront,
Histoire Des Dogmes Dans L’antiquité Chrétienne II: De Saint Athanase a Saint Augustin (314–430) (Victor Lecoffre, 1924), 505–6; Joseph Tixeront,
History of Dogmas, trans. H. L. B., 3 vols. (Christian Classics, Inc., 1984), 2:496–500. Tixeront reads Augustine on 1 Tim 2:4 and God’s antecedent/consequent will as Pohle does.
Adhémar d'Alès (1861–1938) was a Jesuit, Franco-Gallic theologian and patrologist. According to
one source, “He served as principal director of the 4-volume
Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catholique (Paris 1911–28), to which he contributed many articles dealing with the development of theology in the early and medieval Church. He was an exact and careful scholar whose analyses of theological problems in their historical development have proved invaluable.” He seems to have held something of a mediating position. He sees drift in the later Augustine towards an increasingly narrow view on the divine will, but still wants to maintain that Augustine did not entirely abandon his early positions on the point. Augustine’s system still has the potential for synthesis. D'Alès sees some legitimacy in Rottmanner’s interpretation of Augustine, but does not want to entirely agree with him, and so voices precautions. About Augustine’s view, he wrote:
Pour apprécier correctement la position d’Augustin dans la question de la Prédestination, il faut nécessairement se souvenir de l’aspect particulier par où il l’aborde: il s’agit pour lui de revendiquer, contre une hérésie naturaliste, la souveraine indépendance de la grâce divine. Il écrit, Praed. SS., XXI, 34, P. L., XLV, 1027: Praedestinatio praedicanda est, ut possit vera Dei gratia, h. e. quae non secundum merita nostra datur, insuperabili munitione defendi. On ne cherchera point ailleurs la raison d’une lacune très apparente de sa doctrine, relative à l’universalité du pouvoir salifique en Dieu. En 400, cette universalité a trouvé une expression non équivoque dans De catechiz. rud., XXVI, 52, P. L., XL, 31?5: A quo interitu, h. e. poenis sempiternis, Deus misericors volens homines liberare, si ipsi sibi non sint inimici et non resistant misericordiae Creatoris sui, misit unigenitum Filium suum, h. e. Verbum suum aequale sibi…, ut…, deletis omnibus peccatis praeteritis, credentes in eum omnes in vitam aeternam ingrederentur. Sur l’exégèse du texte fameux de saint Paul, I Tim., II, 4, Augustin a beaucoup oscillé. Encore au commencement de la controverse pélagienne, en 412, il écrit, dans De spir. et litt., XXXIII, 58, P. L., XLIV, 238: Vult autem Deus omnes homines salvos fieri et in agnitionem veritatis venire; non sic tamen ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium.—En 421, il propose concurremment deux explications: A) Dieu veut le salut de tous les hommes, en ce sens que nul ne se sauve que par sa volonté, Enchiridion, CIII, 27, P. L., XL, 280 et Contra Julianum, IV, VIII, 42-44, P. L., XLIV, 759-760 ; B) Dieu veut sauver des hommes de toute catégorie, Enchir., ibid.—À partir de 426, sans rétracter ses exégèses précédentes (voir De corr. et grat., XIV, 44, P. L., XLIV, 943), il insiste particulièrement sur l’exégèse A) : Ep., CCXVII, 6, 19, P. L., XXXIII, 985–986 ; Praed. SS., VIII, 14, P. L., XLIV, 971, ou sur B) : De corr. et gr., l. c. Il en ajoute même une nouvelle : Dieu veut le salut de tous les hommes, en ce sens qu’il en inspire le désir à ses saints, Civ. Dei, XXII, 11, 2, P. L., XLI, 753. Ces variations montrent que, pour faire front devant l’hérésie, peu à peu il évacue le terrain de la volonté divine conditionnelle, qu'il occupait encore en 412, pour se fixer sur le terrain de la volonté divine absolue, qui est celui du décret de prédestination.
Tel n'est pas l'avis de Jansénius. À l'en croire, l'interprétation de I Tim., II, 4, consignée en 400 dans le De catechizandis rudibus, rééditée en 412 dans le De spiritu et littera, se confondrait avec l'erreur semipélagienne, dont Augustin se détacha vers la fin de sa vie, et devrait être tenue pour condamnée par son propre et définitif suffrage. Augustinus, t. III, De gratia Christi, I. III, c. XX, p. 157 sqq., Rouen, 1652.
Jansénius oublie qu’Augustin n’avait pas attendu 412 ni même 400 pour désavouer cette erreur de sa jeunesse: il avait rompu avec elle dès le temps des livres Ad Simplicianum, c’est-à-dire dès 397, d’après les témoignages de De praed. SS. et de De dono pers., que nous avons cités. Mais surtout Jansénius n’a pas su voir que les conditions particulières de la controverse pélagienne amenèrent Augustin à laisser en dehors de son horizon toute une partie du genre humain et à s’occuper des seuls prédestinés, quand il commente le texte de saint Paul. En effet, les Pélagiens ne niaient pas seulement la nécessité de la grâce pour le salut; ils niaient encore la puissance de la grâce pour fléchir la volonté humaine. Contre la première erreur, Augustin devait se borner à mettre en lumière l’indigence de la nature. Contre la deuxième erreur, il devait se borner à mettre en lumière la puissance efficace de la grâce pour le salut. Dans la poursuite de ce double but, il néglige volontiers la condition misérable des âmes qui, par leur infidélité, se soustraient aux sollicitations de la grâce, et il insiste très fort sur l’efficacité victorieuse des grâces que Dieu dispense à ses prédestinés. Dans ces développements, les non prédestinés sont pour lui comme n’existant pas, et il ne faut pas chercher ailleurs la raison d’un silence qui n’est pas un désaveu de son exégèse antérieure. Augustin n’a jamais oublié que l’homme peut, par sa faute, déchoir de la grâce. Voir, à ce propos, De San, Tractatus de Deo uno, t. II, c. IV, p. 35–54, Louvain, 1897.
L’évolution réelle, accomplie par Augustin adversaire du pélagianisme, n’est pas une rétractation de sa doctrine sur la grâce: c’est un changement de front, pour faire face à un nouveau danger. Pour ressaisir l’unité de plan, il n’est que de se placer au point de vue que ramenait le même traité, point de vue qui désormais commande tout: celui d’une prédestination de fait, d’une persévérance de fait.
De dono perseverantiae, VI, 10, P. L., XLV, 999: De illa perseverantia loquimur qua perseveratur usque in finem: quae si data est, perseveratum est usque in finem; si autem non est perseveratum usque in finem, non est data… Non itaque dicant homines perseverantiam cuiquam datam usque in finem, nisi cum ipse venerit finis et perseverasse, cui data est, repertus sit usque in finem. Dicimus... perseverantiam usque in finem, quoniam non habet quisquam nisi qui perseverat usque in finem; multi eam possunt habere, nullus amittere. Neque enim metuendum est ne forte, cum perseveraverit homo usque in finem, aliqua in eo mala voluntas oriatur ne perseveret usque in finem. Hoc ergo Dei donum suppliciter emereri potest; sed cum datum fuerit, amitti contumaciter non potest. Cum enim perseveraverit usque in finem, neque hoc donum potest amittere nec alia quae poterat ante finem. Quomodo igitur potest amitti, per quod fit ut non amittatur etiam quod posset amitti?
Du point de vue de la prédestination de fait, la prescience divine antécédente au décret de prédestination s’éclipse, et une autre prescience divine, celle-ci conséquente au décret de prédestination, vient au premier plan. Ce changement ne va pas sans quelque appauvrissement de la donnée paulienne. Le théologien, chez Augustin, fait tort à l’exégète. Il faut oublier celui-ci pour rendre justice à celui-là.
Un éminent spécialiste résumait naguère, en quelques pages substantielles, l’idée-mère de l’« Augustinisme »;—par là il entendait « la doctrine de la Prédestination absolue et de la volonté salvifique restreinte, telle qu’Augustin l’a développée surtout dans la dernière période de sa vie, de 417 à 418, et maintenue fermement jusqu’à sa mort ». O. Rottmanner, O.S.B., Der Augustinismus, München, 1892, p. 5. Après avoir noté, pour rassurer le lecteur, que la théorie augustinienne de la prédestination n’est jamais devenue la doctrine de l’Église, Rottmanner pose en principe que les derniers écrits d’Augustin ont ici, en bonne critique, une importance décisive, comme renfermant l’expression définitive de sa pensée. Il expose, d’après Augustin, la conception de la massa peccati; le rôle de la justice et celui de la miséricorde; la fixité absolue de la prédestination et son infaillibilité; la notion corrélative de réprobation, son mystère et sa justice; la toute-puissance de la volonté divine pour sauver et pour damner; le rôle de la liberté humaine, qui demeure sauve, parce que praeparatur voluntas a Domino; enfin la volonté divine salvifique, non pas universelle, mais restreinte. Il conclut: 1° Qu’il faut désespérer de réconcilier, chez Augustin, la théorie et la pratique du ministère pastoral: la théorie, impliquant l’affirmation de la volonté salvifique restreinte; la pratique, se réglant sur l’hypothèse de la volonté salvifique universelle; 2° Qu’il faut pareillement désespérer de ramener à l’unité la pensée d’Augustin, qui, jusqu’à la fin de sa vie, évolua vers une plus grande rigueur.—Sans méconnaître le mérite de cette synthèse vigoureuse, nous croyons qu’elle appelle des tempéraments. 1° S’il est vrai de dire, avec Rottmanner, et avec Petau (Dogm. theol., I, l. X, c. I, n. 2), que l’Église n’a jamais fait simplement sienne la doctrine d’Augustin sur la prédestination, il ne faut pas oublier l’approbation solennelle donnée par le pape Célestin, dès le lendemain de sa mort, à l’ensemble de sa doctrine sur la grâce (431), D. B., 128 (86)… 134 (92) sqq.; 2° Il est grave d’admettre, chez un homme tel qu’Augustin, un divorce réel, et de plus en plus prononcé, entre la théorie et la pratique; 3° Grave aussi de méconnaître l’unité organique d’une pensée aussi puissante, qui évolua dans le sens de la rigueur, c’est entendu, mais sans désavouer ses origines, sauf le semipélagianisme initial, dont on a vu la rétractation formelle. Il y a des silences qui s’expliquent par le changement des circonstances, mieux que par le changement des principes directeurs. De fait, les circonstances avaient changé: occupé du danger présent, Augustin se fait le champion intransigeant de la grâce divine. Les autres erreurs sont pour lui comme n’existant pas.
Nous croyons rendre à la pensée d’Augustin une plus entière justice en soulignant les limitations essentielles de ses écrits antipélagiens. En accusant le relief de l’action divine, il n’efface pas purement et simplement les traits marqués dans ses écrits antérieurs; parfois il y renvoie expressément, et quand il affirme y reconnaître encore sa pensée présente, nous devons l’en croire. C’est le cas particulièrement pour les Quaestiones ad Simplicianum, de l’année 397.
D’ailleurs cette pensée présente d’incontestables lacunes. La plus notable, sans doute, résulte de l’attention exclusive donnée par Augustin à une seule sorte de volonté divine: la volonté absolue et sûrement exécutoire: conséquemment, l’effacement, de plus en plus marqué, d’une volonté salvifique universelle. Cette exclusion une fois posée, tout le développement suit; développement unilatéral. On ne peut pourtant pas dire qu’Augustin ignore les distinctions nécessaires, puisque, à côté des vocati secundum propositum, il continue d’admettre d’autres vocati, qui sont tous les hommes. Mais il n’en tire pas parti. À cet égard, la théologie chrétienne avait beaucoup à apprendre de la tradition grecque.—Sur la pensée d’Augustin, voir E. Portalie, S. I., art. Augustin, dans D.T.C., t. I, col. 2398–2404; K. Kolb; Menschliche Freiheit und goettliches Vorherwissen nach Augustinus, Freiburg i. B., 1908.
AI (ChatGPT) translation:
To appreciate Augustine's position correctly on the question of Predestination, it is necessary to keep in mind the particular aspect from which he approaches it: for him, the issue is to vindicate the supreme independence of divine grace against a naturalistic heresy. He writes in On the Predestination of the Saints, XXI, 34 (PL 45, 1027): “Predestination must be proclaimed so that the true grace of God—that is, grace which is not given according to our merits—may be defended by an impregnable protection.” One must look no further for the explanation of a very apparent deficiency in his doctrine concerning the universality of God's saving power. In 400, this universality found an unequivocal expression in On the Catechizing of the Uninstructed, XXVI, 52 (PL 40, 315): “From this destruction, that is, from everlasting punishments, God, in His mercy, wishing to deliver human beings, provided that they are not enemies to themselves and do not resist the mercy of their Creator, sent His only-begotten Son, that is, His Word, equal to Himself ..., so that ..., with all their past sins blotted out, all who believed in Him might enter into eternal life.” Regarding the exegesis of the famous text of Saint Paul, 1 Timothy 2:4, Augustine vacillated considerably.
Even at the beginning of the Pelagian controversy, in 412, he writes in On the Spirit and the Letter, XXXIII, 58 (PL 44, 238): “God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth; nevertheless, not in such a way as to deprive them of free will.” In 421, he proposes two interpretations simultaneously: A) God wills the salvation of all men in the sense that no one is saved except through His will. Enchiridion, CIII, 27 (PL 40, 280), and Against Julian, IV, VIII, 42–44 (PL 44, 759–760). B) God wills to save human beings from every category or class. Enchiridion, in the same place. Beginning in 426, without retracting his earlier interpretations (see On Rebuke and Grace, XIV, 44, PL 44, 943), he insists particularly upon interpretation A: Epistle CCXVII, 6, 19 (PL 33, 985–986); On the Predestination of the Saints, VIII, 14 (PL 44, 971); or upon interpretation B: On Rebuke and Grace, in the same place. He even adds a new interpretation: God wills the salvation of all men in the sense that He inspires the desire for it in His saints. The City of God, XXII, 11, 2 (PL 41, 753). These variations show that, in order to confront heresy, Augustine gradually abandons the ground of the conditional divine will, which he still occupied in 412, in order to establish himself upon the ground of the absolute divine will, which is that of the decree of predestination.
Jansenius does not hold this opinion. According to him, the interpretation of 1 Timothy 2:4 recorded in 400 in On the Catechizing of the Uninstructed, and repeated in 412 in On the Spirit and the Letter, would be identical with the Semi-Pelagian error, from which Augustine withdrew toward the end of his life, and ought to be regarded as having been condemned by his own final and definitive judgment. Augustinus, vol. III, On the Grace of Christ, Book III, chapter XX, p. 157 ff., Rouen, 1652.
Jansenius forgets that Augustine had not waited until 412, or even until 400, to repudiate this error of his youth: he had already broken with it by the time of his books To Simplicianus, that is, as early as 397, according to the testimonies of On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Gift of Perseverance, which we have cited. But above all, Jansenius failed to see that the particular circumstances of the Pelagian controversy led Augustine to leave an entire portion of the human race outside his field of consideration and to concern himself only with the predestined when commenting on the text of Saint Paul. For the Pelagians denied not only the necessity of grace for salvation; they also denied the power of grace to bend the human will. Against the first error, Augustine had to confine himself to bringing to light the insufficiency of human nature. Against the second error, he had to confine himself to bringing to light the efficacious power of grace for salvation. In pursuing this twofold aim, he willingly overlooks the wretched condition of souls who, through their infidelity, withdraw themselves from the solicitations of grace, and he insists very strongly upon the victorious efficacy of the graces that God dispenses to His predestined. In these discussions, the non-predestined are, for him, as though they did not exist, and one must not seek elsewhere the reason for a silence that does not constitute a repudiation of his earlier exegesis. Augustine never forgot that man can, through his own fault, fall away from grace. See, in this connection, De San, Tractatus de Deo uno, vol. II, chapter IV, pp. 35–54, Louvain, 1897.
The actual development undergone by Augustine as an opponent of Pelagianism is not a retraction of his doctrine of grace; it is a change of front in order to confront a new danger. To recover the unity of his overall plan, one need only adopt the point of view to which the same treatise had brought him, a point of view that henceforth governs everything: that of a predestination de facto (in actuality), and a perseverance de facto (in actuality).
On the Gift of Perseverance, VI, 10 (PL 45, 999): “We are speaking of that perseverance by which one perseveres to the end. If it has been given, one has persevered to the end; but if one has not persevered to the end, it has not been given. ... Therefore, let people not say that perseverance has been given to anyone unto the end unless the end itself has come and the person to whom it was given is found to have persevered to the end. We say ... perseverance unto the end, because no one possesses it except the one who perseveres to the end; many can possess it, but no one can lose it. For there is no need to fear that, when a person has persevered to the end, some evil inclination might arise within him so that he does not persevere to the end. This gift of God, therefore, can be obtained through humble supplication; but once it has been given, it cannot be lost through obstinate resistance. For when someone has persevered to the end, he can no longer lose this gift, nor anything else that he could have lost before the end. How, then, can that be lost by which it comes about that even what could have been lost is not lost?”
From the standpoint of predestination de facto (predestination in actuality), the divine foreknowledge antecedent to the decree of predestination recedes into the background, and another divine foreknowledge, namely, that which is consequent upon the decree of predestination, comes to the forefront. This change does not come without some impoverishment of the Pauline teaching. In Augustine, the theologian does an injustice to the exegete. One must forget the latter in order to do justice to the former.
A distinguished specialist recently summarized, in a few substantial pages, the central idea of “Augustinianism.” By this he meant “the doctrine of absolute Predestination and of a restricted salvific will, as Augustine developed it especially during the final period of his life, from 417 to 418, and firmly maintained until his death.” O. Rottmanner, O.S.B., Der Augustinismus, Munich, 1892, p. 5.
After noting, in order to reassure the reader, that the Augustinian theory of predestination never became the doctrine of the Church, Rottmanner lays down the principle that Augustine’s final writings have decisive importance here, according to sound critical judgment, since they contain the definitive expression of his thought. He sets forth, following Augustine, the conception of the massa peccati (mass of sin); the respective roles of justice and mercy; the absolute fixity of predestination and its infallibility; the corresponding notion of reprobation, its mystery and its justice; the omnipotence of the divine will to save and to damn; the role of human freedom, which remains intact because praeparatur voluntas a Domino (the will is prepared by the Lord); and, finally, the divine salvific will, which is not universal but restricted. He concludes: 1. That one must abandon all hope of reconciling, in Augustine, the theory and practice of pastoral ministry: the theory entails the affirmation of a restricted salvific will, whereas the practice is governed by the assumption of a universal salvific will. 2. That one must likewise abandon all hope of bringing unity to Augustine’s thought, which, until the end of his life, developed toward an increasingly rigorous position. Without denying the merit of this vigorous synthesis, we believe that it calls for certain qualifications. 1. If it is true to say, with Rottmanner and Petau (Dogmatica Theologica, I, Book X, chapter I, no. 2), that the Church has never simply adopted Augustine’s doctrine of predestination as its own, one must not forget the solemn approval given by Pope Celestine, immediately after Augustine’s death, to the entirety of his doctrine of grace (431), Denzinger-Bannwart, 128 (86)–134 (92) and following. 2. It is a serious matter to maintain that, in a man such as Augustine, there was a real and increasingly pronounced divorce between theory and practice. 3. It is equally serious to overlook the organic unity of so powerful a body of thought, which certainly developed in the direction of greater rigor, but without repudiating its origins, except for its initial Semi-Pelagianism, whose formal retraction has been demonstrated. There are silences that are better explained by changes in circumstances than by changes in governing principles. In fact, the circumstances had changed: preoccupied with the danger immediately confronting him, Augustine made himself the uncompromising champion of divine grace. The other errors, for him, were as though they did not exist.
We believe that we do greater justice to Augustine’s thought by emphasizing the essential limitations of his anti-Pelagian writings. While emphasizing the importance of divine action, he does not simply erase the distinctive features of his earlier writings; sometimes he explicitly refers back to them, and when he affirms that he still recognizes his present thought in those earlier works, we must take him at his word. This is particularly the case with the Questions to Simplicianus, dating from 397.
Moreover, this later thought has undeniable shortcomings. The most notable, without doubt, results from the exclusive attention Augustine gives to only one kind of divine will: the absolute will, which is certainly efficacious. Consequently, there is an increasingly pronounced suppression of a universal salvific will. Once this exclusion has been established, the entire subsequent development follows—a one-sided development. Nevertheless, one cannot say that Augustine ignores the necessary distinctions, since, alongside those who are called according to the purpose (vocati secundum propositum), he continues to acknowledge other called ones (vocati), who are all human beings. But he does not make use of this distinction. In this respect, Christian theology had much to learn from the Greek tradition. On Augustine’s thought, see E. Portalie, S.J., “Augustine,” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique (D.T.C.), vol. I, cols. 2398–2404; K. Kolb, Menschliche Freiheit und göttliches Vorherwissen nach Augustinus [Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge According to Augustine], Freiburg im Breisgau, 1908.
Réginald Marie Garrigou-Lagrange (1877–1964) was a French Dominican friar, philosopher and neo-Thomist theologian. He wrote:
Some Pelagians put a wrong construction upon St. Paul’s text that “God will have all men to be saved,”30 and claimed that God wills equally the salvation of all. In reply to these heretics St. Augustine, arguing from the fact that all men are not saved and from the principle of the infallible efficacy of the divine will, had repeatedly spoken of a restricted will to save. By this he meant the infallibly efficacious will that leads the elect to eternal life. St. Prosper, replying to the objections made against the teaching of his master, insists upon another aspect of this doctrine. St. Augustine had clearly affirmed that “God does not command what is impossible, but in commanding admonishes thee to do what thou canst and to ask for what thou canst not do.”31 God never commands what is impossible, otherwise no one could avoid committing actual sin, which in this case would no longer be a sin, and the divine chastisements inflicted for such would be a manifest injustice. To say that God never commands the impossible means that He wills to make it really possible for all to comply with the precepts imposed upon them and to do so when they are imposed. Thus He wills to make their salvation really possible, though He does not lead them all efficaciously to eternal life. Moreover, St. Augustine again and again, without adding any restrictions, explained St. Paul’s text that “Christ dies for all.”32
True to the teaching of his master, St. Prosper wrote as follows: “We must most sincerely believe and profess that God wills all men to be saved. For this, indeed, is the mind of the Apostle, who most urgently commands, what is a most devout custom in all the churches, that suppliant prayers be offered to God for all men. That many of these perish is the fault of those who perish: that many are saved is the gift of Him who saves.”33
_______________
30 I Tim. 2:4
31 De natura et gratia, PL, XLIII, 50; XLIV, 271.
32 II Cor. 5:15; cf. PL, XLIV, 825; XLV, 1217.
33 PL, LI, 179; cf. Resp. ad 8 obj. Gallorum vincent., ibid., 162.
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange,
Predestination, trans. Dom Bede Rose (B. Herder Book Co., 1953), 45–46.
Abbé Albert Michel (1877–1972), a Thomist priest involved in the anti-modernist struggle, who held the chair of dogmatic theology at the Catholic Institute of Lille and who worked actively on the Dictionnaire de thâeologie catholique as the last editor, has a lot of helpful material on the history of God’s universal salvific will. See his “Volonté de Dieu Salvifique Universelle,” in Dictionnaire de thâeologie catholique: contenant l'exposâe des doctrines de la thâeologie catholique, leurs preuves et leur histoire, 30 vols. (Paris: Letouzey et Anâe, 1908), 15:3355–74. Here is his section dealing with Augustine on the topic:
4. La pensée de saint Augustin. — Elle a été rappelée ici, t. I, col. 2407. La question controversée est celle-ci: Augustin a-t-il varié dans sa doctrine? A-t-il, par réaction contre le semi-pélagianisme, passé de l’interprétation obvie et commune de I Tim., II, 4, à une interprétation restrictive de la volonté salvifique? Ou bien, à une situation nouvelle a-t-il voulu répondre par application nouvelle du texte de saint Paul à la volonté efficace de Dieu?
Avant 420, saint Augustin enseigne que le Christ a versé son sang rédempteur pour tous, puisqu’il sera le juge de tous. Enarr. in ps. XCV, n. 15, P. L., t. XXXVII, col. 1236; même pour le traître Judas, In ps. LXVIII, serm. II, n. 11, t. XXXVI, col. 861. Mais l’affirmation que le Christ est mort pour tous se lit encore dans le Cont. Julianum (qui est de 421), l. VI, n. 8, où est commenté II Cor., v, 15, P. L., t. XLIV, col. 825; bien plus, dans l’Opus imperf. cont. Julianum (429-430), la même interprétation du même texte se retrouve contre les pélagiens, pour les convaincre de l’existence du péché originel. Le Christ est donc mort pour tous sans exception; donc on peut en déduire la volonté salvifique universelle de Dieu, bien qu’en fait cette volonté ne soit pas toujours suivie d’effet, l. II, n. 63, 163, 174, 175, t. XLV, col. 1082, 1211, 1216-1217. Cf. In Joan., tr. XII, n. 12, t. XXXV, col. 1470. Mais déjà, dans ces mêmes commentaires sur saint Jean, on rencontre certains textes où saint Augustin distingue le monde de la rédemption et le monde de la perdition; tr. LXXXVII, n. 2-4; CX, n. 2, col. 1853 sq., 1921. Cf. Serm., CCXIX, n. 2-4; CXXVIII, col. 1088. L’interprétation traditionnelle de I Tim., II, 4 se lit explicitement dans le De spiritu et littera (412), n. 58, t. XLIV, col. 238. Cf. De cat. rudibus (400), n. 52, t. XL, col. 345.
A partir de 420, étudiant directement I Tim., II, 4, saint Augustin restreint la portée du texte : « Dieu veut sauver tous les hommes qui en réalité se sauveront. » Cont. Julianum, l. IV, n. 42, 44, t. XLIV, col. 759, 760; cf. De praedest. sanctorum (428-429), n. 14, id., col. 971; Epist., CXCIV (418), n. 6; CXCVII, 19, t. XXXIII, col. 876, 985. — Même interprétation dans l’Enchiridion (421), accompagnée de plusieurs autres, n. 103, t. XL, col. 280, notamment que Dieu veut sauver des hommes de toutes conditions et de toutes nations. Ou encore que Dieu veut sauver tous les prédestinés. De corrept. et gratia (426-427), n. 44, t. XLIV, col. 943 (sans préjudice d’autres interprétations possibles); ou encore que Dieu veut que nous voulions notre salut, ibid., n. 47, col. 945. On retrouvera des interprétations similaires chez saint Fulgence. Voir plus loin.
L’hypothèse émise par certains auteurs — un changement réel dans la pensée de saint Augustin, fondé sur l’opinion d’une pluralité possible des sens scripturaires, cf. Confess., l. XII, c. XVII, XXVI, t. XXXII, col. 834, 840 — fait injure au génie du grand docteur et aux louanges que lui prodigue l’Église, précisément au sujet de la grâce. On a montré, t. I, col. 2408, à la lumière d’un texte de l’Enchiridion, qu’Augustin, dans la controverse semi-pélagienne, envisage la volonté divine précisément en tant qu’elle n’est plus conditionnelle, mais efficace. C’est, en germe, la distinction de la volonté antécédente et de la volonté conséquente. Cf. Faure, In Enchirid. S. Augustini, c. CIII, Naples, 1847, p. 195 sq. On sait que Prosper d’Aquitaine, disciple de saint Augustin, a fortement adhéré en ce sens les formules bien plus dures de l’évêque d’Hippone. Voir ici PROSPER D’AQUITAINE, t. XIII, col. 847-849. Cf. Lionel Palland, S. Prosperi Aquitani doctrina de praedestinatione et voluntate Dei salvifica; de ejus in Augustinismum influxu, Montréal, 1937.
Le P. Wang Tch’ang Tche, S. J., s’inspirant d’une pensée émise par le P. de Lubac, cf. Actes du IIe Congrès de l’Union missionnaire du clergé de France, 1933, p. 40-41, reprend, en lui donnant une formule nouvelle, l’interprétation de la volonté salvifique restreinte aux prédestinés : « Le genre humain à travers le temps et l’espace constitue un tout physique avec ses multiples solidarités que les sciences modernes constatent de plus en plus. Mais ce tout physique, dans les desseins de son Créateur, n’est que la matière d’où s’élaborera un tout spirituel : le Christ total, chef et corps. Ce Christ total et parfait est prédestiné, chef et corps, par la même grâce et vit du même esprit... De ce point de vue du Christ total, l’interprétation de l’Enchiridion au sujet de la volonté salvifique n’apparaît plus comme une “restriction illégitime”. Elle prend une valeur véritable. Omnes homines, c’est pour Augustin tout le genre humain ramifié dans toutes ses particularités. Ut omnes hominum omne genus humanum intelligamus per quas-cumque differentias distributum. Enchir., CIII, t. XL, col. 280. Et le véritable genre humain qui correspond parfaitement à l’intention divine, qui réalise la finalité suprême de la nature humaine, se trouve dans les élus, ces membres vivants du Christ. Dire que Dieu veut sauver tous les hommes, c’est dire qu’il veut sauver tous les élus. » Saint Augustin et les vertus des païens, Paris, 1938, p. 169.
Sur la pensée de saint Augustin, on consultera : Petau, De Deo, l. X, c. VII; Franzelin, De Deo uno, th. LI-LII; Faure, Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Caritate S. Aurelii Augustini... notis et assertionibus theologicis illustratum, Naples, 1847, c. CIII; Hurter, De Deo, n. 118-121; Tixeront, Hist. des dogmes, t. II, p. 498-511; L. Capéran, Le problème du salut des infidèles, essai historique, 2e éd., Toulouse, 1935, c. IV; Odilon Rottmanner, O. S. B., Der Augustinismus, Munich, 1892; Otto Pfülf, S. J., Zur Prädestinationslehre des hl. Augustinus, dans Zeitschrift für kath. Theol., 1893, t. XVII, p. 485-495; Ph. Huppert, Der Augustinismus, dans Das Katholik, 1893, t. I, p. 162-172; M. Jacquin, O. P., La question de la prédestination aux Ve et VIe siècles : S. Augustin, dans Rev. d’hist. eccl., 1904, t. V, p. 265-283, 725-754; A. d’Alès, art. Prédestination, dans Dict. apolog., t. IV, col. 205-216.
Abbé Albert Michel,
“Volonté de Dieu Salvifique Universelle,” in Dictionnaire de thâeologie catholique: contenant l'exposâe des doctrines de la thâeologie catholique, leurs preuves et leur histoire, 30 vols. (Paris: Letouzey et Anâe, 1908), 15/2:3362–63.
AI (ChatGPT) translation:
4. The Thought of Saint Augustine.—It has been reproduced here, vol. I, col. 2407. The question under controversy is this: Did Augustine vary in his doctrine? Did he, in reaction against Semi-Pelagianism, abandon the obvious and common interpretation of 1 Timothy 2:4 in favor of a restrictive interpretation of the salvific will? Or, rather, did he seek to respond to a new situation by applying a new interpretation to Saint Paul’s text concerning the efficacious will of God?
Before 420, Saint Augustine teaches that Christ shed His redeeming blood for all, since He will be the judge of all. Enarr. in Ps. XCV, no. 15, P. L., vol. XXXVII, col. 1236; likewise, concerning the traitor Judas, In Ps. LXVIII, Sermon II, no. 11, vol. XXXVI, col. 861. But the assertion that Christ died for all is still found in Contra Julianum (which dates from 421), Book I, chapter VI, no. 8, where it is commented upon: II Cor., chapter V, verse 15, P. L., vol. XLIV, col. 825; moreover, in Opus imperfectum contra Julianum (429–430), the same interpretation of the text is found against the Pelagians, in order to convince them of the existence of original sin. Christ therefore died for all without exception; consequently, one can deduce from this the universal salvific will of God, although, in fact, this will is not always followed by its effect. Book I, chapter II, nos. 63, 163, 174, 175, vol. XLV, cols. 1082, 1211, 1216–1217. Cf. In Joan., Treatise XII, no. 12, vol. XXXV, col. 1470.
Already, however, in these same commentaries on Saint John, one encounters certain texts in which Saint Augustine distinguishes between the world of redemption and the world of perdition: Treatise LXXXVII, nos. 2–4; CX, no. 2, cols. 1853 and following; Serm., chapter I, CCXIX, vol. XXXVIII, col. 1088. The traditional interpretation of 1 Timothy 2:4 is explicitly read in De spiritu et littera (412), no. 58, vol. XLIV, col. 238. Cf. De cat. rudibus (400), no. 52, vol. XL, col. 345. Beginning in 420, having directly studied 1 Timothy 2:4, Saint Augustine restricts the scope of the text: “God wills to save all men who are actually saved.” Contra Julianum, Book I, chapter IV, nos. 42, 44, vol. XLIV, cols. 759, 760; cf. De praedestinatione sanctorum (428–429), no. 14, same volume, col. 971; Epistula 194 (418), no. 6, chapters 6–7, vol. XXXIII, cols. 876, 985. The same interpretation is found in the Enchiridion (421), accompanied by several other interpretations, no. 103, vol. XL, col. 280, particularly that God wills to save men of every condition and of all nations. Or again, that God wills to save all the predestined. De correptione et gratia (426–427), no. 44, vol. XLIV, col. 943 (without prejudice to other possible interpretations); or again, that God wills that we should will our own salvation, ibid., no. 47, col. 945. Similar interpretations will be found in Saint Fulgentius. See further below.
The hypothesis proposed by certain authors—that there was a real change in Saint Augustine’s thought, based on the opinion that several possible meanings of Scripture exist—cf. Confessions, Book XII, chapter XVII, chapters XXVI, vol. XXXII, cols. 834, 840 — does an injustice to the genius of the great Doctor and to the praises that the Church bestows upon him, precisely with regard to grace. It has been demonstrated, vol. I, col. 2408, in light of a passage from the Enchiridion, that Augustine, in the Semi-Pelagian controversy, understood the divine will precisely in the sense that it is no longer conditional, but efficacious. This is, in germ, the distinction between the antecedent will and the consequent will. Cf. Faure, In Enchirid. S. Augustini, chapter CIII, Naples, 1847, pp. 195 ff. We know that Prosper of Aquitaine, a disciple of Saint Augustine, strongly adopted this interpretation, expressing it in formulas considerably harsher than those of the Bishop of Hippo. See here PROSPER OF AQUITAINE, vol. XII, cols. 847–849. Cf. Lionel Palland, S. Prosperi Aquitani doctrina de prædestinatione et voluntate Dei salvifica; de ejus in Augustinismum influxu, Montréal, 1937.
Father P. Wang Tch’ang Tche, S.J., inspired by an idea proposed by Father de Lubac, cf. Actes du IIe Congrès de l’Union missionnaire du clergé de France, 1933, pp. 40–41, takes up the interpretation of the salvific will restricted to the predestined, while giving it a new formulation:
“The human race, throughout time and space, constitutes a single physical whole, with its multiple solidarities, which modern sciences increasingly establish. But this entire physical whole, in the designs of its Creator, is only the material out of which a spiritual whole will be formed: Christ, head and body. This total and perfect Christ is predestined, head and body, by the same grace, and lives by the same Spirit.”
From this point of view, the interpretation of the Enchiridion concerning the salvific will no longer appears to be an “illegitimate restriction.” It takes on a genuine meaning. All men means, for Augustine, the entire human race, distributed into all its particular distinctions. Ut omnes homines, c'est tout le genus humanum intelligendum per quas-cumque differentias distributum. (Enchiridion, chapter CIII, vol. XL, col. 280.)
“And the true human race, which corresponds perfectly to the divine intention and fulfills the supreme purpose of human nature, is found in the elect, these living members of Christ. To say that God wills to save all men is to say that He wills to save all the elect.” Saint Augustine and the Virtues of the Pagans, Paris, 1938, p. 169.
Concerning the thought of Saint Augustine, consult: Petau, De Deo, Book I, chapter X, section VII; Franzelin, De Deo uno, chapters LI–LII; Faure, Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Caritate S. Aurelii Augustini... notis et assertionibus theologicis illustratum, Naples, 1847, chapter CIII; Hurter, De Deo, nos. 118–121; Tixeront, Hist. des dogmes, vol. II, pp. 498–511; L. Capéran, Le problème du salut des infidèles, essai historique, 2nd edition, Toulouse, 1935, chapter IV; Odilon Rottmanner, O.S.B., Der Augustinismus, Munich, 1892; Otto Pfülf, S.J., Zur Prädestinationslehre des hl. Augustinus, in Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, 1893, vol. XVII, pp. 485–495; Ph. Huppert, Der Augustinismus, in Das Katholik, 1893, vol. I, pp. 162–172; M. Jacquin, O.P., La question de la prédestination aux Ve et VIe siècles: S. Augustin, in Revue d'hist. eccl., 1904, vol. V, pp. 265–283, 725–754; A. d'Alès, article “Prédestination,” in Dictionnaire apologétique, vol. IV, cols. 205–216.
Henri Rondet, S.J. (1898–1979), a professor of theology at Fourvière Hill in Lyon, France, who was sympathetic to Semi-Pelagianism, thought that “Augustine becomes confused in discussing the universality of God’s salvific will. Not that he principally wants to restrict that will. But he tries to excite gratitude in those who have been drawn out of the condemned mass, to make them understand with what incomparable love they have been loved.” Nevertheless, Rondet said that a “faithful Augustinian can “read the
De correptione et gratia and the
De predestinatione sanctorum in the light of the
Confessions, the
City of God, and the letters and sermons of this great apostle.
In these works, they will read that God desires the salvation of all men and that Christ poured out his blood for the entire human race, not simply for the just of the African church, as the Donatists would have it.
They will read that this blood shed for all men is shed also for each one of us, if we only wish it to be so.” “
In his fight against Pelagian thinking, Augustine denies none of the theses established against the Donatists.” See Henri Rondet, S.J.,
The Grace of Christ: A Brief History of the Theology of Grace, trans. Tad W. Guzie, S.J. (Newman Press, 1967), 141–42,
143.
3. The Contemporary Era
Also, while noting the complexity of Augustine’s teaching on predestination, the will of God, and the death of Christ,
John W. Rettig (1931–2012), of Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio, said:
That God foreknows that some are condemned poses a theological problem in view of the orthodox teaching that Christ died for all and by his death and resurrection redeemed all. As in all matters touching predestination, Augustine’s view is complex, difficult, and somewhat obscure. It would appear that he holds that God does will the salvation of all men and in a general sense he does so by providing all with the power and the means for salvation. But he also, for his own reasons, gives men the freedom to choose or refuse salvation and then he foreknows that some will choose salvation and some damnation. He could intervene, but wills not to do so; were he to intervene freedom of will would be meaningless. Since he foreknows that some will refuse redemption and does not intervene, then in an absolute sense he wills the damnation of some. Why he chooses this kind of world over the many possible dispositions of creation is a mystery. See Browne, 29.1238–46, and E. Portalie, A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine, 215–23. But the situation is probably more complex than this, as all men’s acts are the results of freely given, unmerited graces. Why are some not given graces to enable their perseverance? Augustine, then, would seem to take a rather rigid view of predestination: that God, for his own reasons, in fact wills the damnation of some. This tractate seems to support such a view. See J. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrine, 366–69, for a good, brief account of the latter position.
See Augustine of Hippo,
Tractates on the Gospel of John 28–54, ed. Thomas P. Halton, trans. John W. Rettig, vol. 88, The Fathers of the Church (The Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 230, n. 12; Tractate 48.4; italics original.
While Henri Blocher (b. 1937) thinks that Augustine’s line of thought leads to so-called definite atonement, he also said that,
Augustine’s case is complex, and no unified doctrine of atonement stands out clearly in his writings. His emphasis on the divine desire that all should be saved is repetitious, but other lines would lead to definite atonement.
Henri A. G. Blocher, “Jesus Christ the Man: Toward a Systematic Theology of Definite Atonement,” in
From Heaven He Came and Sought Her: Definite Atonement in Historical, Biblical, Theological, and Pastoral Perspective, ed. David Gibson and Jonathan Gibson (Crossway, 2013), 549.
Segundo Folgado and Nello Cipriani seem to agree that Augustine affirmed God’s universal salvific will, but just say Prosper “knew how to proclaim the universality of God’s salvific will with greater clarity than his teacher Augustine.” See Segundo Folgado and Nello Cipriani, “Predestination,” in Encyclopedia of Ancient Christianity, ed. Angelo Di Berardino and James Hoover, trans. Joseph T. Papa, Erik A. Koenke, and Eric E. Hewett (IVP Academic; InterVarsity Press, 2014), 296. When it comes to the time Augustine wrote On the Spirit and the Letter (c. AD 412), Teske said Augustine believed that “God wills that all be saved, but not so that he deprives anyone of free choice. Whether one believes or refuses to believe, the will of God remains undefeated, since unbelievers do not escape God’s just punishment (paragraph 58). At this point in the development of his thinking on grace, Augustine seems to take God’s universal salvific will as found in 1 Timothy 2:4 without any restriction and to situate the will to believe or not to believe in the free choice of the individual, given God’s call.” See Roland J. Teske, S.J., “The Spirit and the Letter: Introduction,” in Saint Augustine, Answer to the Pelagians, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Roland J. Teske, vol. 23, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (New City Press, 1997), 142. Josephine Lombardi (b. 1968), Associate Professor of Systematic and Pastoral Theology at St. Augustine’s Seminary, while seeing that Augustine taught exclusivism, she says that he did teach God’s universal salvific will. See Josephine Lombardi, The Universal Salvific Will of God in Official Documents of the Roman Catholic Church (The Edin Mellen Press, 2007), 28–31; What Are They Saying About the Universal Salvific Will of God? (Paulist Press, 2008), 16.
As we shall see in the following quotes, Augustine did indeed believe in God’s will, wish, and desire for the salvation of all men. Keep in mind that it is not only these quotes that are relevant to the subject, but also those many statements in Augustine where he said Christ was crucified for all and redeemed all mankind. If Christ did that, then certainly Christ desires the salvation of all men. Also, Augustine never retracted what he said about these matters.
It must also be understood that just because a theologian takes a decretal or limited view of one of the controversial passages on the will of God (e.g., 1 Tim 2:4 or 2 Pet 3:9), it does not follow that they denied that God, in principle, or categorically, wills the salvation of all men. Take W. G. T. Shedd, for example. He viewed 2 Pet 3:9 as referring to God’s effectual will, and thus taught that the verse concerns the elect, and yet Shedd strongly affirmed that God desires the salvation of all men in His revealed will, as did John Murray, who took 2 Pet 3:9 to refer to all men, like Calvin. Moreover, while Charles Spurgeon took 1 Tim 2:4 to refer to God’s revealed desire for the salvation of all men, I am fairly sure that Phil Johnson, who highly respects Spurgeon, takes that verse to refer to all kinds of the elect, yet both Spurgeon and Johnson believe God desires the salvation of all men in principle, or categorically. The point is this: Among Augustinians, the Reformed, and mainstream Calvinists, there may be hermeneutical disagreements, but there is categorical agreement on God’s revealed desire for the salvation of all men. A failure to understand this principle has led so many historians astray, not only the subject of God’s will, but also on the extent of the atonement.
With that said, here is some of the material from Augustine:
II. The Primary Sources Dealing with the Will of God in Mostly Chronological Order
A. FROM THE EXPOSITION OF THE PSALMS (AD 396–420)
Psalm 111:2: God does not will that we sin, but rather wills to spare the sinner that he may return and live.
Coxe Translation:
“These are the great works of the Lord, sought out unto all His wills” (ver. 2): through which mercy forsaketh none who confesseth, no man’s wickedness is unpunished … Let man choose for himself what he listeth: the works of the Lord are not so constituted, that the creature, having free discretion allowed him, should transcend the will of the Creator, even though he act contrary to His will. God willeth not that thou shouldest sin; for He forbiddeth it: yet if thou hast sinned, imagine not that the man hath done what he willed, and that hath happened to God which He willed not. For as He would that man would not sin, so would He spare the sinner, that he may return and live; He so willeth finally to punish him who persisteth in his sin, that the rebellious cannot escape the power of justice. Thus whatever choice thou hast made, the Almighty will not be at a loss to fulfill His will concerning thee.
Augustine, “Exposition on the Book of Psalms,” trans. A. Cleveland Coxe, in
NPNF, 1st Series, ed. by Philip Schaff (Hendrickson Publishers, 2004), 8:545; Ps 111:2. Augustine’s meaning in the highlighted portion above is this: In the sense that God doesn’t want man to sin (but rather to obey), in that sense (i.e. according to the revealed will) he wishes to spare the sinner, that he may return and live. He is alluding to Ezek 18:32 and 33:11, as the Boulding translation indicates.
Boulding Translation:
Great are the works of the Lord to be seen on that day. They are finely wrought to fulfill all his purposes. What he wills is that no one who confesses shall be bereft of mercy and no one’s iniquity go unpunished, for he whips even his children, every one whom he acknowledges as his (Heb 12:6). But if the just are barely saved, where will there be room for the sinner and the unbeliever (1 Pet 4:18)? Let men and women choose as they wish; the works of the Lord are not so wrought that a creature endowed with freedom of choice can override the will of the creator, even by acting contrary to his will. God does not want you to sin, and he forbids you to do so; but if you have sinned, do not delude yourself that a human being has done what he wanted, while God has had to suffer what he did not want. No: just as he wills human beings not to sin, he also wills to pardon the sinner so that he or she may turn back again and live (Ezek 18:23; 33:11), but so too does he will in the end to punish one who perseveres in sin, that no defiant sinner may evade the power of his justice. It follows that whatever you choose, the Almighty will not lack the means to carry out completely his will in your regard, for great are the works of the Lord; they are finely wrought to fulfill all his purposes.
Saint Augustine,
Expositions of the Psalms 99–120, ed. Boniface Ramsey, trans. Maria Boulding, vol. 19, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (New City Press, 2003), 287; Ps 111.2; italics original.
B. FROM DE CATECHIZANDIS RUDIBUS (AD 400)
Canning Translation:
19,31. “And we should not allow ourselves to be disturbed by the fact that so many people go along with the devil and so few follow God, for, in comparison with the chaff, the quantity of grain is also much smaller. But, just as the farmer knows what to do with the huge pile of chaff, so too God: the great number of sinners is nothing to him and he knows how to act in their regard, so that the government of his kingdom may in no way be disrupted or brought into disrepute. Nor must we think that the devil has gained the ascendancy because he has dragged so many along him; he, with them, will be brought low by just a few.
“So we see two cities—one of the wicked, the other of the saints130—existing from the beginning of the human race right through to the end of time. At present they are mixed together in body but separated in will, though, on the day of judgment, they are to be separated in body as well. Indeed, all those people who, with empty pride and haughty display, find pleasure in disdaining others and lording it over them in this world, and all those spirits who have a predilection for such things and strive to obtain glory for themselves by making slaves of human beings, are closed up together in the one community. And, though they often fight among themselves for the sake of acquiring these things, they are all hurled down into the same abyss by the same weight of immoderate desire, and they find themselves yoked together by the similarity of their practices and their demerits. On the other hand, all those people and all those spirits who humbly seek God’s glory, not their own,131 and who wait upon him with due reverence, belong to one community. For all that, God is extraordinarily merciful: he shows forbearance to the wicked and gives them scope for repentance and reform.132
19,32. “This happened, for example, when God destroyed all humankind in the Flood, making an exception of the one righteous man and his family, whom he wanted to be safe in the ark.133 God certainly knew that people were not going to mend their ways. Nevertheless, during the hundred years that the ark took to build,134 they had it made known to them again and again that God’s anger was about to descend on them.135 And, if they had turned to God, he would have spared them in the same way that at a later time he spared the city of Nineveh, which set about doing penance when its imminent destruction was foretold through the prophet.136 Now, if God gives time to repent even to those people who he knows will remain obstinate in their wickedness, he does this in order to exercise our patience and mold it by his example. So, we should learn with what great forbearance we, who have no knowledge of the kind of people they may later turn out to be, ought to endure the wicked, since God, from whom nothing in the future is hidden, spares them and lets them live.
_______________
130 As early as 389–391, in True Religion 25, Augustine referred to the whole human race as divided into two classes, the wicked and those devoted to God. Here, for the first time, he uses the term “cities” (civitates) of these two classes. The contrast between the two cities is drawn most fully in The City of God, where it is famously summarized in XIV,28; there the cities are distinguished on the basis of the loves on which they are founded—the earthly city on a distorted self-love and the heavenly city on love for God.
131 See Ps 115:1; Jn 7:18.
132 See Rom 2:4.
133 See Gn 6:11–7:16.
134 Noah is said to have been 500 years old when he became the father of Shem, Ham and Japheth, and 600 years old when the Flood began. See Gn 5:32; 7:6.
135 Scripture says nothing about these warnings; this is Augustine’s eisegesis.
136 See Jon 3.
Augustine of Hippo, “Instructing Beginners in Faith,” in
Morality and Christian Asceticism, ed. Boniface Ramsey, trans. Raymond Canning, vol. 10, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (New City Press, 2023), 207–8;
De catechizandis rudibus, c. 19.
26,52. “Truly, brother, the great and true blessedness is that which is promised to the saints in the world to come. All visible things, however, pass from existence, and the ostentatious display of this world and its allurements and its curiosity will all come to nothing,281 and they will drag their lovers down with them in ruins.
“From these ruins—that is to say, from eternal punishment—God in his compassion wished to free human beings, provided that they do not prove enemies to themselves and struggle against their creator. So he sent his only-begotten Son—that is to say, his Word, equal to himself, through whom he created all things.282 The Son, to be sure, remained in his divine state; he did not leave the Father’s side, nor was he in any way changed. Yet he took on a man283 and came among human beings, making himself visible to human beings in mortal flesh. Just as death entered into the human race through one man,284 the first to be created—that is, Adam—and this came about because he joined his wife, who had been led astray by the devil, in transgressing God’s commandment,285 in the same way, too, through one man, who is also God, the Son of God, Jesus Christ, all the sins of the past would be wiped away and all who believe in him would enter into eternal life.
_______________
281 See 1 Jn 2:16–17. “Curiosity” here is equivalent to “concupiscence of the eyes.” For Augustine’s highly negative assessment of curiosity see Confessions X,35,54–57.
282 See Jn 1:3.
283 “He took on a man”: assumendo … hominem. See 20,36 above and the relevant note.
284 See Rom 5:12.
285 See Gn 3:1–6; 1 Tim 2:14.
Augustine of Hippo, “Instructing Beginners in Faith,” in
Morality and Christian Asceticism, ed. Boniface Ramsey, trans. Raymond Canning, vol. 10, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (New City Press, 2023), 229–30;
De catechizandis rudibus, c. 26, 52.
C. FROM THE TRACTATES ON JOHN’S GOSPEL (AD 406–430)
Tractate 89: Christ came to that the Jews might believe, or to enlist the faith of the Jews.
Gibb and Innes Translation:
What, then, does He mean by the words, “If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin”? Was it that the Jews were without sin before Christ came to them in the flesh? Who, though he were the greatest fool, would say so? But it is some great sin, and not every sin, that He would have to be understood, as it were, under the general designation. For this is the sin wherein all sins are included; and whosoever is free from it, has all his sins forgiven him: and this it is, that they believed not on Christ, who came for the very purpose of enlisting their faith. From this sin, had He not come, they would certainly have been free. His advent has become as much fraught with destruction to unbelievers, as it is with salvation to those that believe; for He, the Head and Prince of the apostles, has Himself, as it were, become what they declared of themselves, “to some, indeed, the savour of life unto life; and to some the savor of death unto death”(2 Cor 2:16).
Augustine of Hippo, “Lectures or Tractates on the Gospel according to St. John,” in
St. Augustin: Homilies on the Gospel of John, Homilies on the First Epistle of John, Soliloquies, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. John Gibb and James Innes, vol. 7, A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, First Series (Christian Literature Company, 1888), 357–58; Tractate LXXXIX.
Rettig Translation:
(3) What, then, does it mean, “If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin”? Were the Jews without sin before Christ had come to them in the flesh? Who, even [if he were] very stupid, would say this? But he intended to be understood a particularly great sin, not every sin, under the general term, as it were. For this is the sin by which one holds fast to all sins; for if anyone should not have this [sin], all sins are forgiven him. Now, this sin is that they did not believe in Christ, who came for this precise reason, that there be belief in him. This sin, if he had not come, they assuredly would not have. For his coming, as salutary as it was made for those who believe, so deadly was it made for those who believe not, as though he also, the Head and Prince of the Apostles, had shown himself to be the very thing they themselves said of themselves, “to some indeed the odor of life unto life, but to some the odor of death unto death” (2 Cor 2:16).
Augustine of Hippo,
Tractates on the Gospel of John 55–111, ed. Thomas P. Halton, trans. John W. Rettig, vol. 90, The Fathers of the Church (The Catholic University of America Press, 1994), 156; Tractate 89.
Hill Translation:
What does this mean, then: If I had not come and spoken to them, they would have no sin? Were the Jews without sin before Christ came to them in the flesh? Who would be so very foolish as to say that? But he wants a certain great sin, not every sin, to be understood, as it were, under this general term. For this is the sin by which all sins are retained. If someone doesn’t have this sin, all his sins are forgiven him.1 This one, though, is that they didn’t believe in Christ, who came so that he would be believed in.2 If he hadn’t come, they certainly wouldn’t have had this sin. Indeed, just as his coming has been salvific for those who believe, so it has been turned into ruin for those who don’t believe, as though he, the head and prince of the apostles, came to be what they said about themselves: For some, indeed, the fragrance of life unto life, but for others the fragrance of death unto death (2 Cor 2:16).
_______________
1 See Homilies 38, 7; 53, 10; Sermon 144, 1.
2 See Sermons 71, 11; 143, 2.
Saint Augustine,
Homilies on the Gospel of John 41–124, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald and Boniface Ramsey, trans. Edmund Hill, vol. 13, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (New City Press, 2020), 319–20.
D. FROM THE LETTERS (EPISTULAE)
Letter 105 (AD 409): God is beseeching, threatening, chastising, begging, and rebuking the Donatists because he does not wish or want them to be lost.
Parsons Translation:
Be at peace with us, brothers. We love you; we wish the same for you as we do for ourselves. If you hate us so deeply because we do not allow you to go astray and be lost, say so to God, whose threats to the faithless shepherds we fear, when He says: ‘That which was driven away you have not brought again, neither have you sought that which was lost’ (Ezek 34:4). This is what God Himself does for you through us, either by beseeching or threatening or chastising; by loss or trouble; by His secret warnings or trials; or by the laws of secular powers. Understand what is being done to you: God does not wish you [the Donatists] to be lost, cut off from your mother, the Catholic Church, in the midst of a sacrilegious dissension. You have not at any time been able to prove anything against us. When your bishops were called together by us, would they confer peaceably with us, or did they avoid converse with us as if we were sinners? Could anyone endure such pride? As if Paul the Apostle did not converse with sinners, and with quite abandoned ones! Read the Acts of the Apostles and see. As if the Lord Himself did not hold speech with the Jews by whom He was crucified, and answer them courteously! Finally, the Devil is the chief of all sinners, since it will never be possible for him to be converted to goodness, yet the Lord Himself did not disdain to answer him about the Law (Matt 4:1–10), by which you may know that the Donatists refuse to confer with us because they know that their case is lost.
Augustine of Hippo, “Letter 105. Augustine, Catholic Bishop, to the Donatists (409),” in
Letters (83–130), ed. Roy Joseph Deferrari, trans. Wilfrid Parsons, vol. 18, The Fathers of the Church (The Catholic University of America Press, 1953), 205–6.
Teske Translation:
4, 13. Be reconciled with us, brothers; we love you; we want for you what we want for ourselves. If you hate us more deeply because we do not allow you to go astray and to be lost, tell this to God whom we fear, when he threatens bad shepherds and says, You have not called back what has gone astray, and you have not sought what was lost (34:4). God himself does this to you through us by begging, by threatening or by rebuking, by fines or by penalties, through his hidden warning or chastisements or through the laws of temporal authorities. Understand what he is doing with you; God does not want you to be lost, separated from your Catholic mother in your sacrilegious discord. You were unable at any time to prove anything against us. When your bishops were invited by us to a conference, they always refused to confer peacefully with us, as if they did not want to speak with sinners. Who would put up with this pride? As if the apostle Paul did not converse with sinners and with quite sacrilegious persons! Read the Acts of the Apostles and see. As if the Lord himself did not have discussions about the law with the Jews, by whom he was crucified, and did not answer them appropriately! Finally, the devil is the first of all sinners; he will never be able to be converted to righteousness, and still the Lord did not refuse to reply to him concerning the law (Matt 4:1–10). All this was done so that you might understand that those bishops of yours refused to confer with us because they knew that theirs was a lost cause.
Saint Augustine,
Letters (Epistulae) 100–155, ed. Boniface Ramsey, trans. Roland Teske, vol. II/2, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (New City Press, 2003), 60–61; Letter 105.
Letter 185 (c. AD 417):
Parsons Translation:
Chapter 49
Let us, then, understand that this does not apply to every sin, but to a certain sin against the Holy Spirit, which will not be forgiven. In the same way, when He said: ‘If I had not come, they would not have sin’ (John 15:22), He manifestly did not intend us to understand every sin, for indeed they were guilty of many great sins, but that, if they did not have a certain special sin, all the others which they had could be forgiven them; and that sin was that they did not believe in Him when He came—they would not have had this sin if He had not come—so also when He said: ‘He that shall sin against the Holy Spirit or shall speak a word against the Holy Spirit,’ it is plain that He did not mean every sin committed against the Holy Spirit by deed or word, but a certain particular sin. This sin is a hardness of heart persisted in until the end of this life, by which a man refuses to accept remission for his sins in the unity of the body of Christ, to which the Holy Spirit gives life. For, when He had said to His disciples: ‘Receive ye the Holy Spirit,’ He immediately added: ‘Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; whose sins you shall retain, they are retained’ (John 20:22, 23). Therefore, whoever shall resist this gift of the grace of God, and shall oppose it or shall in any way be estranged from it until the end of this temporal life, ‘It shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the world to come,’ for, obviously, this is so great a sin that all other sins are comprised in it; but it is not committed by anyone until he has left the body. As long as he lives, as the Apostle says: ‘The patience of God leadeth him to do penance,’ but, if the sinner remains in his persistent wickedness, then, as the Apostle adds at once: ‘According to the hardness of his heart and his impenitent heart,’ he treasures up for himself ‘wrath against the day of wrath and revelation of the just judgment of God’(Rom. 2:4, 5), and ‘it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the world to come.’
Augustine of Hippo,
Letters (165–203), ed. Hermigild Dressler, trans. Wilfrid Parsons, vol. 30, The Fathers of the Church (The Catholic University of America Press, 1955), 188–89;
Epistulae, 185, c. 49.
Teske Translation:
49. Let them, therefore, understand that it is not every sin but a particular one that is meant by the sin against the Holy Spirit that absolutely will not be forgiven. For when he said, If I had not come, they would have no sin (Jn 15:22), he certainly did not want us to understand every sin, since they were filled with many great sins, but a particular sin which, if they did not have, all those that they had could be forgiven them, that is, the sin of not believing in him. For they would not have this sin if he had not come. In the same way, when he said, He who sins against the Holy Spirit, or, He who says a word against the Holy Spirit, he did not want us to understand every sin that is committed against the Holy Spirit by word or deed but a specific and particular sin. This sin is a hardness of heart up to the end of this life by which a person refuses to receive the forgiveness of sins in the unity of the body of Christ, to which the Holy Spirit gives life. For, after he said to his disciples, Receive the Holy Spirit, he immediately added, If you forgive the sins of anyone, they will be forgiven him; if you retain the sins of anyone, they will be retained (Jn 20:22–23). Whoever, then, resists and refuses this gift of the grace of God or is somehow apart from it up to the end of this temporal life, it will not be forgiven him either in this world or in the world to come, that is, this sin that is so great that all sins are retained by it and that is not proved to have been committed by anyone until he leaves the body. Yet as long as he lives here, as the apostle says, the patience of God leads to repentance (Rom 2:4). But if with most obdurate iniquity, as the apostle goes on, he stores up for himself in accord with his hard and unrepentant heart anger for the day of anger and of the revelation of the just judgment of God (Rom 2:5), it will not be forgiven him either in this world or in the world to come (Mt 12:32).
Saint Augustine,
Letters (Epistulae) 156–210, trans. Roland Teske, ed. Boniface Ramsey, vol. II/3, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (New City Press, 2004), 205–6;
Epistulae, 185, c. 49; italics original.
E. FROM THE SPIRIT AND THE LETTER (AD 412)Chapter 58: God wills and wishes all men to be saved. Jean Daillé (1594–1670) cited this from Augustine to show that Augustine believed that God wills all men to be saved.
Latin edition:33. 58. Prius igitur illud dicamus et videamus utrum huic satisfaciat quaestioni, quod liberum arbitrium naturaliter adtributum a Creatore animae rationali illa media vis est, quae vel intendi ad fidem, vel inclinari ad infidelitatem potest et ideo nec istam voluntatem, qua credit Deo, dici potest homo habere quam non acceperit, quando quidem vocante Deo surgit de libero arbitrio, quod naturaliter cum crearetur accepit. Vult autem Deus omnes homines salvos fieri et in agnitionem veritatis venire, non sic tamen, ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene vel male utentes iustissime iudicentur.
Quod cum fit, infideles quidem contra voluntatem Dei faciunt, cum eius Evangelio non credunt, nec ideo tamen eam vincunt, verum se ipsos fraudant magno et summo bono malisque poenalibus implicant experturi in suppliciis potestatem eius, cuius in donis misericordiam contempserunt. Ita voluntas Dei semper invicta est; vinceretur autem, si non inveniret quid de contemptoribus faceret aut ullo modo possent evadere quod de talibus ille constituit. Qui enim dicit verbi gratia: “Volo ut hi omnes servi mei operentur in vinea et post laborem requiescentes epulentur, ita ut quisquis eorum hoc noluerit, in pistrino semper molat”, videtur quidem quicumque contempserit contra voluntatem Domini sui facere, sed tunc eam vincet, si et pistrinum contemnens effugerit, quod nullo modo fieri potest sub Dei potestate. Unde scriptum est: Semel locutus est Deus, hoc est, incommutabiliter, quamquam et de unico Verbo possit intellegi. Deinde subiungens quid incommutabiliter sit locutus: Duo haec, inquit, audivi, quoniam potestas Dei est, et tibi, Domine, misericordia, qui reddes unicuique secundum opera sua. Ille igitur reus erit addamnationem sub potestate eius, qui contempserit ad credendum misericordiam eius. Quisquis autem crediderit eique se a peccatis omnibus absolvendum et ab omnibus vitiis sanandum et calore ac lumine eius accendendum illuminandumque commiserit, habebit ex eius gratia opera bona, ex quibus etiam secundum corpus a mortis corruptione redimatur, coronetur bonisque satietur non temporalibus, sed aeternis, supra quam petimus et intellegimus.
Holmes, Wallace, Warfield Translation:
Let us then, first of all, lay down this proposition, and see whether it satisfies the question before us: that free will, naturally assigned by the Creator to our rational soul, is such a neutral4 power, as can either incline towards faith, or turn towards unbelief. Consequently a man cannot be said to have even that will with which he believes in God, without having received it; since this rises at the call of God out of the free will which he received naturally when he was created. God no doubt wishes all men to be saved5 and to come into the knowledge of the truth; but yet not so as to take away from them free will, for the good or the evil use of which they may be most righteously judged. This being the case, unbelievers indeed do contrary to the will of God when they do not believe His gospel; nevertheless they do not therefore overcome His will, but rob their own selves of the great, nay, the very greatest, good, and implicate themselves in penalties of punishment, destined to experience the power of Him in punishments whose mercy in His gifts they despised. Thus God’s will is for ever invincible; but it would be vanquished, unless it devised what to do with such as despised it, or if these despises could in any way escape from the retribution which He has appointed for such as they. Suppose a master, for example, who should say to his servants, I wish you to labour in my vineyard, and, after your work is done, to feast and take your rest; but who, at the same time, should require any who refused to work to grind in the mill ever after. Whoever neglected such a command would evidently act contrary to the master’s will; but he would do more than that,—he would vanquish that will, if he also escaped the mill. This, however, cannot possibly happen under the government of God. Whence it is written, “God hath spoken once,”—that is, irrevocably,—although the passage may refer also to His one only Word.6 He then adds what it is which He had irrevocably uttered, saying: “Twice have I heard this, that power belongeth unto God. Also unto Thee, O Lord, doth mercy belong: because Thou wilt render to every man according to his work.”7 He therefore will be guilty unto condemnation under God’s power, who shall think too contemptuously of His mercy to believe in Him. But whosoever shall put his trust in Him, and yield himself up to Him, for the forgiveness of all his sins, for the cure of all his corruption, and for the kindling and illumination of his soul by His warmth and light, shall have good works by his grace; and by them8 he shall be even in his body redeemed from the corruption of death, crowned, satisfied with blessings,—not temporal, but eternal,—above what we can ask or understand.
________________
4 [“Media vis,” a “midway power,” as Dr. Bright translates it; i.e., it is indifferent in itself, and neither good nor bad, but may be used for either.—W.]
5 1 Tim. 2:4.
6 John 1:1.
7 Ps. 62:11, 12.
8 Ex quibus.
Augustine,
“A Treatise on the Spirit and the Letter: Chapter 58,” trans. Peter Holmes, Robert Ernest Wallace, and B. B. Warfield, in NPNF, 1st Series, ed. Philip Schaff (Hendrickson Publishers, 2004), 5:109;
De spiritu et littera, c. 58.
Burnaby Translation:
58. Here the first point to be made, as a possible solution of the difficulty, is that the freedom of choice which the Creator has conferred in the way of nature upon the rational soul is a neutral power, which can either be exerted to faith or sink into unbelief. Accordingly it cannot be said that in the act of will whereby a man believes God, he possesses what he has not received, since it arises at God’s call from the freedom of choice which he received in the way of nature at his creation. God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth; but not so as to deprive them of that freedom of choice, for the good or evil use of which they are subjected to the judgment of absolute Justice. By that judgment, the unbelieving act against God's will when they disbelieve his gospel; yet what they do is not to defeat his will but to cheat themselves of a supreme good and fall into the distress of punishment: in which they must lie under the power of him whose mercy in his gifts they have despised.98 Thus the will of God is ever undefeated: which would not be, had he no way of dealing with his despisers, or were there any escape for them from his sentence upon such. Suppose a master say: “I will that all these my servants work in the vineyard, and after their labour rest and feast; provided that any who will not so work shall grind for ever in the mill.” It might appear that one who should despise the order is acting 'against his master's will; but he will only defeat it if in his master's despite he escapes also from the mill. And that under the power of God is altogether impossible. So it is written: “God spoke once”—which we understand in the sense of “unchangeably,” though it might also be taken to mean a single utterance—and then we hear the matter of this unchangeable word: “these two things have I heard, that power belongeth unto God, and that mercy is thine, O Lord, who wilt render to every man according to his works” (Ps 62:11f). The despiser of his mercy, which calls for belief, must bear under his power the sentence of condemnation. But whosoever believes, and trusts himself to God for the absolution of all his sins, for the healing of all his sicknesses, for kindling and illumination by the warmth and light of God, shall have by his grace those good works which lead to deliverance even in the body from the corruption of death, to crowning and satisfaction with the good things which are not temporal but eternal, above all that we ask or think (Eph 3:20).
Augustine,
“The Spirit and the Letter, in Later Works, trans. John Burnaby, LCC 8 (Westminster Press, 1955), 242–43. In footnote #97, Burnaby said, “Note that in this treatise Augustine does not find it necessary, as he did later, to explain away this text (cf.
Enchrid., 103).
Teske Translation:
58. Let us, then, first set forth this idea and see whether it provides a satisfactory answer to our question. The free choice which the creator has given to the rational soul as part of its nature is a neutral power that can either turn to faith or fall into unbelief. Therefore, human beings cannot be said to have this will by which they believe God unless they have received it, when at God’s call it arises from the free choice which they received as part of their nature when they were created. God wills that all human beings be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim 2:4), but not so that he deprives them of free choice, since they will be judged with perfect justice according to their good or bad use of it. Consequently, unbelievers act against the will of God when they do not believe his gospel, but they do not on that account defeat his will. Rather, they deprive themselves of the great and supreme good and plunge themselves into evils which are punishments. They are destined to experience in punishment the power of the God whose mercy they held in contempt in his gifts. Thus the will of God is never defeated, but it would be defeated, if it could not find something to do with those who hold him in contempt or if they could somehow escape what he has appointed for them. He says, for example, I will that all these servants of mine work in the vineyard and that, after their labor, they rest and feast. But if any of them refuse to do this, they will forever grind grain at the millstone. Any who held him in contempt would seem to act against the will of their lord, but they would defeat it if they took flight from the millstone out of contempt—something that could never happen under God’s power. Hence, scripture said, God has spoken once, that is, immutably—though one could also understand this with regard to the only Word. Then, adding what he spoke immutably, it says, These two things have I heard: that power belongs to God and to you, Lord, belongs mercy; you repay all according to their works (Ps 62:12–13). Therefore, they will be liable to condemnation under his power who, with regard to believing, have held his mercy in contempt. But those who believe and entrust themselves to God to be forgiven all their sins and to be healed from all their wounds and to be enkindled and enlightened by warmth and light will have good works as a result of his grace. By them they will be redeemed from the corruption of bodily death; they will be crowned and satisfied with goods—not temporal ones, but eternal ones, beyond what we ask for and understand (Eph 3:20).
Saint Augustine, “The Spirit and the Letter,” in
Answer to the Pelagians, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Roland J. Teske, vol. 23, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (New City Press, 1997), 182–83;
De spiritu et littera, c. 33, 58; italics original.
F. FROM CONTRA JULIANUM (AD 420)
Teske Translation:
4, 14. You write, “The apostle said, The goodness of God draws you to repentance” (Rom 2:4). That is true; I agree. But he draws to repentance those he has predestined, even if by the stubbornness of their unrepentant heart, insofar as it is up to them, they store up anger for themselves on the day of anger and of the revelation of the just judgment of God who will repay all according to their works.14 After all, regardless of the amount of patience he shows, who will do penance, unless he gives them that gift? Have you forgotten that the very same teacher said, In case God may grant them penance to know the truth and they withdraw from the snares of the devil (2 Tm 2:25–26)? But his judgments are a great abyss.
Surely, if we permit those who are under our power to commit crimes before our eyes, we will be guilty along with them. Yet he [God] permits countless crimes to take place before his eyes, though he would on no account permit them, if he did not want to. He is, nonetheless, just and good. By showing patience he allows room for repentance, since he does not want anyone to perish.15
_______________
14 See Rom 2:4–6.
15 See 2 Pt 3:9.
Saint Augustine, “Answer to Julian,” in
Answer to the Pelagians, II, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Roland J. Teske, vol. 24, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (New City Press, 1998), 442; italics original;
Contra Iulianum, 5.3.4, 14.
G. FROM THE ENCHIRIDION (AD 421–422)
III. The Primary Sources on the Death of Christ in Mostly Chronological Order
To be continued....
As some historians noted above, Augustine held the view that Christ suffered for the sins of the whole human race. He held a form of universal redemption. From this it may be inferred, as they say, that he held that God wills the salvation of all men. This is certainly true of Prosper of Aquitaine, as seen in his Defense of Augustine.
IV. THE ISSUE OF HIS INTERPRETATION OF 1 TIM 2:4
To be continued...
Post Joseph Pohle, Grace, Actual and Habitual: A Dogmatic Treatise, ed. Arthur Preuss, 5th ed. (B. Herder, 1924), 160–62 and his explanation of Augustine on 1 Tim 2:4 involving the distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will. Post Tixeront as well, who argues similarly.
Examine Alexander Y. Hwang, “Augustine’s Interpretations of 1 Tim. 2:4 in the Context of His Developing Views of Grace,” Studia Patristica 43 (2006): 137–41; and Roland Teske, S.J., “1 Timothy 2:4 and the Beginnings of the Massalian Controversy,” in Grace for Grace: The Debates After Augustine and Pelagius, ed. Alexander Y. Hwang, Brian J. Matz, and Augustine Casiday (The Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 14–34.
Note that Aquinas and Vermigli, two theologians following Augustine, grant that the verse can be taken in a number of legitimate senses, not just one, and one of those senses can mean God wills the salvation of all men antecedently or in his revealed or signified will. See Aquinas,
Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 19, A. 6; Question 23, Article 4; and
his commentary on 1 Tim 2:4. See also Peter Martyr Vermigli,
Predestination and Justification, ed. John Patrick Donnelly, Frank A. James III, and Joseph C. McLelland, trans. Frank A. James III, vol. 8, The Peter Martyr Library (Truman State University Press, 2018), 62–64.
V. AN ANALYSIS OF JEAN DAILLÉ’S CASE
To be continued...
VI. THE VIEWS OF AUGUSTINE’S EARLY DISCIPLES CONSIDERED
Prosper, Quodvultdeus, Paulus Orosius of Braga, Fulgentius, Caesarius of Arles, et al.
To be continued...
VII. THE VIEWS OF AUGUSTINE’S LATER DISCIPLES CONSIDERED
Florus of Lyon, Remigius of Lyon, Gottschalk, Aquinas, Hugh of Saint Victor, the Reformers, Jansen, et al.
To be continued...
VIII. Concluding Comments
To be continued...
--------------------------
Miscellaneous Notes for Further Study:
Juan Martínez de Ripalda (1594–1648; De ente supernat. T. II. disput. CXI)
Juan Martinez de Ripalda, S.J. (1594-1648)
https://books.google.com/books?id=gPwkOChYREoC&pg=PA400#v=onepage&q&f=false
https://books.google.com/books?id=HN1RAAAAcAAJ&pg=PA497#v=onepage&q=augustinus&f=false
https://books.google.com/books?id=Kt1OYm3LtVcC&pg=PA485#v=onepage&q&f=false
https://www.digitale-sammlungen.de/en/view/bsb10937134?page=548,549
Alphonse Le Moyne (b. c.1596–1659; De dono orandi, sive de gratia ad orandum sufficiente, cap. II),
https://www.google.com/books/edition/De_Dono_orandi_sive_de_Gratia_ad_orandum/dZVi8qcUgysC?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA138&printsec=frontcover
Scipione Maffei (1675– 1755; Hist. Theolog. de gratia, lib XVI),
Scipio Maffei (1675-1755)
Historia theologica dogmatum et opinionum de divina gratia, libero arbitrio et praedestinatione
https://books.google.com/books?id=dvBoAAAAcAAJ&pg=PA261#v=onepage&q&f=false
Bernardus Désirant (1656–1725; In opere inscripto, s. Augustinus vindicatus contra centum et unam damnatas Paschalis Quesnelli propositiones),
Jean Le Porcq (1636–1722; In opere, cui titulum fecit, Les sentiments de saint Augustin sur la grâce opposez à ceux de Jansenius
Faure, In Enchirid. S. Augustini, chapter CIII, Naples, 1847, pp. 195
Lionel Palland, S. Prosperi Aquitani doctrina de prædestinatione et voluntate Dei salvifica; de ejus in Augustinismum influxu, Montréal, 1937
Father P. Wang Tch’ang Tche, S.J., inspired by an idea proposed by Father de Lubac, cf. Actes du IIe Congrès de l’Union missionnaire du clergé de France, 1933, pp. 40–41
Faure, Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Caritate S. Aurelii Augustini... notis et assertionibus theologicis illustratum, Naples, 1847, chapter CIII
Hurter, De Deo, nos. 118–121
Tixeront, Hist. des dogmes, vol. II, pp. 498–511
Louis Capéran, Le problème du salut des infidèles, essai historique, 2nd edition, Toulouse, 1935, chapter IV
Otto Pfülf, S.J., Zur Prädestinationslehre des hl. Augustinus, in Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, 1893, vol. XVII, pp. 485–495
Ph. Huppert, Der Augustinismus, in Das Katholik, 1893, vol. I, pp. 162–172
M. Jacquin, O.P., La question de la prédestination aux Ve et VIe siècles: S. Augustin, in Revue d'hist. eccl., 1904, vol. V, pp. 265–283, 725–754
De San, Tractatus de Deo uno, vol. II, chapter IV, pp. 35–54, Louvain, 1897.
K. Kolb, Menschliche Freiheit und göttliches Vorherwissen nach Augustinus, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1908.