Asahel Nettleton (1783–1844) on Total Depravity and Free Agency

This doctrine [of total depravity] does not imply that men are as bad as they can be. “Evil men and seducers shall wax worse and worse.” And all the finally impenitent will wax worse and worse forever. The longer sinners suffer in hell, the more will they deserve to continue there.

This doctrine does not imply that men are not free moral agents. They possess all the faculties which are essential to moral agency—reason, judgment, memory, will, and affections. If they were not free moral agents, they could not be the subjects of moral depravity. To say, therefore, that total depravity is inconsistent with free agency is absurd. It if is, there can be no such thing as sin or blame in the Universe. For if total depravity annihilates free agency, then partial depravity destroys it in some degree. So far as an individual is depraved, so far as he is not free, and of course, not blame-worthy.

Asahel Nettleton, “Sermon 44: Total Depravity (Genesis 6:5),” in Asahel Nettleton: Sermons from the Second Great Awakening (Ames, IA: International Outreach, 1995), 394–95. Also in Asahel Nettleton, “Sermon XXVIII: Total Depravity,” in Remains of the Late Rev. Asahel Nettleton, D. D., ed. Bennet Tyler (Hartford: Published by Robins and Smith, 1845), 314–15.

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Samuel Spring (1746–1819) on Natural and Moral Ability

5. Does the total depravity of man consist in the destitution of any faculties or abilities which are necessary to constitute a moral agent. For, if men were not moral agents, or were destitute of natural ability to keep the divine commands, they would be incapable of moral action. It is not possible for men to be disobedient, except they have natural ability to be obedient. For the commands of God never exceed the natural ability of man. God does not require the improvement of more talents than he has given. “For to whom much is given much shall be required.” The depravity of man, therefore, does not consist in the destitution of natural ability to obey the divine command; but in those volitions or exercises which are opposed to it. It is the will or heart of man which is depraved. Accordingly Christ does not condemn sinners because they are destitute of natural ability to come to him; but because they refuse: therefore he says, “Ye will not come unto me that ye might have life.” Sinners are able to do their duty, but not willing. For God requires no natural impossibilities.

Samuel Spring, Moral Disquisitions: And Strictures on the Rev. David Tappan’s Letters to Philalethes, 2nd ed. (Exeter: Printed by Charles Norris & Co., 1815), 10–11.

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Richard Baxter’s (1615–1691) Notes on 1 Timothy 2:5–6

5. For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus; 6. Who gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time.

5, 6. For it must move us to pray for all, in compliance with this Will of God, that would have all Men saved; because there is One God who is good to all, and One Mediator between God and Mankind, who took on him the Common Nature of all Men, and gave himself a Ransom for all, revealed in the Season appointed of God, (or to be preached to all in due time, as God pleaseth.)

Note, The Controversie about Universal Redemption, too hotly agitated by Beza, Piscater, and others, on one side, and by many on the other, I have fully handled in my Catholick Theologie, and Methodus Theologiae; and it needs no more than as aforesaid: 1. Whoever is damned, it is not because no Ransom was made for him, or because it was not sufficient for him. 2. By Gods Will to save all, is meant the Effects of his Will that have a tendency to their Salvation. 3. It is notorious, that God hath made an Universal Act of Grace or Oblivion, giving Pardon of all Sin, and Right to Life in Christ, to all Men, without exception, on Condition of Believing-acceptance; and hath commissioned his Ministers to offer this Gift to all Men, to the utmost of their power, and entreat them to accept it; and doth by many Mercies intimate to them, that he useth them not according to the mere violated Law of Innocency, but on Terms of Grace. 4. Few Christians have the face to affirm, that this Universal Conditional Pardon and Gift (or Law of Grace) is no Fruit of the Death of Christ. 5. If therefore this Act of Pardon was purchased by Christ, and given to all, no modest Face can deny, that he so far died for all, as to purchase for them all that he actually giveth them. 6. It is usual to say that we give a Man a Benefit, (e. g. Life to a condemned Malefactor) if it be given him on the fair Condition of his Acceptance, and brought to his own Will, and he entreated to receive it. 7. If any Wrangler say, that this is unfit Language, (to say, He is willing that Men shall be saved, who offereth them Salvation freely, unless he also make them willing:) Let him confess, that it is but the Name that he denieth, and none of the Gifts in question. 8. And be it known, that Unwillingness cometh not from a Physical Impossibility, through the want of Natural Faculties, (as it is with Brutes) but from a voluntary Pravity, which aggravateth the Sin. 9. And the mutable Will of Man is to be changed by Reason: And God giveth Men Reasons in their kind sufficient to persuade them to accept of Christ and Life. 10. And lastly, No Man can say, that Adam when he fell had not Grace enough to make him Able to have stood, which he might have used, and should have done, to his actual standing: Nor, that God never giveth such a power to believe (or at least to come nearer the State of a true Believer) to many that might bring it into Act, and do not. This much is enough to end this Controversie with modest Wits.

Richard Baxter, “The First Epistle of Paul the Apostle to Timothy,” in A Paraphrase on the New Testament (London: Printed for B. Simmons, at the Three Cocks in Ludgate-street, 1685), xxx3^v.

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Richard Baxter (1615–1691) on the Arrogancy of Some in Believing Half-Truths

"4. Another expression of this Arrogant Ignorance is, When men will not believe the several truths of God, because they are not able to reconcile them, and place each one in its own order, and see the Method and Body of Truth in its true Locations and Proportion: Nay, perhaps they will believe none, because they cannot discern the harmony.

What abundance of seeming contradictions in Scripture do rise up in the eyes of an Ignorant Infidel? as strange apparitions do to a distracted man; or as many colors do before the inflamed or distempered eye. These self-conceited ignorant Souls, do imagine all to be impossible which exceedeth their knowledge; and because they cannot see[?] the sweet consent of Scripture, and how those places do suit, and fortify each other, which to them seemed to contradict each other, therefore they think that no one else can see it; no not God himself. They are like an ignorant fellow in a Watch-makers shop, that thinks nobody can fix[?] all the loose pieces together, and make a Watch of them, because he cannot. When he hath tried many ways, and cannot[?] hit it, he casts all by, and concludeth, that it's impossible.

And upon this account many cast away particular truths, though they will not cast away all. Some cannot reconcile the efficiency of the Spirit, with that of the Word, in the Conversion and Confirmation of sinners; and therefore some exclude one, and some the other, or own by the empty names; some cannot reconcile the Law, and the Gospel: And too great a part of the Teachers, in the Christian World, have been so troubled to reconcile God's grace, with man's free-will, that of old, many did too much exclude the natural liberty of the will, upon a supposition of the inconsistency; only the names of both were still owned.

Many cannot reconcile the sufficiency of Christ's satisfaction, with the necessity of man's endeavors, and inherent righteousness; and therefore one must be strained or denied. Many cannot reconcile common love and grace, with that which is special and proper to the Elect; and therefore some deny one, and some another. The like might be said of many other cases, wherein the Arrogancy of man's wit hath cast out God's truth: If both parts be never so express, yet they are upon this unbelieving questioning strain, [How can these things be?] How can these agree together? How can both be true? when yet it is evident, that God hath owned both.

It is certain, that the Truths of God's Word are one perfect well-jointed Body; and the perfect symmetry or proportion, is much of its beauty: It is certain, that Method is an excellent help in knowing Divine things: and that no man can know God's truths perfectly, til he see them all as in one Scheme or Body, with one view, as it were, and so sees the Location of each Truth, and the respect that it hath to all the rest; not only to see that there is no contradiction, but how every Truth doth fortify the rest. All this therefore is exceeding desirable, but it is not every man's lot to attain it, nor any man's in this world perfectly, or near to a perfection: It is true, that the sight of all God's frame of the Creation, uno intuitus, in all its parts, with all their respects to each other, would acquaint us with abundance more of the glory of it, then by looking on the Members peace-meal we can attain: But who can see them thus, but God? at least, what mortal eye can do it? And we shall never in this life attain to see the full Body of Divine Revealed-Truths, in that method and due proportion, as it necessary to the knowledge of its full beauty. It is a most perfectly melodious Instrument; but every man cannot see it in tune, so as to perceive the delectable harmony.

What then? because we cannot know all, shall we know nothing, or deny all? Because we cannot see the whole frame of the world, in its junctures and proportion, shall we say, That there is no world, or, that the parts are not rightly situated: or feign one to be inconsistent with the rest? we must rather receive first that which is most clear, and labor by degrees to see through the obscurities that beset the rest. And if we first find from God, that both are truths, let us receive them, and learn how to reconcile them after, as we can: And if we cannot reach it, its arrogancy therefore to think that it is not to be done, and to be so highly conceited of our own understandings."

Richard Baxter, The Arrogancy of Reason Against Divine Revelations, Repressed. Or, Proud Ignorance the Cause of Infidelity, and of Mens Quarrelling with the Word of God (London: Printed by T. N. for Tho. Underhil, 1655), 21–24. Some of the English has been updated.

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Richard Baxter (1615-1691) on Moral Power as Distinct from Natural Faculties

"3. I easily acknowledge that grace giveth such a power as is commonly called Moral, distinct from the natural faculties, as our corrupt estate contains an opposite impotency. But this is but an applying of the terms [Can] and [Cannot] [Power] and [Impotency] to Dispositions and Undisposedness, to Habits and their Privations. 

4. A new heart and spirit, I easily confess necessary. But those words do commonly signify in Scripture, only new Inclinations, Dispositions, Qualifications. It is a new heart, though only the old faculties and substance. I hope you will not follow Illyricus.

5. Where you say that [without faith a man can no more Receive Christ, nor do ought towards it, than a dead man can walk or speak.] I Reply 1. That proves not faith to be equivalent to a Potentia vel facultas, any otherwise then that it is of as absolute necessity, but not that it is of the same nature. If you show an illiterate man a Greek or Hebrew book, he can no more read in it then a dead man, that is, both are truly in sensu composito impossible: But yet it is but a habit that is wanting  to one, and a power or faculty natural, to the other. And so it may truly be said that a sinner cannot do well that hath accustomed to do evil, no more than a Leopard can change his spots, or a Blackmoore his skin. Yet if you mean that such are equally distant from actual change as a dead man, it is but a dead comparison. A dead man wants both natural faculties, and an inclination or moral power. An unbeliever wants but one."

Richard Baxter, The Reduction of a Digressor (London: Printed by A. M. for Thomas Underhill, at the Anchor and Bible in Pauls Church-yard near the little North-door, and Francis Tyton, at the three Daggers in Fleetstreet near Dunstans Church, 1654), 131.

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Isaac Watts (1674‒1748) on Natural and Moral Impotency

Object. I. But may it not be said here, If there be only an outward Sufficiency of Salvation provided for the Non-elect, by a conditional Pardon procured through the Death of Christ if they should repent and believe, but no inward Sufficiency of Grace provided to enlighten their Minds, to change their Hearts, and enable them to exercise this Faith and Repentance, the Event will be infallibly and necessarily the same, and their Damnation as necessary and certain, as if there were no outward Salvation provided; since they of themselves cannot repent, they cannot believe; for by the Fall all Men are become blind in Spiritual things, and dead in Sin.

Answer. It is granted, that no Sinner will truly and sincerely repent and believe in Christ, without the powerful and effectual Influences of converting Grace; and therefore they are called Blind and Dead in Sin, because God knows the final Event will be the same as if they were under a natural Impossibility, or utter natural Impotence. And for this reason the Conversion of a Sinner is called, A New Creation; Being born again; Giving Sight to the Blind; or, a Resurrection from the Dead: And the Necessity of Divine Power to effect this Change, is held forth in many Places of Scripture.

Yet we must say still, that Sinners are not under such a real natural Impossibility of repenting and believing, as though they were naturally Blind or Dead. 'Tis true, the Blind and the Dead have lost their natural Powers of Seeing and Moving; but when Scripture represents the Inability of Sinners to repent, or believe in Christ, by such Figures and Metaphors as Death or Blindness, it must be remembered these are but Metaphors and Figures, such as the holy Writers and all the Eastern Nations frequently use; and they must not be understood in their literal Sense, as if Men had lost their natural Powers or Faculties of Understanding, Will, and Affections, which are the only natural Powers necessary to believe and repent.

Now 'tis plain that these natural Faculties, Powers, or Capacities, are not lost by the Fall; for if they were, there would be no manner of need or use of any moral Means or Motives, such as Commands, Threatenings, Promises, Exhortations; these would all be impertinent and absurd, for they could have no more Influence on Sinners, than if we command or exhort a blind Person to see, or a dead Body to rise or move; which Commands and Exhortations would appear ridiculous and useless. And since the blessed God, in his Word, uses these moral Means and Motives to call Sinners to Repentance and Faith, it is certain that they have natural Powers and Faculties sufficient to understand and practice these Duties; and therefore they are not under a Necessity of Sinning, and of being destroyed, since there is nothing more wanted in a way of sufficient natural Powers, Faculties, or Abilities, than what they have.

All the other Impotence and Inability therefore in Sinners to repent and believe, properly speaking, is but moral, or seated chiefly in their Wills. 'Tis a great Disinclination or Aversion in these natural Faculties, to attend to, learn, or practice the things of God and Religion*; and this holds them fast in their sinful State in a similar way, as if they were blind and dead, and I said the final Event will be the same, i.e. they will never repent without Almighty Grace. And upon this account that strong and settled Inclination to Sin, and Aversion to God, which is in the Will or Affections, is represented in our own Language, as well as in the Eastern Countries, by Impotence or Inability to forsake or subdue Sin: As when a Drunkard shall say, I had such a strong Desire to the Liquor, that I could not but drink to excess, I could not with-hold the Cup from my Mouth: Or when a Murderer shall say, I hated my Neighbor so much, that having a fair Opportunity, I could not help killing him: Or when we say to a Man of Fury in his Passion, You are so warm at present, that you cannot see thins in a true Light, you cannot hearken to Reason, you cannot judge aright, you are not capable of acting regularly. And that this is the Manner of speaking in the Eastern Countries, is evident from the Bible, Gen. xxxvii. 4. Joseph's Brethren hated him, and could not speak peaceably to him: Yet you will grant all this is but moral Impotence, i.e. a very strong Inclination to Excess of Drink, or Murder, or Passion, or a strong Aversion to the contrary Virtues. Even in the things of common Life the Can-not sometimes signifies nothing but the Will-not, Luke xi. 7. Trouble me not, my Door is shut, my Children are with me in Bed, I cannot rise to give thee; i.e. I will not. And with regard to Faith or believing in Christ, our Saviour explains his own Language in this manner. In one place he saith, No Man can come unto me except my Father draw him, John vi. 44. And in another Place he charges the Jews with this as their Fault: Ye will not come unto me, that ye may have Life, John v. 40. So in the Parable one Excuse is, Luke xiv. 20. I have married a Wife, and I cannot come. All these Citations intend the same thing: their Can-not is their Will-not, i.e. 'tis the Strength of their Aversion to Christ, which is a moral Impotence or Inability to believe in him, and the Fault lies in the Will.

St. Paul speaks to the same purpose, Rom. viii. 7. where he shows, that 'tis the Aversion or Enmity of the Carnal Mind to God, which hinders it from obeying the Law of God, and at last he says, it cannot be subject to it. The Carnal Mind is Enmity against God, for it is not subject to the Law of God, neither indeed can be: So then they who are in the Flesh cannot please God. The Fault still lies in the Will of sinful Man; and 'tis this makes it criminal, while it is not naturally impossible to be avoided or overcome.

And upon this account God is pleased to use moral Means and Motives, (viz.) Promises, Threatenings, Commands, &c. toward all Men, such as are suited to awaken their Hearts, and excite and persuade their Will to use all their natural Abilities, to set their natural Powers or Faculties to work, to attend to, and learn, and practice Faith and Repentance; and 'tis by these very means God persuades his Elect powerfully to repent and believe. But when Persons will not hear, nor be influenced by these Motives, because of their strong and willful Aversion to God and Godliness, their Crime is entirely their own, and their Condemnation is just. They have natural Powers or Faculties in them, which, if well tried, might overcome their native Propensity to Vice, though they never will do it.

If the great God, in a way of Sovereign Mercy, gives some Persons superior Aids of Grace to overcome this moral Impotence, and conquer this Aversion to God and Goodness‡; if he effectually leads, inclines, or persuades them by his Spirit to repent and believe in Christ, this does not at all hinder the others from exercising their natural Powers of Understanding, and Will in believing and repenting.

Nor can any thing of their Guilt and willful Impenitence be imputed to the blessed God, who is Lord of his own Favours, and gives or with-holds where he pleases, and who shall say to him, what dost thou? Why should mine Eye be evil toward my Neighbour, because the Eye of God is good? Or what Pretense have I to charge God with Injustice, when he does more for me than he is bound to do, though he does more for my Neighbor than he has done for me?

Let this then be constantly maintained, there is a natural, inward Sufficiency of Powers and Faculties given to every Sinner to hearken to the Calls and Offers of Grace and the Gospel, though they lie under a moral Impotence; and there is an outward Sufficiency of Provision of Pardon in the Death of Christ, for every one who repents and accepts the Gospel, though Pardon is not actually procured for all Men, nor secured to them. And thus much is sufficient to maintain the Sincerity of God in his universal Offers of Grace through Jesus Christ, and his present Commands to all Men to repent and trust in his Mercy; as well as to vindicate his Equity in the last great Day, when the Impenitent and Unbelievers shall be condemned. Their Death lies at their own doors, for since there was both an outward and inward Sufficiency for their Recovery, the Fault must lie in their own Free-will, in their willful Aversion to God and Christ, and his Salvation. I think this Distinction of natural and moral Power and Impotence, will reconcile all the various Expressions of Scripture on this Subject, both to one another, and well as to the Reason of things, which can hardly be reconciled any other way.

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* I grant this Inability to repent has been sometimes called by our Divines a Natural Impotence, because it arises from the original Corruption of our Nature since the Fall of Adam; and in this Sense I fully believe it. But this Spring of it is much better signified and expressed by the Name of Native Impotence, to show that is comes from our Birth; and the Quality of this Impotence is best called Moral, being seated chiefly in the Will and Affections, and not in any want of Natural Powers or Faculties to perform what God requires: And the Reason is plain, (viz.) That no new natural Powers are given by converting Grace, but only a Change of the moral Bent or Inclination of the Soul, a happier Turn given to our natural Faculties by the sovereign Grace of God and his Spirit.

‡ Whether the Spirit of God effectually persuade the Will to repent and believe in Christ, by immediate Influence upon the Will itself, or by setting the Things of the Gospel before the Mind in so strong a Light, and persuading the Soul so to attend to them, as shall effectually influence the Will, this shall not be any Matter of my present Debate or Determination; for in both the Event and Consequences are much the same: There is no new natural Power or Faculty given to the Soul in order to Faith and Repentance, but a divine Influence upon the old natural Powers, giving them a new and better Turn.

Isaac Watts, The Ruin and Recovery of Mankind (London: Printed for R. Hett and J. Brackstone, at the Bible and Crown in the Poultry, 1740), 247‒254.

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Joseph Truman (1631–1671) on the Natural/Moral Ability Distinction in Twisse

That Distinction well understood, which is must insisted on by the French Protestant Divines, would much conduce herein, namely the distinction of Natural and Moral Impotency.

And though many of Dr. Twisses Judgment in other things, oppose it, yet he himself in many places, when pressed with difficulties, fled to it as his chief Sanctuary, Vindic. grat. lib. 2. Errat. 9. Sect. 6. pag. (mihi) 211.

Joseph Truman, A Discourse of Natural and Moral Impotency (London: Printed for Robert Clavel; and are to be sold at the Sign of the Peacock in St. Pauls Church-yard, 1675), 3.

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See one quote from Twisse here (click), and also Archibald Alexander's statements about Twisse and others (click).

Andrew Fuller (1754–1815) on Moral Inability

MORAL INABILITY.
First, You inquire "whether any person by nature possesses that honest heart which constitutes the ability to comply with the invitations of the gospel?" I believe the heart of man to be by nature the direct opposite of honest. I am not aware, however, that I have any where represented an honest heart as constituting our ability to comply with gospel invitations, unless as the term is sometimes used in a figurative sense, for moral ability. I have said, "There is no ability wanting for this purpose in any man who possesses an honest heart." If a person owed you one hundred pounds, and could find plenty of money for his own purposes, though none for you; and should he at the same time plead inability, you would answer, there was no ability wanting, but an honest heart: yet it would be an unjust construction of your words, if an advocate for this dishonest man were to allege that you had represented an honest heart as that which constituted the ability to pay the debt. No, you would reply, his ability, strictly speaking, consists in its being in the power of his hand, and this he has. That which is wanting is an honest principle; and it is the former, not the latter, which renders him accountable. It is similar with regard to God. Men have the same natural powers to love Christ as to hate him, to believe as to disbelieve; and this it is which constitutes their accountableness. Take away reason and conscience, and man would cease to be accountable; but if he were as wicked as Satan himself, in that case no such effect would follow.

Secondly, If no man by nature possess an honest heart, you inquire, "Whether, if I be not what you call an elect sinner, there are any means provided of God, and which I can use, that shall issue in that 'honesty of heart' which will enable me to believe unto salvation?" Your being an elect or a non-elect sinner makes no difference as to this question. The idea of a person destitute of honesty using means to obtain it is in all cases a contradiction. The use of means supposes the existence of an honest desire after the end. The Scriptures direct to the sincere use of means for obtaining eternal life; and these means are, "Repent, and believe the gospel;" but they no where direct to such a use of means as may be complied with without any honesty of heart, and in order to obtain it. Nothing appears to me with greater evidence than that God directly requires uprightness of heart, not only in the moral law, but in all the exhortations of the Bible, and not the dishonest use of means in order to obtain it. Probably you yourself would not plead for such a use of means, but would allow that even in using means to obtain an honest heart we ought to be sincere; but if so, you must maintain what I affirm, that nothing short of honesty of heart itself is required in any of the exhortations of Scripture; for a sincere use of means is honesty of heart. If you say, "No; man is depraved; it is not his duty to possess an honest heart, but merely to use means that he may possess it;" I answer, as personating the sinner, I have no desire after an honest heart. If you reply, "You should pray for such a desire," you must mean, if you mean any thing, that I should express my desire to God that I may have a desire; and I tell you that I have none to express. You would then, sir, be driven to tell me I was so wicked that I neither was of an upright heart, nor would be persuaded to use any means for becoming so; and that I must take the consequences. That is, I must be exposed to punishment, because, though I had "a price in my hand to get wisdom, I had no heart to it." Thus all you do is to remove the obstruction further out of sight: the thing is the same.

I apprehend it is owing to your considering human depravity as the misfortune, rather than the fault, of human nature, that you and others speak of it as you do. You would not write in this manner in an affair that affected yourself. If the debtor above supposed, whom you knew to have plenty of wealth about him, were to allege his want of an honest heart, you might possibly think of using means with him; but you would not think of directing him to use means to become what at present he has no desire to be—an honest man!

Thirdly, You inquire, if there be no means provided of God which I can use that shall issue in that honesty of heart which will enable me to believe unto salvation, "how can the gospel be a blessing bestowed upon me; seeing it is inadequate to make me happy, and contains no good thing which I can possibly obtain or enjoy?" If I be under no other inability than that which arises from a dishonesty of heart, it is an abuse of language to introduce the terms "possible, impossible," &c., for the purpose of diminishing the goodness of God, or destroying the accountableness of man. I am not wanting in power provided I were willing; and if I be not willing, there lies my fault. Nor is any thing in itself less a blessing on account of our unreasonable and wicked aversion to it. Indeed, the same would follow from your own principles. If I be so wicked as not only to be destitute of an honest heart, but cannot be persuaded to use means in order to obtain it, I must perish; and then, according to your way of writing, the gospel was "inadequate to make me happy, and was no blessing to me!" You will say, I might have used the means; that is, I might if I would, or if I had possessed a sincere desire after the end: but I did not possess it ; and therefore the same consequences follow your hypothesis as that which you oppose.

If these things be true, say you, we may despair. True, sir; and that is the point, in a sense, to which I should be glad to see you and many others brought. Till we despair of all help from ourselves, we shall never pray acceptably; nor, in my judgment, is there any hope of our salvation.

Let a man feel that there is no bar between him and heaven except what consists in his own wickedness, and yet that such is its influence over him that he certainly never will by any efforts of his own extricate himself from it, and he will then begin to pray for an interest in salvation by mere grace, in the name of Jesus—a salvation that will save him from himself; and, so praying, he will find it; and, when he has found it, he will feel and acknowledge that it was grace alone that made him to differ; and this grace he is taught in the Scriptures to ascribe to the purpose of God, given him in Christ Jesus before the world began.

Andrew Fuller, “Answers to Queries: Moral Inability,” in The Complete Works of Rev. Andrew Fuller (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1845), 3:768–69. Also in The Complete Works of the Rev. Andrew Fuller, rev. by Joseph Belcher, D. D. (Harrisonburg, VA: Sprinkle Publications, 1988), 3:768–69.

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Hugh Knox (c.1733–1790) on Moral and Natural Inability

The distinction between natural and moral inability, I have ever thought an important and useful one, when well stated and explained. My worthy and excellent friend president Burr was the first who ever gave me an idea of this distinction. He did it in three sermons preached from Joshua xxiv. 19. "Ye cannot serve the LORD; for he is an holy GOD," &c. He acknowledged they were the substance of Mr. Edwards' book relative to that subject, and expressed a pretty strong desire of having them printed, as some of the most useful and important he had ever preached. All the world I suppose are agreed in the idea of natural inability; and were I to define moral inability, it would be in terms like these; "A natural and contracted disinclination or aversion to the exercises of piety and moral virtue, which becomes faulty and criminal by our resisting motives which would have overcome it, and wilfully neglected to apply to GOD, thro' the REDEEMER, by prayer and the other instrumental duties of religion, for those influences of his HOLY SPIRIT (freely offered to all who seek him) by which it would have been totally subdued, and our volitions and actions engaged on the side of piety and moral rectitude.

Hugh Knox, A Letter to the Rev. Mr. Jacob Green, of New Jersey, Pointing out some DIFFICULTIES in the CALVINISTICK Scheme of Divinity, respecting FREE WILL, DIVINE DECREES, PARTICULAR REDEMPTION, &c. and requesting a SOLUTION of them (London: printed for G. Keith, J. Johnson, E. Englefield: and sold by J. Gore, in Liverpool; P. Broster, in Chester; W. Pine, in Bristol; Newton, Clarke, and Harrop, in Manchester; and the princip alsic booksellers in Leeds, 1770), 39.

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Thomas Scott (1747–1821) on Natural and Moral Ability

But sinners cannot obey the call. This is a truth if truly understood. They are under a moral, not a natural inability. Is this distinction useless and unintelligible? Is there no difference betwixt a covetous wretch, who with a full purse hath no heart; and a compassionate man who hath no money, to relieve a fellow-creature in distress? Both are effectually prevented, but the one from himself, the other by an external hinderance. Every generous man at once indignantly condemns the one, and wholly justifies the other. When the case is put, divested of all false colouring, the one could if he would, and the other would if he could. It is said of God that he "cannot lie." But whence arises this impossibility? Surely not from external restraint, but from the perfection of his essential holiness. Satan cannot but hate his Maker. Not because of outward force put upon him, but through the horrid malignity of his disposition.*

*If there be no real difference betwixt the want of natural faculties, and the want of moral dispositions, there can be nothing culpable even in Satan's opposing God, and endeavouring the destruction of men; for it is as impossible at least that he should do otherwise, as that sinners should perfectly obey the law, or of themselves repent and believe the gospel; and if they are excusable, Satan is consequently so too. Indeed, on this supposition, all characters are reduced to a level; for in proportion to the degree of evil disposition, or moral inability to good, evil actions become excusable: and by parity of reasoning, in proportion to the degree of moral excellency of disposition, or of moral inability to evil, good actions being unavoidable, become less praise-worthy. Thus, the more inwardly holy any man is, the less esteem is his piety, justice, and charity entitled to; for he can scarcely do otherwise. An angel, as confirmed in holiness, is still less entitled to commendation; for in some sense it is impossible he should do otherwise than be holy. He cannot sin. And through necessary excellency of nature it is strictly impossible that God should do any thing inconsistent with the most consummate wisdom, justice, truth, and goodness. He cannot: and, shall we say, this inability (which is the incommunicable glory of his nature) renders him less entitled to our admiring, adoring, grateful love, than otherwise he would be?

Every one must see what confusion would be introduced into civil and domestic concerns, if no regard were paid to this distinction, and an inveterate propensity were allowed as an excuse for crimes: and it introduces equal perplexity into all our discourses on divine things; because it runs directly counter to all our rules of judging characters and actions. A good outward action without the least corresponding disposition, is in reality mere hypocrisy: as the disposition to good and aversion to evil increase, good actions have more genuine sincerity, and the character more amiableness. When we can say with the apostles, "We cannot but do" so and so—we are entitled to as much esteem and approbation as mere men can be. This moral inability to evil is much stronger in angels, and the spirits of just men made perfect; and therefore we are taught to look forward to such a holy state and temper as the summit of our wishes and desires: and God himself, who, being under no restraint, but doing his whole pleasure, cannot but be perfectly and unchangeably holy, is proposed as the object of supreme love, admiring gratitude, and adoring praise.

On the other hand a bad action, if done without intention, or the least disposition to such moral evil, is deemed purely accidental, and not culpable. When it is contrary to a man's general disposition and character, and the effect of sudden temptation, it is considered as more venial than when the effect of a rooted disposition; and for a criminal to plead, "I am so propense to theft and cruelty, that I could not help it," would be to condemn himself as the vilest miscreant, not fit to live, in the opinions of judge, jury, and spectators.

There can be no difficulty in proving, that this distinction is implied throughout the Bible, and has its foundation in the nature of things; and so far from being novel, it is impossible that a rational creature can be unacquainted with it. No man ever yet missed the distinction between the sick servant who could not work, and the lazy servant who had no heart to his work; that is, betwixt natural and moral inability; and no man could govern even his domestics in a proper manner, without continually adverting to it.

"But," say some, "human nature now must be laid low, and grace exalted." Now we ask, Which lays human nature lowest? To rank man among the brutes, who have no power, or among fallen spirits who have no disposition, to love and serve God? Or which most exalts grace? To save a wretch who could not help those crimes for which he is condemned to hell: or to save a rebel, who was willingly an enemy to his Maker, and persisted in that enmity, till almighty power, by a new creation, overcame his obstinacy, and made him willing to be reconciled?

Thomas Scott, “Sermon on Election,” in The Theological Works of the Rev. Thomas Scott (Edinburgh: Peter Brown and Thomas Nelson, 1830), 150.

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Archibald Alexander (1772–1851) on Natural and Moral Inability

…many adopted with readiness a distinction of human ability into natural and moral. By the first they understood merely the possession of physical powers and opportunities; by the latter, a mind rightly disposed. In accordance with this distinction, it was taught that every man possessed a natural ability to do all that God required of him; but that every sinner laboured under a moral inability to obey God, which, however, could not be pleaded in excuse for his disobedience, as it consisted in corrupt dispositions of the heart, for which every man was responsible. Now this view of the subject is substantially correct, and the distinction has always been made by every person, in his judgments of his own conduct and that of others. It is recognized in all courts of justice, and in all family government, and is by no means a modern discovery. And yet it is remarkable that it is a distinction so seldom referred to, or brought distinctly into view, by old Calvinistic authors. The first writer among English theologians that we have observed using this distinction explicitly, is the celebrated Dr. Twisse, the prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, and the able opposer of Arminianism, and advocate of the Supralapsarian doctrine of divine decrees. It was also resorted to by the celebrated Mr. Howe, and long afterwards used freely by Dr. Isaac Watts, the popularity of whose evangelical writings probably had much influence in giving it currency. It is also found in the theological writings of Dr. Witherspoon, and many others, whose orthodoxy was never disputed. But in this country no man has had so great an influence in fixing the language of theology, as Jonathan Edwards, president of New Jersey College. In his work on "The Freedom of the Will," this distinction holds a prominent place, and is very important to the argument which this profound writer has so ably discussed in that treatise. The general use of the distinction between natural and moral ability may, therefore, be ascribed to the writings of President Edwards, both in Europe and America. No distinguished writer on theology has made more use of it than Dr. Andrew Fuller; and it is well known that he imbibed nearly all his views of theology from an acquaintance with the writings of President Edwards. And it may be said truly, that Jonathan Edwards has done more to give complexion to the theological system of Calvinists in America, than all other persons together. This is more especially true of New England; but it is also true to a great extent in regard to a large number of the present ministers of the Presbyterian church. Those, indeed, who were accustomed either to the Scotch or Dutch writers, did not adopt this distinction, but were jealous of it as an innovation, and as tending to diminish, in their view, the miserable and sinful state of man, and as derogatory to the grace of God. But we have remarked, that in almost all cases where the distinction has been opposed as false, or as tending to the introduction of false doctrine, it has been misrepresented. The true ground of the distinction has not been clearly apprehended; and those who deny it have been found making it themselves in other words; for that an inability depending on physical defect, should be distinguished from that which arises from a wicked disposition, or perverseness of will, is a thing which no one can deny who attends to the clear dictates of his own mind; for it is a self-evident truth, which even children recognize in all their apologies for their conduct.

Archibald Alexander, “The Inability of Sinners,” in Theological Essays: Reprinted from the Princeton Review (New York & London: Wiley and Putnam, 1846), 266–67.

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For an example where the distinction has been misrepresented, see Canon XXI in the Formula Consensus Helvetica (1675).

Thomas Manton (1620–1677) on Moral and Natural Ability

(3.) Impotency and weakness, which lieth in the wilfulness and hardness of their hearts. Our non posse is non velle. Our inability lies in our unwillingness: Ps. Iviii. 4, 5, 'They are like to the deaf adder, that stoppeth her ear, which will not hearken to the charmer, charming never so wisely;' Mat. xxiii. 37, 'How often would I have gathered thy children together as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not?' Luke xix. 14, 'His citizens hated him, and sent a message after him, saying, We will not have this man to reign over us.' Now what more proper cure for all these evils than the word of God? Teaching is the proper means to cure ignorance, for men have a natural understanding. Warning of danger and mindfulness of duty is the proper means to cure slightness. And to remove their impotency (which lieth in their obstinacy and wilfulness), there is no such means as to beseech them with constant persuasions. The impotence is rather moral than natural. We do not use to reason men out of bare natural impotency, to bid a lame man walk, or a blind man see, or bid a dead man live; but to make men willing of the good which they rejected or neglected; in short, to inform the judgment, awaken the conscience, persuade the will: yet it is true the bare means will not do it without God's concurrence, the evidence and demonstration of the Spirit; but it is an encouragement to use these means, because they are fitted to the end, and God would not appoint us means which should be altogether in vain.

Thomas Manton, The Complete Works of Thomas Manton (London: James Nisbet & Co., 1873), 21:332.

Thomas Manton (1620–1677) on the Will and Human Responsibility

God being our creator, doth preserve the liberty of his workmanship; he applieth himself to every creature according to the nature of it, so as to improve it, not destroy it; he offereth no violence to our natural faculties, but super-addeth grace; draweth, that we may run, Cant i. 4; not hoisteth up, as dead things by pulleys and engines. The will is not compelled, but overcome by the sweet efficacy of grace; being actuated by God, we act under God; that is, by our own voluntary motion, and in a way of operation proper to us. I say, God influenceth all things according to their natural inclination; he enlighteneth by and with the sun, burneth by and with the fire; reasoneth with man; acts necessarily with necessary causes, and freely with free causes; draweth us with the cords of a man, Hos. xi. 4. Now we pervert this order, if we lie upon the bed of ease, and cry, 'Christ must do all.' Christ that doth all for you, doth all in you, and by you; he propoundeth reasons which we must consider, and so betake ourselves to a godly course; he showeth us our lost estate, the possibility of salvation by Christ, sweetly inviting us to accept of grace, that he may pardon our sins, sanctify our natures, and lead us in the way of holiness to eternal life.

Thomas Manton, The Complete Works of Thomas Manton (London: James Nisbet & Co., 1873), 12:78.

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Stephen Charnock (1628–1680) on Natural and Moral Inability

I was recently questioned about the distinction between natural and moral inability. Here's my reply:

If we are to affirm that man is in fact responsible, then he must be just that: response-able. One of the reasons that hypers like to speak of man being "accountable" rather than "responsible" is because they overstate the T in TULIP. They deny any sense of ability in man to believe. What then do Calvinists mean when they speak of "Total Inability" if not that man is without any sense of ability to believe whatsoever?

I think it's better to speak of Total Moral Inability. It's not that man lacks the faculties with which to respond to God in repentance and faith, but that he lacks the desire or want to do so. Man's problem is not in their will power, so to speak, but in their WON'T power.

Fallen man is entirely corrupted by sin. It pollutes their entire persons: mind, body and will. Even though man is fallen and dead in trespasses and sins, they still have the image of God, which AT LEAST consists in their being rational moral agents. Sinners cannot complain that they have not the faculties with which to respond to God. They are constituted by God with minds to think and wills to act. This is what I mean when I speak of "natural ability."

When I speak of the "moral inability" of those still dead in trespasses and sin, I am saying that they're so fixed and determined in their stubborness that they do not even desire to turn to God in truth. The warped affections of their hearts (moral impulses) causes them to perpetually use their God-given intellectual and voluntary instruments (natural abilities or capacities) to play nothing but a cacophonous noise. They are content being in such a state of deadness until the Holy Spirit grants them a new heart with new affections, which creates new moral impulses to use their members (mind, body, wills etc.) to the glory of God.

I am distinguishing between man's constitutional (or natural) abilities and his moral abilities, but I don't want to suggest that we can separate them. They are, admittedly, interrelated. However, what the bible is constantly underlining when it describes our naturally enslaved state is our moral inability, and not our lack of constitutional capacities.

When God regenerates us, he doesn't give us new personalities or new faculties. It's just the case that our faculties are renewed even as our hearts are renewed. When quickened by the Spirit, our wills change because our spiritual affections have changed. The regenerate are now motivated by a love to God and the love of our neighbor. This is now our dominating moral impulse, even though we still struggle with remaining pollution (the flesh principle). Consequently, our minds are no longer "set on the flesh" as they once were.

Does that help you understand the distinction I am trying to make? "Ought" does imply "can" in some sense (in the sense that we possess the faculties with which to respond to God's commands), but "ought" does not imply "can" in another sense (in the sense that our mind and/or wills are morally neutral, or without a dominant moral impulse).

I then provided this quote by Stephen Charnock that relates to the same subject:

(2.) It doth not disparage his wisdom to command that to man which he knows man will not do without his grace, and so make promises to man upon the doing it. If man indeed had not a faculty naturally fitted for the object, it might entrench upon God's wisdom to make commands and promises to such a creature as it would be to command a beast to speak. But man hath a faculty to understand and will, which makes him a man; and there is a disposition in the understanding and will which consists in an inclination determined to good or evil, which makes us not to be men, but good or bad men, whereby we are distinguished from one another as by reason and will we are from plants and beasts. Now the commands and exhortations are suitable to our nature, and respect not our reason as good or bad, but simply as reason. These commands presuppose in us a faculty of understanding and will, and a suitableness between the command and the faculty of a reasonable creature. This is the reason why God hath given to us his law and gospel, his commands, not because we are good or bad men, but because we are men endued with reason, which other creatures want, and therefore are not capable of government by a command. Our blessed Lord and Saviour did not exhort infants, though he blessed them, because they were not arrived to the use of reason; yet he exhorted the Jews, many of whose wills he knew were not determined to good, and whom he told that they would die in their sins. And though God had told them, Jer. xiii., that they could no more change themselves than an Ethiopian could his skin, yet he expostulates with them why they 'would not be made clean:' verse 27, 'O Jerusalem, wilt thou not be made clean? when shall it once be?' Because, though they had an ill disposition in their judgment, yet their judgment remained, whereby to discern of exhortations if they would. To present a concert of music to a deaf man that cannot hear the greatest sound were absurd, because sounds are the object of hearing; but commands and exhortations are the object, not of this or that good constitution of reason, but of reason itself.

Stephen Charnock, "A Discourse of the Efficient of Regeneration" in The Works of Stephen Charnock (Carlisle, Penn.: Banner of Truth, 1986), 3:227–228.

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For those interested, Jonathan Edwards makes the distinction in his work on the Freedom of the Will.