Joseph Hacon’s (1603–1662) Response to the Double Payment Argument

Now because you think that you must maintain, some sins are forgiven absolutely, as of due debt, because otherwise universal Redemption, presupposeth two payments of the same debt, one from the Savior of the world, and another from the person impenitent or unbelieving, pag. 61. [“It is unjust to require two payments of the same debt.”] I desire your attention to what I shall now say. The work of the Son of God in behalf of lost mankind is set forth to us diversely; under the term and likeness of Reconciliation, or Atonement of parties that are at distance: of a Sacrifice offered to propitiate the Deity: of Adoption, whereby not only part for malefactors, but further, the state of sons and heirs is procured: of Redemption, whereby captives are ransomed by some price paid: of one that is punished in another’s stead, or for another’s fault, or that doth satisfy or discharge the debt, which some other owes. These particulars, with divers others, being of a different nature one from another, cannot all of them, perfectly agree to the work of man’s salvation, that Jesus Christ wrought. With men ordinarily, there is a numerical punishment, applied to a numerical or individual fault. But when Christ was smitten for our sins, the punishment was one, but of infinite value, applicable to the sins of all men, were there more than there are, or ever will be. In this similitude therefore, the respect of punishing the same fault twice, must be forborn: so must that also, touching a double payment of the same debt. But take the other similitudes; Reconciliation there may be, and Adoption there may be, which may come to nothing for want of the condition: and a general ransom may be many ways defective, as to some persons: and a Sacrifice may be offered, and the God not appeased; according as the Latins make a difference between Sacrificare and Litare: to your argument therefore I answer, when the payment or satisfaction is absolute, as to all effects, then there is no other satisfaction to be expected.

But when it is absolute as to some effect, and conditional, as to some other, then it is neither against reason, nor justice, nor custom, but that a payment, pardon or satisfaction may be twofold. The General ransom is absolute thus far, that God’s justice or wrath is appeasable. All sins are venial, and way made for pardon, the Covenant of works notwithstanding. But thus far it is conditional, that it shall not be actually beneficial for any to life eternal, but according to the tenor of the Covenant of Grace, namely, upon Repentance and Belief in the Son of God. I gave you the similitude of a general pardon granted from the King: to which you say not one word to the purpose, but most impertinently betake yourself to the point of Free-will, in the fourth Section of your former chapter. And as for the injustice you speak of, I answer, had we ourselves of our own, paid these our debts: or had our Surety and Redeemer paid them and satisfied for them so as that all men should by virtue of his sacrifice have been instantly discharged from all their sins, and admitted to possession of life, no condition whatsoever intervening: or had Almighty God made any such promise or agreement, with his son our Savior, to bestow faith and repentance upon all those, for whom he was to lay down his life: in any of these cases it had not been just to demand a second payment. But inasmuch as God himself did freely procure the ransom and satisfaction for our sins, it was free for him to annex thereto, what conditions it pleased him. There is therefore no wrong done to such persons as are punished for their sins, after the price of their ransom is accepted, because they did neither pay that ransom, nor perform the condition required.

Joseph Hacon, A Vindication of the Review. Or, the Exceptions formerly made against Mr. Horn’s Catechisme set free from his late allegations, and maintained not to be Mistakes (Cambridge: Printed by John Field, 1662), 141–143.

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Hacon was a native of Topcroft, Norfolk, where he was born on the 17th of May, 1603. He was educated at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, and, after entering Holy Orders, was made Rector of Massingham in his 40th year. After a few years, he was made Registrar of the Parish. He was buried at Massingham Parva on the 18th September, 1662. See Ronald F. McLeod, Massingham Parva: Past and Present (London: Waterlow & Sons, 1882), 113–114.

Richard Baxter (1615–1691) Answers the Double Payment Question

Cont. 28. Is it not unjust to punish him that Christ died for, even one sin twice? 

Ans. No, Unless it were the same person that suffered, or the very same punishment that was due (and all that was due) were expected again; and unless it were against our mediators will. But all is contrary in this case. 1. The Law bound no one to suffer but the offender. 2. Therefore Christ suffering was not the same punishment which the Law did threaten, but it was Satisfaction instead of it; which is the Tantundem, not the idem quod debitum suit, but redditio æquivalentis aliàs indebiti, as the Schoolmen call it. For noxa caput sequitur; the Law threateneth not a surety, but only the sinner, and ubi alius solvit, simul aliud solvitur. 3. And Christ himself never satisfied with any other intent; and therefore it is according to his will, that they that tread under foot the blood of the Covenant wherewith they were Sanctified, as an unholy thing, and do despite to the Spirit of Grace, should suffer the far sorer punishment, Heb. 10. Yea it is Christ himself that will have it so, and that doth so judge, them, and inflict this punishment for the contempt of grace.

And it is his will that his own members be punished by correction, notwithstanding his sufferings: As many as he loveth he doth rebuke and chasten: And Christ doth not wrong himself: The end of his suffering never was to execute the redeemed from all suffering, nor to make believers lawless.

Richard Baxter, The Scripture Gospel defended, and Christ, Grace and Free Justification Vindicated Against the Libertines […] In Two Books […] (London: Printed for Tho. Parkhurst, at the Bible and Three Crowns, at the lower end of Cheapside, 1690), 1:47–48. See also Richard Baxter, Catholick Theologie: Plain, Pure, Peaceable: For Pacification Of the Dogmatical Word-Warriours […] In Three Books. […] (London: Printed by Robert White, for Nevill Simons at the Princes Arms in St. Pauls Church-yard, 1675), 1.2.68–69; §148–151.

Error 5. ‘That God were unjust if he laid any degree of punishment on those that Christ died for; or (say others) on the justified; because he shall punish one sin twice.’
Contr. It is certain, that God punisheth the justified in some degree (much more the elect before conversion), and it is certain that God is not unjust. Therefore it is certain that the ground of this accusation is false; for it was not our deserved punishment itself, or the same which was due in the true sense of the law which Christ endured: but it was the punishment of a voluntary sponsor, which was the ‘equivalens,’ and not the ‘idem’ that was due; and did answer the ends of the law, but not fulfil the meaning of the threatening; which threatened the sinner himself, and not another for him: seeing then it was a satisfaction, or sacrifice for sin, which God received for an atonement and propitiation, and not a solution or suffering of the sinner himself in the sense of the law, the charge of injustice on God is groundless.

Richard Baxter, The Practical Works of the Rev. Richard Baxter, 23 vols. (London: James Duncan, 1830), 12:315–16.

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John More (d. 1592) on Christ’s Sufficient Death for the World

Here then you see the Son of God, taking upon him our nature hath borne and overcome for us whatsoever God of his justice and truth can lay against us. And here behold the depth of the mystery of God’s eternal wisdom, his mercy and his justice joined together: his mercy in forgiving our sins, his justice in punishing our sins: his justice that would not suffer one of our sins unpunished, but even with his heavy curse doth reward them: & yet his mercy toward his elect, that he doth not punish their sins in themselves, but layeth them all upon the shoulders of his own dear son for us. Here behold the wonderful wisdom of God, who in saving of his children, yet omitteth no part of his justice, but punisheth their sin even to the full with that self same punishment which he himself hath appointed: & this which he hath suffered is a full recompense for all our sins, according as the Holy Ghost allegeth, ‘If any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father (1. Jn. 2. 1, 2), even Jesus Christ the righteous, and he is the propitiation or ransom for our sins, so much as is sufficient, & well pleasing the Lord our God, it is a sweet smelling sacrifice before our God (Eph. 5. 2). This then is sufficient for the sins of the whole world. But here yet ariseth a doubt, for seeing Jesus Christ hath sustained and borne the punishment of our sins, so much as the sins of the whole world deserveth, it should seem then that all the world should be saved: but we see the clean contrary (Matth. 7. 13) even by the testimony of Jesus Christ himself, who saith, that many run to damnation, and few in comparison to salvation. How can this be then that Christ hath satisfied the punishment of all our sins? True it is that Jesus Christ hath borne whatsoever is due for all our sins, & that which he hath borne is also sufficient punishment for all the sin of the earth, and yet as true it is also that a great number are damned notwithstanding, and that because they have not the hand of faith to take some part of this recompense for their sins. For the blessed word of God, which setteth forth unto us Jesus Christ a full ransom of our sins, doth also give us to understand, that none are benefited to salvation, saving only those, which do believe. ‘So God loved the world, that he gave his only begotten son, to the end that all that believe in him should not perish, but have everlasting life’ (Jn. 3. 16): he saith not, all the world; but, all that believe: he saith on the contrariwise, whosoever doth not believe is damned (vs. 18. 36).

John More, Three Godly and Fruitful Sermons (London: Printed by John Legatt, Printer of the University of Cambridge, 1594), 56–58. Some spelling has been updated.

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One can see that More, a classic-moderate Calvinist, takes an unlimited reading of the world in 1 John 2:2 and John 3:16, and then follows an Ursinus-like trajectory (as stated in the Heidelberg Catechism) in reply to the double payment argument, saying some perish because they do not believe, not that they were never died for (i.e., the later Owenic/Turretinian trajectory). He’s also following the classic Lombardian Formula in his understanding of Christ’s sufficiency.

Credit to Alan Clifford for the find.

Henry James Carpenter on the Double Payment Argument

But I proceed to notice another objection, and one very commonly urged against this doctrine [general redemption]. It is objected, that if our Lord died for all, then it would be unjust to punish any one, for this would be to exact a double penalty for the same offence—to punish the same sins twice over.

No doubt it would be unjust to punish the sinner if Christ had borne his sins, with the stipulation that his sins should be absolutely forgiven—that, in consequence of his sacrifice, all men should be unconditionally pardoned, irrespective of their state of mind, irrespective of their believing or not believing, of their receiving the Gospel or rejecting the Gospel.

But nothing like this doctrine can be discovered in the Bible; the death of our Lord is nowhere in Scripture represented in this light. There we read, as I observed before, that a certain medium is necessary before the benefits of Christ's death can be actually applied to any man. Men must have faith; they must believe on Christ—they must trust wholly in his atoning sacrifice, that they may be forgiven their trespasses. "He that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be damned." The Lord Jesus is "set forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood."

It is undeniable that our Lord could have annexed what condition he, in his wisdom, thought fit, in order that man should receive the benefits of the sacrifice he was about to offer; and it is no more unjust to punish the sinner who rejects Christ's offer of salvation than to treat an imprisoned debtor as still liable to his debt, because he refuses to send a petition to his rich benefactor, who freely paid his debt, but stipulated that the benefits of his generous payment should only be enjoyed by those debtors who would comply with his condition, and petition him for their release.

Henry James Carpenter, Did Christ Die For All Men, Or For The Elect Only? A Letter To A Friend In Ireland (London: T. Hatchard, 1857), 21.

Double-Payment and Double-Jeopardy

Flynn has responded to some of the recent talk about the Double-Payment and Double-Jeopardy arguments at Theology Online:

Double-Payment and Double-Jeopardy: Three Documented Responses

Norman Douty on the Double Payment Argument

4. If satisfaction has been made for all, how can any go to hell?

Answer: Though God has provided atonement for all, He has also stipulated that none get the good of it, except through repentance and faith. Deliverance from doom was not contingent on the atonement itself but on the reception of it. Men can starve in the presence of a free feast, if they refuse to partake of it.

Norman F. Douty, Did Christ Die Only for the Elect? (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1998), 129.

My comments:

Douty is arguing, like other Calvinists on the same subject, that Christ's satisfaction does not ipso facto liberate all for whom it was made. Though Christ suffered sufficiently for all, the promise of deliverance--on the legal basis of that satisfaction--is conditional. One must repent and believe in order to benefit by it unto eternal life. If a gospel hearer refuses to repent and believe into Christ, they will ultimately perish and suffer for their sins in hell.

None of this entails that the condition of faith is meritorious, or that the unregenerate have the moral ability to believe. Also, just because God gives the elect the gift of faith [in the sense of granting them moral ability by the Spirit], it is still their act and their responsibility.

The gospel not only sincerely promises life to the unbelieving elect and unbelieving non-elect on the condition of faith, but it also sincerely threatens them both with hell if they do not believe, despite the fact that Christ suffered sufficiently for their sins. The double payment argument not only entails that the non-elect cannot, with any consistency, receive well-meant offers by God through the external gospel call, it also entails that the unbelieving elect are not receiving sincere threats by that same gospel message. Consequently, God would not only be giving counterfeit offers to the non-elect, but He would also be merely pretending to threaten the unbelieving elect with perishing. The argument entails a double blasphemy that its advocates do not want to own.

Carl Trueman on Double Jeopardy

This is old news, but still worth posting. Carl Trueman was interviewed on Reformation 21 awhile back and he was asked this question:

Following on from the previous question, it is sometimes argued that the Hodges (Charles and Archibald Alexander) as well as R. L. Dabney, did not agree with Owen’s view of “limited atonement,” in particular disagreeing with the use of the “double jeopardy” argument that Owen employed. What do you make of this?

Aha, here you probe one of my weaknesses. I rarely read the Hodges and gave up on Dabney many years ago. Indeed, I am an early modernist in terms of scholarship, and, with the exception of Warfield, have really no interest in American theology and have never found any non-contemporary American theologian to be that helpful compared to the European Reformed Orthodox of the seventeenth century. Thus, I have to plead ignorance on their comments on this point. As to the `double jeopardy’ argument, that is not a strong element of the limited atonement argument; I would not rest my case on that point; and neither did Owen. Far more significant is the covenant of redemption (which, as noted above, was seen by the Reformed Orthodox to be defensible on exegetical grounds), and the issues raised by the Socinian critique of what we now call penal substitution, along with Hugo Grotius’s response to the same.

Whether Owen put heavy stress on that particular argument (among others) and literal payment concepts to sustain his viewpoint can be debated, but here one can see that Trueman clearly doesn't think it is a "strong element" in the "limited atonement argument." Nevertheless, it is like Atlas among contemporary American Calvinists. It seems as though the whole world is resting upon that issue in order to sustain their strictly limited viewpoint, since it so frequently and inevitably comes up. I would be willing to bet my entire library that some "half-witted gargoyle" [credit to Steve for this humorous expression] is going to stand up and pose the "dilemma" to the panel of speakers at the upcoming John 3:16 Conference during the Q&A time, as if no one has ever considered it before. And on their face will be a look of utter invincibility. I might be willing to pay someone to snap a photo of it when it happens.

For an interesting critique of a related Trueman article by Flynn some time ago, see HERE.

Joseph Bellamy on Double Payment

Obj. 1. If Christ has suffered the penalty of the law, not only for the elect, but also for the non-elect, how can it be just that they themselves should be made to suffer it over again forever in hell?

Ans. Because Christ did not die with a design to release them from their deserved punishment, but only upon condition of faith; and so they have no right to the release, but upon that condition. It is as just, therefore, they should be punished, as if Christ had never died, since they continue obstinate to the last ; and it is just, too, they should have an aggravated damnation, for refusing to return to God, despising the offers of mercy, and neglecting so great salvation. (John iii. 16–19.)

Joseph Bellamy, “True Religion Delineated,” in The Works of Joseph Bellamy (Boston: Doctrinal Tract and Book Society, 1853), 1:301.

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Alan Clifford on John Owen’s (1616–1683) Triple Choice

Under the influence of Aristotle’s teleology and the commercial theory of the atonement, Owen proposes a ‘dilemma to our universalists’ in a powerful piece of reasoning. After stating that there was a qualitative and quantitative ‘sameness’ in the sufferings of Christ and the eternal punishment threatening those for whom he died, Owen affirms, ‘God imposed his wrath due unto, and Christ underwent the pains of hell for, either all the sins of all men, or all the sins of some men, or some of the sins of all men’. This is Owen’s famous ‘triple choice’ position, which, in his view, conclusively settles the controversy in favour of a limited atonement. The last choice is quickly ruled out: if the atonement fails to deal with all sins, then the sinner has something to answer for. The first choice invites Owen’s question, ‘Why, then, are not all freed from the punishment of all their sins?’ He therefore concludes that the second choice alone fits the case; the atonement is exclusively related to ‘all the sins of some men’.

Owen anticipates the universalist objection that men are only lost through an unbelieving rejection of the atonement. He asks:

But this unbelief, is it a sin or not: If not, why should they be punished for it? If it be, then Christ underwent the punishment due to it, or not. If so, then why must that hinder them more than their other sins for which he died from partaking of the fruit of his death?. If he did not, then did he not die for all the sins.

For all its apparent cogency, this compelling argument raises some important problems. It is clear that unbelievers are guilty of rejecting nothing if Christ was not given for them; unbelief surely involves the rejection of a definite provision of grace. It also makes nonsense of the means of grace, depriving general exhortations to believe of all significance.

A further objection arises from an unexpected quarter. In Owen’s view the sufferings of Christ not only deal with the guilt of the believer’s pre-conversion unbelief, they are causally related to the removal of unbelief. But Owen’s pastoral experience taught him that even true believers – or those who have grounds to regard themselves as elect – continue to be plagued with unbelief. Should this be the case if Christ had died to purchase faith for them, or are they perhaps deceived? Owen certainly denies that lapses of unbelief in the elect are not sinful if Christ has paid the penalty for them. Neither would he question the fact that doubting believers fail to participate fully in the subjective blessings Christ’s death has purchased for them. In other words, his argument applies as much to supposed believers as it does to unbelievers, with interesting consequences. For if partial unbelief in a Christian hinders him from enjoying the fullness of those blessings Christ has died to purchase for him, this is no different in principle from saying that total unbelief in a non-Christian hinders him from ‘partaking of the fruit’ Christ’s death makes available for him too.

Basic to Owen’s argument is his theory of the nature of the atonement, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Suffice it to say that making the sufferings of Christ commensurate with the sins of the elect in a quantitative, commercialistic sense explains and reinforces his teleology of the atonement. This was the consideration which led him to modify the sufficiency-efficency distinction. His apparent acceptance of it is really little more than lip-service; his deliberate redefinition of it means that the atonement is only sufficient for those for whom it is efficient. In other words, if the atonement is strictly limited, then the ‘credit facilities’ of the gospel are only available to the elect.

This prevented Owen from seeing that there was an alternative way of dealing with his ‘triple choice’ challenge. For earlier generations of Calvinists the solution was a simple one. Viewing the sufficiency of the atonement in terms of a universal provision of grace, they would embrace the first choice (all the sins of all men) with respect to the atonement’s sufficiency, and the second (all the sins of some men) with respect to its efficiency. As an earlier chapter has demonstrated, the sixteenth-century Reformers taught – both in their writings and in their confessions of the faith – that the atonement was relevant and applicable to all, though it was applied only to the elect. This much is clear: Calvin and his companions believed that the sufferings of Christ were related to the sins of the whole world; men are lost, not for lack of atonement, but for not believing. Unlike Owen, the Reformers had little difficulty in establishing the basis of human guilt. While guilt is undoubtedly defined in terms of transgressing the law, a very significant component of it arises from ungrateful neglect of the gospel remedy. But on Owen’s account, if the atonement relates only to the sins of the elect, then it is doubtful justice to condemn anyone for rejecting what was never applicable to them.

Owen’s acceptance of common grace is surely in conflict with his view of the atonement’s sufficiency, for it implies a broader view than his narrower theory will allow. As a corollary, his acceptance of the ‘free offer’ of the gospel is embarrassed by his strict commercialist position. He does indeed assert that the gospel is to be preached to ‘every creature’ because ‘the way of salvation which it declares is wide enough for all to walk in’. But how can this be if the atonement is really only sufficient for the elect? Calvin and his colleagues had no difficulty in speaking like this, but Owen cannot consistently do so. Not surprisingly, Gill and his fellow hypercalvinists employed the very kind of commercialism espoused by Owen, but did so to deny the validity of universal offers of grace.

Alan C. Clifford, Atonement and Justification (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 111–113.

For more on this subject with extensive quotes from Reformed/Calvinistic men, see my post on Double Jeopardy?

On Penal Substitution

I was interacting with a guy on Gene Cook’s blog who thought that some who maintain that Christ died for the entire human race must also deny penal substitution by implication. Perhaps some of my readers may find my response helpful.

The following material is from one of my posts to him:

Actually, I think it would be good for you to reflect on the notion of a “Penal Substitution.” Those two words are significant. First of all, let me say that Christ’s work was more than a penal substitution, but it was not less than a penal substitution. This is somewhat beside the point, but I think it’s useful for us to reflect on other achievements of Christ’s cross-work than merely emphasizing the penal substitutionary nature of it. I think you would agree with me that no single atonement view (whether the governmental, moral example, or Christus Victor view, etc.) fully captures the totality of what Christ did. Nevertheless, his work was not less than penal and not less than substitutionary. So, let’s reflect on those two notions.

Second, his work was a penal satisfaction, and not a commercial transaction. Therefore, the focus is on the person suffering and not the thing “paid.” Here’s what I mean. In a commercial transaction, the focus is on the thing paid. For instance, let’s say a man named Bilbo eats at a restaurant and his bill comes to 40 dollars. Frodo hears that Bilbo does not have the money to pay and decides to step in and pay the bill. The restaurant will therefore not pursue Bilbo for the 40 dollars. The thing has been paid. Bilbo merely comes to a mental awakening to the fact that his bill has been paid by another (Frodo) and is thankful. Whether he’s thankful and acknowledges it or not, no one pursues him for the money. It’s paid in full and there are no further obligations.

A penal payment, on the other hand, is not like this. Consider the following scenario: Frodo is put in jail for committing a certain crime X for 10 years. Frodo is really innocent but suffers in jail for the full 10 years. Afterwards, it is discovered that Bilbo has really committed crime X and not Frodo. Even though Frodo has already suffered for 10 years, the state captures Bilbo and makes him suffer the same 10 years in jail, despite the fact that Frodo has already suffered the amount of time required. Can you see the difference? The focus in this penal transaction is on the person paying and not the thing paid.

Next, or thirdly, let’s consider the substitutionary aspect of Christ’s work. Let’s suppose that Bilbo commits crime X but denies it, and yet Judge Gandalf rightly finds him guilty, but Frodo loves Bilbo and agrees to suffer for crime X. Judge Gandalf is under no obligation to accept Frodo’s willingness to suffer in his stead, but graciously allows the arrangement under some conditions. Judge Gandalf allows Frodo to suffer for X but will not release Bilbo from his penal obligations unless he confesses to committing crime X and joins Aragorn’s army within a span of time. Even though Frodo has suffered for crime X in his innocence, Bilbo may still be charged with the crime and not be released unless he fulfills the judges aforementioned conditions. There is no injustice if Bilbo suffers for crime X even though Frodo has suffered for it, since it’s not the same person “paying twice.” Injustice would occur if the same person suffered twice for the same crime, but there is no injustice if person 1 (Frodo) suffers for person 2 (Bilbo) and person 2 (Bilbo) remains under penal obligations (i.e., remains under penal wrath, so to speak) unless he fulfills certain conditions.

There is graciousness in (1) the judge even allowing for a substitute and in (2) allowing the suffering of Frodo to be credited to Bilbo when the conditions are met. Both acts are gracious since it’s a penal substitution. If it was a commercial transaction, Bilbo, whether he’s thankful or not, could claim that it’s his right to be released since the thing has already been paid by Frodo.

However, this commercial presentation is not what we find in scripture regarding Christ’s work. We find that it’s penal (not commercial) and that it’s substitutionary (entirely an act of grace with no obligation to release upon the thing being suffered). If Christ suffers for someone and yet that same person suffers for their own sins, there is no “double jeopardy.” It’s not the same person suffering twice, but two different people suffering. God has added conditions to His gracious scheme in order for the guilty party to be released from their penal obligations. If one does not meet the conditions (i.e., repent and believe), then they are still held accountable to suffer for their crime (hell).

Thus, I (as one who maintains that Christ suffered for the entire human race) really hold to a penal substitution and not a commercial transactionalism. Even though Christ’s work is analogically compared to various commercial transactions in scripture for the sake of illustration, it is not an univocal comparison. Christ’s satisfaction is not literally commercial, but penal in nature. If one pushes the commercial analogies so far as to make them literal, then I believe that one will arrive at a pound for pound (or a so-much-suffering-for-so-much-sin) viewpoint, such that Christ was wounded measurably for the amount of the elect’s sins alone which were transferred to him. This view has been called “Equivalentism” historically.

Here’s how one hyper-Calvinist named John Stevens put his view:

Therefore if we suppose anyone to stand in the place of one lost sinner, we are not in so doing, to imagine, that such a substitute must, on that account, suffer as much as though he represented all lost sinners. The greater the guilt, the greater the punishment: the greater the number of sinners, the greater the measure of guilt. It must therefore follow that, if more sinners had been saved, the sorrows of the Saviour must have been proportionally increased.

Cited in Robert W. Oliver’s History of the English Calvinistic Baptists 1771–1892 (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 2006), 209.

John Owen even spoke of a certain “weight and pressure” in Christ’s sufferings (i.e., his suffering was proportioned to the amount of the elect’s sins “imputed” to him). This shows that he was taking his commercialistic categories seriously. I used to hold to a form of Equivalentism since I used to conceive of Christ’s work as a commercial transfer rather than a penal imputation.

I would also argue that if only the sins of the elect were imputed to Christ, then his suffering is not sufficient for all. And, if it is not really sufficient for all, then the gospel offer is insincere, or not well-meant. God says to the unbeliever through the external gospel proclamation that, “if you believe, you will be saved.” Such a conditional promise presupposes an ample sufficiency in Christ’s satisfaction for the covering of the sins of all that hear the external call, whether elect or not, even as, by analogy, the lifted up serpent in the wilderness was able to heal all those bitten, if they would only but look through faith to the sincere promise of God.

God’s name is besmirched if his gospel offer is made to be insincere by the theological systems of men that undercut Christ’s sufficient suffering. That’s no small charge.

A. A. Hodge (1823–1886) on Commercialism

II. The Difference between a penal and a pecuniary satisfaction. These differ precisely as do crime and debt, things and persons, and therefore the distinction is both obvious and important. Many, who either are incapable of understanding the question, are ignorant of its history, or who are unscrupulous as to the manner in which they conduct controversy, are continually charging our doctrine with the folly of representing the sacrifice of Christ as a purely commercial transaction, in which so much was given for so much, and in which God was in such a sense recompensed for his favours to us that however much gratitude we may owe to Christ, we owe on this behalf none to God. Long ago the doctrine of the Reformed Churches was unanswerably vindicated from such puerile charges by all its most authoritative expounders. “Here the twofold solution, concerning which jurists treat, should be accurately distinguished. The one, which ipso facto liberates the debtor or criminal because that very thing which was owed is paid, whether it was done by the debtor or by another in his name. The other, which ipso facto does not liberate, since not at all the very thing which was owed, but an equivalent, is paid, which, although it does not thoroughly and ipso facto discharge the obligation, yet having been accepted – since it might be refused – is regarded as a satisfaction. This distinction holds between a pecuniary and a penal indebtedness. For in a pecuniary debt the payment of the thing owed ipso facto liberates the debtor from all obligations whatsoever, because here the point is not who pays, but what is paid. Hence the creditor, the payment being accepted, is never said to extend toward the debtor any indulgence or remission, because he has received all that was owed him. But the case is different with respect to a penal debt, because in this case the obligation respects the person as well as the thing; the demand is upon the person who pays as well as the thing paid; i.e., that the penalty should be suffered by the person sinning; for as the law demands personal and proper obedience, so it exacts personal enduring of the penalty. Therefore, in order that a criminal should be absolved – a vicarious satisfaction being rendered by another hand – it is necessary that there should intervene a sovereign act of the supreme law-giver, which, with respect to the law, is called relaxation, and with respect to the debtor is called remission, because the personal endurance of the penalty is remitted, and a vicarious endurance of it is accepted in its stead. Hence it clearly appears that in this work (of Redemption) remission and satisfaction are perfectly consistent with each other, because there is satisfaction in the endurance of the punishment which Christ bore, and there is remission in the acceptance of a vicarious victim. The satisfaction respects Christ, from whom God demanded the very same punishment, as to kind of punishment, though not as to the degree nor as to the nature of the sufferings which the law denounced upon us. The remission respects believers, to whom God remits the personal, while he admits the vicarious punishment. And thus appears the admirable reconciliation of justice and mercy – justice which executes itself upon the sin, and mercy which is exercised towards the sinner. Satisfaction is rendered to the justice of God by the Sponsor, and remission is granted to us by God.” (Turretin, Locus XIV. Quaestio 10.)

Hence pecuniary satisfaction differs from penal thus: (a.) In debt, the demand terminates upon the thing due. In crime, the legal demand for punishment is upon the person of the criminal. (b.) In debt, the demand is for the precise thing due – the exact quid pro quo, and nothing else. In crime, the demand is for that kind, degree and duration of suffering which the law – i.e., absolute and omniscient justice – demands in each specific case, the person suffering and the sin to be expiated both being considered. (c.) In debt, the payment of the thing due, by whomsoever it may be made, ipso facto liberates the debtor, and instantly extinguishes all the claims of the creditor, and his release of the debtor is no matter of grace. In crime, a vicarious suffering of the penalty is admissible only at the absolute discretion of the sovereign; remission is a matter of grace; the rights acquired by the vicarious endurance of penalty all accrue to the sponsor; and the claims of law upon the sinner are not ipso facto dissolved by such a satisfaction, but remission accrues to the designed beneficiaries only at such times and on such conditions as have been determined by the will of the sovereign, or agreed upon between the sovereign and the sponsor.

Archibald Alexander Hodge, The Atonement (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1867), 35–37.

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Edward Polhill (1622–c.1694) on the Proportion of Christ’s Suffering

1. There was a proportion between the seats of suffering in Christ, and the seats of sin in us. Man sinned in his body, sin was organically and instrumentally there; proportionably Christ suffered in his body, no part of it but was racked upon a tormenting cross: because our corporeal parts had been weapons of iniquity, justice made his the subjects of misery. Man sinned in his soul, there was the prime and chief seat of sin; proportionably Christ suffered in his soul; nay, there was the prime and chief seat of suffering, because the main residence and venom of sin was in our souls, the greatest pressure and bitterness of wrath was upon his. He was exceeding sorrowful, even to death; he was sore amazed, and as it were fainted away; yea, for very anguish he sweat drops of blood, and upon the cross cried out, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? All this befel him, who was fortitude and constancy itself. Under the law, justice had an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, wound for wound, stripe for stripe; in Jesus Christ it had a suffering body and soul, as a compensation for the sinning bodies and souls of men.

2. There was a proportion between the penal sufferings in Christ, and those in the threatening of the law. Christ suffered not the very idem, neither indeed could he do so; because there was a change of person, and in strictness, Si alius solvit, aliud solvitur : but his sufferings came as near to those in the law, as could possibly stand with a just decorum to his sacred person; as little was abated as might be. This will appear by the many steps of his humiliation. He, the Son of God, very God, assumed our frail nature. But might this infinite and wonderful condescension satisfy justice for the sin of the world? no, he must be under the law, and fulfil all righteousness. Well, that being done, might that obedience (wherein so high an honour was reflected upon the law, as that it was obeyed perfectly in all things, and that by its Maker) satisfy for sin? No, that alone was not enough; there must be shedding of blood, or no remission. But if there must be blood, might not a few drops of his blood, the same being of an infinite value, do the work? No, the law calls for death, without that he could not be an expiatory sacrifice for us. But if a death must be, might not a simple one, being of so great a person, serve the turn? No, the law pronounces a curse, and that he was made, the marks and tokens of wrath were upon him: and why all this, but that God would have his sufferings comply, and come as near the terms of the law as might be? It is true, he did not bear the accidentals of punishment, his sufferings were not eternal; but in the law punishment is eternal, only as it relates to a finite creature, which can never satisfy, but not as it relates to a mighty sponsor, who could pay down all at once, and swallow up death in victory. He suffered not the worm of conscience, or desperation. But the first of these is from sin, inherent, and putrifying in conscience; and the second, from the imbecility of the creature, sinking under its burden, neither of which could be in him. He bore not the accidentals of punishment; but as great a person as he was, the essentials could not be abated. There was in his sufferings, pæna sensus, when the fire of wrath melted him into a bloody sweat; and pæna damni, when the eclipse of favour made him cry out of forsaking. Though God in his sovereignty would relax the law, and introduce his own Son, as a sponsor to satisfy for us; yet his Son standing in that capacity, he would in justice have him suffer as near the penalty in the law as could be.

3. There was a proportion between the sufferings of Christ, and the sin of a world. Sin is an infinite evil; and his sufferings, to compensate it, were of an infinite value. Sufferings are not to be estimated as money, which, in whose hands soever it be, is one and the same, but according to the dignity of the person. Hence that of the people to David, Thou art worth ten thousand of us. (2 Sam. xviii. 3.) Hence, that Spanish proverb, used to Charles the Ninth, to move him to seize upon the chief protestants, One salmon's head is more worth than the heads of fifty frogs. In the Roman laws, punishments were varied according to the conditions of persons. Free men were not under the same punishments as servants. The lex porcia would not leave rods upon the back of a free man: the sufferings of a prince and a private man, are not to be valued at the same rate. At the death of Abner, David took special notice of it, and cried out, A prince, a great man is fallen this day in Israel. (2 Sam. iii. 38.) The sufferings of great men are very estimable; what then are the sufferings of a God, such as our Saviour? The Scripture is very emphatical in setting forth this to us: God purchased the church with his own blood. (Acts, xx. 28.) God laid down his life for us. (1 John iii. 16.) The Lord of glory was crucified. (1 Cor. ii. 8.) The man, God's fellow, was smitten. (Zach. xiii. 7.) He offered up himself through the eternal Spirit. (Heb. ix. 14.) The Prince of life was killed. (Acts iii. 15.) His Deity stamped an infinite value upon his sufferings, such as made them a full compensation for the sin of a world. That, therefore, of Socinus, that the sufferings of Christ have no more virtue in themselves, than if a mere man had suffered, is no less than horrible blasphemy, and for ever to be abhorred by us.

4. There was a proportion between the sufferings of Christ, and the sufferings of a world. "One died for all," saith the apostle. (2 Cor. v. 14.) But what an one was he? No less than very God: his Deity elevated his sufferings into a kind of infinity. Upon this account his sufferings, though but the sufferings of one, did equalize, nay, snperexceed the sufferings of a world. For as the French divines have observed; if you multiply one, you shall at last have the number of all men: but a collection of all men, however multiplied, will never equal the power, authority, dignity, wisdom, sanctity, and Deity of Christ. In the sufferings of a world, every sufferer would have been but a mere creature; but in his sufferings, the sufferer was no less than God himself. Here therefore, justice appears more signally, than if all the world had suffered and that for ever. His sufferings, though but temporary, did more than counterpoise the eternal sufferings of a world. Should we suppose, which is impossible, that all men had paid and passed through eternal sufferings, those would have delivered them from the curse of the law; the sufferings of Christ (which shews their equivalency, and more) produce the same effect, and over and above, merit life eternal. There is a double order in punishing; the order of justice would have a punishment infinite in magnitude; but because a finite creature cannot bear it, the order of wisdom will have it infinite in duration. But, as the French divines have observed, Christ being substituted in our room, the order of justice returns again. Our Saviour's sufferings were of an infinite value, the sum of sufferings was paid down all at once. In these, therefore, justice is more illustrious than it could have been in eternal ones; wherein mere finite creatures would have been ever paying a little, and a little, but could never have satisfied divine justice.

Edward Polhill, “A View of Some Divine Truths,” in The Works of Edward Polhill 1622–1694 (Morgan, PA: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 1998), 15–16.

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John Davenant's (1572–1641) Reply to the Double Jeopardy Issue

(UPDATE on 8-21-07: Some of John Davenant's writings can be found online for free HERE).

Objection 5. If the death of Christ be a benefit from the ordination of God, applicable to each and every man, then it may be said, that Christ made satisfaction for the sins of the whole human race. But this cannot be defended, without at the same time overthrowing the justice of God, since the idea of justice does not admit that the same sin should be punished twice. Suppose, then, that the death of Christ is a ransom, by which satisfaction was made to God for the sins of the human race, how can so many persons be called to account for the same by the justice of God, and be tormented with eternal punishment?

Reply 5. As to the major proposition, we think its consequence may be safely conceded. For the orthodox Fathers boldly assert that Christ made satisfaction for the sins of the human race or all of mankind. Thus Eusebius, (Evang. Demonstr. lib. x. in the preface) It was needful that the Lamb of God should be offered as a sacrifice for the other lambs whose nature he assumed, even for the whole human race. Thus Nazianzen (Orat. 2. in Pasch.) The sacrifice of Christ is an imperishable expiation of the whole world. Thus, finally (omitting others), Cyril (Catech. 13.), He redeemed the whole world of mankind. The same form of speaking is every where made use of in the Articles of religion of our Church of England, (Art. 2, 15, 31, &c.). Thus also those speak who endeavour to limit to the utmost this death of Christ. We adduced before the testimony of the Reverend Heidelberg Divine Pareus, who freely confesses in his judgment exhibited at the Synod of Dort, The cause and matter of the passion of Christ was a feeling or sustaining of the wrath of God, incensed by the sin, not of some men, but of the whole human race. A little afterwards, The whole of sin and of the wrath of God against it, is affirmed to have been borne by Christ. Nor ought this to appear unsound, since this universal redemption, satisfaction, or expiation performed by the death of Christ, brings nothing more than an universal cause of salvation to be confirmed and granted to the human race by the Divine ordination; the benefit of which every individual may enjoy through faith required by the Gospel. We therefore call Christ the Redeemer of the world, and teach that he made satisfaction for the sins not of some, but of the whole world, not because that on account of the payment of this price for the sins of the human race, all mankind individually are to be immediately delivered from captivity and death, but because by virtue of the payment of this price, all men individually may and ought to be delivered from death, and, in fact, are to be delivered according to the tenor of the evangelical covenant, that is, if they repent and believe in this Redeemer.

To what is further urged, That it is contrary to justice to receive satisfaction or a ransom for the sins of the whole human race, and yet not to deliver them all from the punishment of their sins, but, notwithstanding this satisfaction, to adjudge many to eternal torments; I answer, That this would indeed be most unjust, if we ourselves had paid this price to God, or if our Surety, Jesus Christ, had so offered to God his blood as a satisfactory price, that without any other intervening condition, all men should be immediately absolved through the offering of the oblation made by him; or, finally, if God himself had covenanted with Christ when he died, that he would give faith to every individual, and all those other things which regard the infallible application of this sacrifice which was offered up for the human race. But since God himself of his own accord provided that this price should be paid to himself, it was in his own power to annex conditions, which being performed, this death should be advantageous to any man, not being performed it should not profit any man. Therefore no injustice is done to those persons who are punished by God after the ransom was accepted for the sins of the human race, because they offered nothing to God as a satisfaction for their sins, nor performed that condition, without the performance of which God willed not that this satisfactory price should benefit any individual. Nor, moreover, ought this to be thought an injustice to Christ the Mediator. For he so was willing to die for all, and to pay to the Father the price of redemption for all, that at the same time he willed not that every individual in any way whatsoever, but that all, as soon as they believed in him, should be absolved from the guilt of their sins. Lastly, Christ, in offering himself in sacrifice to God the Father in order to expiate the sins of the world, nevertheless submitted to the good pleasure of the Father the free distribution and application of his merits, neither was any agreement entered into between the Father and the Son, by which God is bound to effect that this death of Christ, which, from the ordination of God, is applicable to all under the condition of faith, should become applied to all by the gift of faith. We ought not, therefore, to deny that the offering of Christ once made is a perfect satisfaction for the sins, not of some men only, but of all; yet so that he who is simply said to have died for all, promises remission of sin through his death and salvation conditionally, and will perform it to those alone who believe. We will illustrate all these things by a similitude; Suppose that a number of men were cast into prison by a certain King on account of a great debt, or that they were condemned to suffer death for high treason; but that the King himself procured that his own Son should discharge this debt to the last farthing; or should substitute himself as guilty in the room of those traitors, and should suffer the punishment due to them all, this condition being at the same time promulgated both by the King and his Son, That none should be absolved or liberated except those only who should acknowledge the King's Son for their Lord and serve him: These things being so determined, I inquire, if those who persist in disobedience and rebellion against the King's Son should not be delivered, would any charge of injustice be incurred, because after this ransom had been paid, their own debts should be exacted from many, or after the punishment endured by the Son, these rebels should nevertheless be punished? By no means; because the payment of the just price, and the enduring of the punishment was ordained to procure remission for every one under the condition of obedience, and not otherwise. I shall add no more; it will be easy to accommodate all these things to our present purpose.

John Davenant, “A Dissertation on the Death of Christ,” in An Exposition of the Epistle of St. Paul to the Colossians (London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co., 1832), 2:374–377.

For other responses to the Double Jeopardy argument by Reformed thinkers such as Edward Polhill, Charles Hodge, R. L. Dabney, W. G. T. Shedd, Curt Daniel and Neil Chambers, go here:

Double Jeopardy?

Neil Chambers on “Unbelief as a Sin Atoned For”

At the conclusion of the triple choice argument Owen, to rule out the possibility that there could be any sense in which Christ could be said to have died for all men, asks the general redemptionists why, if Christ did die for all men all are not saved?

You will say, “Because of their unbelief; they will not believe.” But this unbelief, is it a sin, or not? If not, why should they be punished for it? If it be, then Christ underwent the punishment due to it, or not; if so, then why must that hinder them more than their other sins for which he died from partaking of the fruit of his death? If he did not, then did he not die for all their sins? Let them choose which part they will.

Clifford has made a number of criticisms of this argument in relation to its impact on the guilt of unbelief, its depriving “general exhortations to believe of all significance”, and the tension it establishes with Owen’s commitment to common grace which need not be repeated here. What needs to be seen is that Owen’s argument defeats itself by proving too much. If, in Owen’s terms, Christ died for all the sins of some people, the elect, then he must also have died for their unbelief, where ‘died for’ is understood to mean having paid the penalty for all their sins at Calvary. If this is the case, then why are the elect not saved at Calvary? If Owen replies that it is because the benefits of Christ’s death are not yet applied to them, then I would ask what it means for those benefits not to be applied to them? Surely it means that they are unbelieving, and therefore cannot be spoken of as saved. But they cannot be punished for that unbelief, as its penalty has been paid and God, as Owen assures us, will not exact a second penalty for the one offense. If then, even in their unbelief, there is no debt against them, no penalty to be paid, surely they can be described as saved, and saved at Calvary. That being the case, the gospel is reduced to a cipher, a form of informing the saved of their blessed condition.

These last two conclusions are positions that Owen would deny, for he is committed to the necessity and integrity of the universal gospel call and the indissoluble bond between faith and salvation. There is then a real tension in Owen’s position brought about by a number of factors. The first is what might be called polemical reductionism in his consideration of ‘unbelief’ here, for unbelief is not just an offense like any other, it is also a state, which must be dealt with not only by forgiveness but by regeneration. Owen recognizes this in relating the cross to the causal removal of unbelief as a state, but unbelief regarded as a sin and unbelief as a state bear a different relation to the cross. Sin bears a direct relation to the cross, which is the enduring of the penalty for sin; the change of state an indirect relation, dependent upon preaching and regeneration by the Spirit. To acknowledge that reality Owen would have to say that Christ died for all the sin, including the unbelief, of those who believe, and for none of the sins of those who won’t believe. But for polemical force he ignores the distinction which might seem, in its introduction of belief and unbelief, to place too much weight on human response and exposes his argument to criticism.

Neil Chambers, A Critical Examination of John Owen’s Argument for Limited Atonement in the Death of Death in the Death of Christ (Th.M. thesis, Reformed Theological Seminary, 1998), 235–236. This thesis is available at Tren.

Double Jeopardy?

[11-10-09 Note: In retrospect, the title of this post should be "Double Payment?," since there is a technical difference between that argument and "Double Jeopardy." Also, the reader should be sure to read the comments section of this post, since many other primary sources are quoted. Or one visit my index on "Double Payment" and see many of the references.]

I am weary of so many people repeating John Owen's double jeopardy arguments without thinking it through critically. Contrary to popular opinion among "Calvinists" (they are really more Owenic than Calvinistic), Owen's double payment argument has very serious problems. Here's one of my lastest online interactions:

MD said:

Tony, I'm reading your arguments and the same problem of Double Jeopardy comes to mind with those who hold to unlimited atonement. If we take your arguments and interpretations as true (I'll agree that the word "world" by itself or even in some contexts allows for multiple definitions to be applied), then we have the problem of double jeopardy come up.

...if Jesus actually paid for the sins of everyone, you have double jeopardy if anyone suffers hell, as God exacted payment first from Jesus and THEN from the person. What is more incredible, I think, if it is a possibility for no one to have accepted Christ's sacrifice, then you have the Father exacting punishment on a perfectly just and holy person, this makes God unrighteous for punishing someone who did not break the law. For these reasons I never preach unlimited atonement, I preach Christ paid for the sins of believers.

My reply:

You're confusing a pecuniary payment with a judicial satisfaction, as R. L. Dabney, A. A. Hodge, W. G. T. Shedd and Charles Hodge seek to correct below.

1) If your position is correct, then on what basis are Christians subject to the wrath of God prior to faith? After all, your sins were paid for as one of the elect.

2) How then can God hold you subject to his wrath even as the others? Christ paid for your sins when he died.

3) What kind of double jeopardy is in your own system?

Do not deny that you, as one who professes to be one of the elect, are really subject to divine wrath and judgment prior to your faith. If you do so, then you're speaking contrary to scripture.

NKJ Ephesians 2:3 among whom also we all once conducted ourselves in the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind, and were by nature children of wrath, just as the others.

Dabney, the Hodge's, and Shedd, who were solid 5-point Calvinists themselves, have the solution. We must distinguish between a pecuniary and judicial satisfaction. Also, we must look at the covenantal nature of the satisfaction, i.e. there are important conditions and agreements in the terms of this judicial satisfaction or transaction(s).

R. L. Dabney said:

Nor would we attach any force to the argument, that if Christ made penal satisfaction for the sins of all, justice would forbid any to be punished. To urge this argument surrenders virtually the very ground on which the first Socinian objection was refuted, and is incompatible with the facts that God chastises justified believers, and holds elect unbelievers subject to wrath till they believe. Christ’s satisfaction is not a pecuniary equivalent, but only such a one as enables the Father, consistently with His attributes, to pardon, if in His mercy He sees fit. The whole avails of the satisfaction to a given man is suspended on His belief. There would be no injustice to the man, if he remaining an unbeliever, his guilt were punished twice over, first in his Savior, and then in Him. See A. A. Hodge on Atonement, page 369.

A. A. Hodge said:

5. The doctrine of the Reformed Church is that there is no limit whatsoever in the Redemption of the Lord Jesus except that which resides in the eternal purpose of God to save thereby the elect and none others. A divine person suffered the penalty due to human sin, and obeyed that law obedience to which was made the condition of man’s well-being. He did this because of his divinity exhaustively and without limit as to intrinsic sin-expiating and justice satisfying sufficiency. If the work itself, therefore, be viewed separately from the intention [Tony's comment: I would qualify this like his father Charles Hodge does by saying "special intention"] with which it was undertaken, it plainly stands indifferently related to the case of each and every man that ever lived and sinned. It is not a pecuniary solution of debt, which, ipso facto, liberates upon the mere payment of the money. It is a vicarious penal satisfaction, which can be admitted in any case only at the arbitrary discretion of the sovereign; and which may have a redemptive bearing upon the case of none, of few, of man, or of all; and upon the case of one and not of another, and upon the elect case at whatsoever time and upon whatsoever conditions are predetermined by the mutual understanding of the Sovereign and of the voluntary substitute. The relations of the Atonement as impersonal and general or as personal and definite do not spring from considerations of the degree, duration or kind of suffering or acts of vicarious obedience which Christ rendered, but solely from the purpose he had in rendering them.

A. A. Hodge, The Atonement (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1867), 368–369.

W. G. T. Shedd said:

Vicarious atonement without faith in it is powerless to save. It is not the making of this atonement, but the trusting in it, that saves the sinner: “By faith are you saved (Eph. 2:8); “he that believes shall be saved” (Mark 16:16). The making of this atonement merely satisfies the legal claims, and this is all that it does. If it were made but never imputed and appropriated, it would result in no salvation. A substituted satisfaction of justice without an act of trust in it would be useless to sinners. It is as naturally impossible that Christ’s death should save from punishment one who does not confide in it as that a loaf of bread should save from starvation a man who does not eat it. The assertion that because the atonement of Christ is sufficient for all men therefore no men are lost is as absurd as the assertion that because the grain produced in the year 1880 was sufficient to support the life of all men on the globe therefore no men died of starvation during that year. The mere fact that Jesus Christ made satisfaction for human sin, alone and of itself, will save no soul. Christ, conceivably, might have died precisely as he did and his death have been just as valuable for expiatory purposes as it is, but if his death had not been followed with the work of the Holy Spirit and the act of faith on the part of individual men, he would have died in vain. Unless his objective work is subjectively appropriated, it is useless so far as personal salvation is concerned. Christ’s suffering is sufficient to cancel the guilt of all men and in its own nature completely satisfies the broken law. But all men do not make it their own atonement by faith in it by pleading the merit of it in prayer and mentioning it as the reason and ground of their pardon. They do not regard and use it as their own possession and blessing. It is nothing for them but a historical fact. In this state of things, the atonement of Christ is powerless to save. It remains in the possession of Christ who made it and has not been transferred to the individual. In the scriptural phrase, it has not been “imputed.” There may be a sum of money in the hands of a rich man that is sufficient in the amount to pay the debts of a million debtors; but unless they individually take money from his hands into their own, they cannot pay their debts with it. There must be a personal act of each debtor in order that this sum of money on deposit may actually extinguish individual indebtedness. Should one of the debtors, when payment is demanded of him, merely say that there is an abundance of money on deposit, but take no steps himself to get it and pay it to his creditor, he would be told that an undrawn deposit is not a payment of a debt. “The act of God,” says Owen (Justification, chap. 10), “in laying our sins on Christ, conveyed no title to us to what Christ did and suffered. This doing and suffering is not immediately by virtue thereof ours or esteemed ours; because God has appointed something else [namely, faith] not only antecedent thereto, but as the means of it.” (See supplement 6.2.7)

The supposition that the objective satisfaction of justice by Christ saved of and by itself, without any application of it by the Holy Spirit and without any trust in it by the individual man, overlooks the fact that while sin has a resemblance to a pecuniary debt, as is taught in the petition “forgive our debts,” it differs from it in two important particulars. In the instance of pecuniary indebtedness, there is no need of a consent and arrangement on the part of the creditor when there is a vicarious payment. Any person may step up and discharge a money obligation for a debtor, and the obligation ceases ipso facto. But in the instance of moral indebtedness to justice or guilt, there must be a consent of the creditor, namely, the judge, before there can be a substitution of payment. Should the Supreme Judge refuse to permit another person to suffer for the sinner and compel him to suffer for his own sin, this would be just. Consequently, substitution in the case of moral penalty requires a consent and covenant on the part of God, with conditions and limitations, while substitution in the case of a pecuniary debt requires no consent, covenant, or limitations. Second, after the vicarious atonement has been permitted and provided, there is still another condition in the case, namely, that the sinner shall confess and repent of the sin for which the atonement was made and trust in the atonement itself.

W. G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing 2003), 726–727.

Again, Shedd explained:

Supplement 6.2.7

The expiation of sin is distinguishable from the pardon of it. The former, conceivably, might take place and the latter not. When Christ died on Calvary, the whole mass, so to speak, of human sin was expiated merely by that death; The claims of law and justice for the sins of the whole world were satisfied by the “offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all” (Heb. 10:10); but the sins of every individual man were not forgiven and “blotted out” by this transaction. Still another transaction was requisite in order to this, namely, the work of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the sinner working faith in this expiatory offering and the declarative act of God saying “your sin is forgiven you.” The Son of God, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins forever, “sat down on the right hand of God” (10:12); but if the redeeming work of the Trinity had stopped at this point, not a soul of mankind would have been pardoned and justified, yet the expiatory value of the “one sacrifice” would have been just the same.

Ibid., 758.

Read what Charles Hodge said as well. This is why I posted him.

Some Wisdom from Charles Hodge

Some of those who are holding to a strictly limited atonement are not adequately studying the issues. They are picking up Owen's arguments through popular Calvinistic books, and no one is questioning the assumptions and reasoning processes. It's a major problem among those who adhere to the doctrines of grace. If you think that the Arminian resistance to the doctrines of grace is strong and persistent, then I dare you to try to correct the unbiblical and bad thinking among the High Calvinists. It's at least as bad.

For critical comments on Owen's Triple Choice argument, go to Chambers on "Unbelief as a Sin Atoned For"

A brief word of clarification:

I am not associating High Calvinism with so-called 5-point Calvinism necessarily. I would say that those who hold the L in the strict sense are high, but not every 5-point Calvinist holds the strict view of L in TULIP. Not every 5-pointer holds to a strictly limited atonement view. Those that do I am calling "High." There are other ingredients that go along with High Calvinism, but this strict view is one of them. The strict position is built on limited imputation assumptions, i.e. that only the sins of the elect were imputed to Christ when he died. The High Calvinist thinks that Christ only bore a legal relationship to the elect when he died as a substitute because his work is exclusively filtered through the grid of the Covenant of Redemption. This is called limited imputation.

One may be a "5-pointer" (or in agreement with Dort's teaching on redemption) and yet not agree with the strictly limited or Owenic view. I am of this variety (even though some of the strict advocates will seek to bias the discussion and call me a "4-pointer" of some sort). Others at the Synod of Dort held my views, but there were differences of opinion present (High's and Low's, etc.). However, all were in agreement that the Remonstrants were wrong, and the delegates all signed the Canons.

UPDATE: I've posted many more relevant quotes in the comment section, so be sure to read those.

Some Wisdom from Charles Hodge (1797–1878) on the Double-Payment Argument

§ 2. Proof of the Augustinian Doctrine.

If the Atonement be limited in Design, it must be restricted in the Offer.

There is still another ground on which it is urged that Augustinians cannot consistently preach the gospel to every creature. Augustinians teach, it is urged, that the work of Christ is a satisfaction to divine justice. From this it follows that justice cannot condemn those for whose sins it has been satisfied. It cannot demand that satisfaction twice, first from the substitute and then from the sinner himself. This would be manifestly unjust, far worse than demanding no punishment at all. From this it is inferred that the satisfaction or righteousness of Christ, if the ground on which a sinner may be forgiven, is the ground on which he must be forgiven. It is not the ground on which he may be forgiven, unless it is the ground on which he must be forgiven. If the atonement be limited in design it must be limited in its nature, and if limited in its nature it must be limited in its offer. This objection again arises from confounding a pecuniary and a judicial satisfaction between which Augustinians are so careful to discriminate. This distinction has already been presented on a previous page (470). There is no grace in accepting a pecuniary satisfaction. It cannot be refused. It ipso facto liberates. The moment the debt is paid the debtor is free; and that without any condition. Nothing of this is true in the case of judicial satisfaction. If a substitute be provided and accepted it is a matter of grace. His satisfaction does not ipso facto liberate. It may accrue to the benefit of those for whom it is made at once or at a remote period; completely or gradually; on conditions or unconditionally; or it may never benefit them at all unless the condition on which its application is suspended be performed. These facts are universally admitted by those who hold that the work of Christ was a true and perfect satisfaction to divine justice. The application of its benefits is determined by the covenant between the Father and the Son. Those for whom it was specially rendered are not justified from eternity; they are not born in a justified state; they are by nature, or birth, the children of wrath even as others. To be the children of wrath is to be justly exposed to divine wrath. They remain in this state of exposure until they believe, and should they die (unless in infancy) before they believe they would inevitably perish notwithstanding the satisfaction made for their sins. It is the stipulations of the covenant which forbid such a result. Such being the nature of the judicial satisfaction rendered by Christ to the law, under which all men are placed, it may be sincerely offered to all men with the assurance that if they believe it shall accrue to their salvation. His work being specially designed for the salvation of his own people, renders, through the conditions of the covenant, that event certain; but this is perfectly consistent with its being made the ground of the general offer of the gospel. Lutherans and Reformed agree entirely, as before stated, in their views of the nature of the satisfaction of Christ, and consequently, so far as that point is concerned, there is the same foundation for the general offer of the gospel according to either scheme. What the Reformed or Augustinians hold about election does not affect the nature of the atonement. That remains the same whether designed for the elect or for all mankind. It does not derive its nature from the secret purpose of God as to its application.

Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 2:557–58.