Showing posts with label Aquinas. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Aquinas. Show all posts

July 23, 2016

A. C. Denlinger on Robert Baron (c.1593/6–1639) and God’s Universal Saving Will

God’s Universal Will to Save

Baron’s discussion of ‘the true sense of that statement “God wants all to be saved”’ occurs in the context of lengthy reflections about ‘whether God, who wants all to be saved (as the Apostle says in 1 Tim. 2), has denied the nations destitute of faith in Christ the means necessary unto salvation’.26 Having previously argued that explicit faith in Jesus Christ, who is revealed only in the gospel, is necessary for salvation, Baron notes ‘an infinite multitude in the New World and the more remote parts of Asia and Africa who lack the light of the gospel’.27 God’s providential withholding of the gospel from so many persons seems hard to reconcile with God’s desire for their salvation.

In formulating a response to this ‘serious and difficult question’ Baron takes his cues primarily from Augustine’s fifth-century disciple Prosper of Aquitaine, who ‘contemplated this mystery more than all the Fathers of the ancient church’.28 In his work De vocatione omnium gentium, Prosper advanced three assertions which, in Baron’s judgement, comprise the right theological response to the question at hand. ‘The first is that God wills all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth.’29 With Prosper, Baron understands ‘all men’ in the apostolic affirmation quoted (1 Tim. 2.14) to mean every human person without exception; no one is excluded in the divine will to save.30 ‘The second is that no one is actually saved or comes to a knowledge of the truth by his own merits or abilities, but only by the power and operation of divine grace’.31 Third and finally, ‘no one in this life can know exactly why God does not administer means of grace equally to all, or why God, who wants all to be saved, does not save all’.32

Prosper’s assertions do not serve to alleviate the tension inherent to the question at hand; they serve to state it with greater force and clarity. His first and second assertions, in particular, establish an apparent contradiction between God’s sentiments and his actions towards humankind, or at least towards those who are not ultimately saved. God loves them and wills their salvation. God denies them a particular grace without which they will not be saved. His third assertion, far from serving to resolve this paradox, asserts the futility of attempting – at least ‘in this life’ – to reconcile these seemingly contradictory truths.

According to Baron, then, the proper dogmatic response to the apparent contradiction between God’s universal will to save and God’s sovereign discrimination in the distribution of his saving grace is to assert both truths with equal rigour. Neither truth, in other words, should be watered down or washed away in service to the other. This, of course, requires a rather careful balancing act; Baron proceeds by identifying two categories of theologians who ‘shrink back from the moderation and modesty of St Prosper’ on this issue, exalting one dogmatic truth at the expense of the other.

On one hand are ‘those who affirm that God’s grace for the obtaining of salvation is universal, so that its efficacy in some persons rather than others depends upon the freedom of man’s will’.33 Baron has in mind certain medieval scholastics as well as contemporary Jesuit thinkers who:
explain and confirm their opinion with that well-known axiom facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam. If, they say, the nations were to make good use of those natural gifts and means of salvation originally distributed to them, then God, who does not deny grace to those who do what lies within them, would grant them fuller grace, … and lead them finally to a knowledge of Christ.34
Those advancing this position, Baron notes, deny that man can properly (or condignly) ‘merit grace through a good use of free will’. They affirm, however, that man might, ‘by virtue of his natural abilities’, render himself ‘disposed to grace’ –or at least ‘less indisposed to grace’ – which God in turn will grant according to his promise.35

In Baron’s judgement such doctrine ‘is clearly semi-Pelagian, and hence contrary to Scripture and the general consensus of the Fathers’. He rejects it on the grounds that it makes God a debtor to man in the distribution of his saving grace: ‘If God has regard to deeds performed by the virtues of [human] nature when he confers helping grace upon some and denies the same to others, then our calling unto salvation in some way depends upon our works, contrary to Paul’s teaching in Rom. 11.6, Eph. 2.8–9, 2 Tim. 1.9, and Tit. 3.9.’ Moreover, such a doctrine creates space for human boasting: ‘The one who is called has distinguished himself [by his proper use of natural gifts] from the one who is not, contrary to Paul’s teaching in 1 Cor. 4.7: “Who has set you apart from others? And what do you have that you have not received?”’36

While rejecting the positive assertion that man might elicit saving grace from God through the right use of natural gifts, Baron acknowledges some truth in the inverse claim that man’s abuse of natural gifts ‘provides a peculiar reason that he is denied grace’.37 ‘Sacred Scripture’, notes Baron, ‘clearly testifies that man’s prior rejection of God is a cause of divine dereliction: “Because you have forsaken Jehovah, he has forsaken you” (2 Chron. 24.20).’38 But two caveats are required. First, it should be noted that God also, and justly, denies men grace because ‘they have sinned in Adam’s loins’, regardless of their subsequent abuse of natural gifts.39 In other words, actual sins merely aggravate the culpability established by original sin. So ‘Thomas, following Augustine, says that grace is justly withheld from those to whom it is not given as punishment for previous sin, even original sin’.40 It should be noted, secondly, that human sin – whether original or actual – provides no ‘exact or adequate explanation for why certain men are denied grace, since … grace is given to other men who are no less unworthy’.41

Equally removed, on the other hand, from Prosper’s ‘moderation and modesty’ are those who ‘recklessly affirm that no divine grace whatsoever extends to those who have not received the gospel’, and that, ‘in the end, God in no way wants them to be saved’.42 Here Baron has in mind certain Reformed peers who, he says, interpret the biblical phrase ‘God wants all to be saved’ to mean not that God wants ‘every person’ to be saved, but that he wants ‘every kind of person, i.e. individuals from every nation, rank and position’ to be saved; thus they ultimately understand ‘all’ as a reference ‘only to the elect’, who in fact receive the means necessary to salvation. According to Baron, ‘the principal reason they cling so tenaciously to this stern doctrine’ is recognition that ‘if God wants some to be saved who are not actually saved, it follows that in God there is somehow an ineffective will, a desire for things to happen which never in fact occur, and this seems absurd’.43

In response to these theologians Baron argues that God has granted some grace even to those who are not ultimately elected to eternal life – ‘not only to the reprobate living within the church, but also to the nations’ – and has done so from a genuine desire that they seek him. Concerning ‘the reprobate within the church’: these ‘are granted certain gracious assistances, not only externally but also internally (Heb. 6.4–5)’.44 Baron appeals to those theologians who belonged to the British delegation to the Synod of Dort, who in their suffrage on the articles of that Synod affirmed that ‘God truly and earnestly calls and invites the reprobate within the church to faith and repentance, and neither deserts them nor desists from pushing them forward in the way of true conversion until they first desert him by voluntarily neglecting or rejecting his grace’.45 He anticipates an objection: ‘You will say it follows that the reason one rather than another is converted is to be found not in God, but in men themselves; one made good use, another bad, of that initial grace given to them.’ Baron unequivocally rejects such an implication, insisting that both ‘the elect who are actually converted’ and ‘the reprobate’ equally ‘abuse that initial grace’. Indeed ‘all [within the church] are called by God in a certain manner which they resist’, but while God ‘justly deserts some because they have first deserted him’, others are ‘not deserted, but are led by an extraordinary and peculiar grace of God to genuine faith and repentance, and are saved’.46

Those outside the church have some grace and certain gifts entrusted to them as well; they have ‘the law of nature written on their hearts (Rom. 2.14–15)’ and some further ‘witness to God (Acts 14.17)’ through ‘the works of creation’. Baron quotes Rom. 1.19–20: ‘What may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them. For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities – his eternal power and divine nature – have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made.’47 He discovers in Acts 17.27 a clear statement of the purpose for such divine self-disclosure: ‘It is said that God offers these means to them “in order that they might seek him”.’ Nevertheless some – Baron specifically names contemporary English divine William Twisse – discover in the ultimate clause of Romans 1.20 (‘so that men are without excuse’) a rather different purpose for God’s witness to himself in creation; they insist that ‘these means are imparted to [those who are not ultimately saved] merely in order to render them anapologia, that is, inexcusable before God’.48

Baron takes strong exception to this interpretation of the final clause of Romans 1.20: ‘These words should not be understood to indicate cause, but only consequence; in other words, they should not be read as naming the reason that God manifests his invisible qualities to the nations, but only as naming the actual outcome of that manifestation.’ It is man’s sinful response to God’s self-disclosure through ‘the works of creation’ that properly renders man anapologia in the judgement; thus ‘inexcusability before God’ is ‘only secondarily and per accidens, not per se, an end of God’s manifestation’.49 He highlights the support his reading of Romans 1.20 finds in the biblical commentaries of Reformed theologians Heinrich Bullinger, Martin Bucer, Augustin Marlorat, Wolfgang Musculus and David Pareus.50 And he discovers a further argument in his favour in the claim of Rom. 1.21 that ‘those who knew God’ through his self-disclosure in creation ‘did not give thanks to God.’ He explains:
If God offered these means [of knowing him] to those who are perishing only to the end of rendering them inexcusable, then those means offered to them would not have the proper character of gifts, and consequently, those who abused those means and rendered themselves anapologia or inexcusable would be falsely accused of ingratitude towards God.51
The charge of ingratitude against those who squander the gift of God’s testimony to himself in creation assumes that such testimony flows from a genuine desire for their good and well-being.

As noted above, Baron perceives the fundamental objection against a universal salvific will in God to be that it credits God, at least by implication, with an ineffective will; he tackles this problem in a discrete section titled ‘whether there is in God a certain will which is ineffective or conditional’.52 Baron answers ‘yes’ to that question. God genuinely wills the salvation of all, but all are not saved; something, therefore, renders that divine will ineffective. He recognizes, however, that ‘Arminians, Lutherans, and some Romanists’ also affirm an ineffective will in God, and he is keen to dissociate his view from:
those who teach that God equally or indifferently seeks and intends the salvation of all, so that the reason one is saved rather than another is to be sought not in God’s eternal election or the measure and quality of grace which men in time receive, but in the free volition of men themselves, presupposing some grace.53
In contrast to any such scheme of grace and salvation, Baron affirms that:
God generally wills all to be saved by his conditional or ineffective will, but he also specifically intends and seeks the salvation of certain men by his effective will, and he decrees the salvation of certain men prior to any foreknowledge of faith, repentance, or good works which they in time will perform.54
The arguments that Baron subsequently advances serve to demonstrate the reality of some ineffective will in God per se, regardless of its orientation towards the salvation of all. He notes, for example, that God ‘loves and prescribes many good works in his law’. If God loves certain works, he must genuinely desire their performance by men. But ‘many good works which God prescribes do not happen’. Thus, Baron reasons, ‘it is necessary to attribute to God a certain will or volition which is, in fact, ineffective’.55 Likewise, ‘God often, in sacred scripture, promises men good things, some temporal and some eternal, which in fact they never receive because they fail to fulfil some condition which is attached to the promise’. So, for example, ‘God promised Cain his favour and acceptance, adding the condition “if you do well” (Gen. 4); God promised the Israelites that he would dispel the remaining nations from the land, adding the condition “if you cling to Jehovah” (Josh. 23. 5, 8)’. Similarly, ‘Adam and his posterity were promised immortality on condition of obedience’. Such conditional promises, Baron reasons, require recognition of ‘a certain ineffective will in God’, for a promise made to man without some corresponding desire that man fulfil the prescribed condition and inherit that which is promised would be ‘false, deceitful, and hypocritical’.56

Baron also appeals to authorities in support of his doctrine: ‘A conditional or ineffective will in God for the salvation of all is acknowledged not only by the sacred Fathers, … but also by many orthodox theologians.’ Among the Fathers he names Chrysostom, Jerome, Prosper, John of Damascus, ‘and, indeed, Augustine himself ’ as supporters of his doctrine. Among orthodox Reformed theologians he names Jerome Zanchi, Amandus Polanus and Musculus.57 Lucas Trelcatius, he notes further, ‘distinguishes between an absolute and a conditional divine will, even if he does not explicitly say that God, by virtue of his conditional will, wants all to be saved’.58 Pareus, moreover, ‘not only acknowledges a conditional will (which he also calls “antecedent”) in God, but also asserts that, according to it, God wills all to be saved by faith, i.e., on the condition that they believe in the Son of God’.59 So also Daniel Chamier ‘distinguishes between … God’s will of approbation and his will of decree, and says that God, by virtue of the former, wills all to come to salvation’.60

Baron addresses, finally, two objections to the doctrine of an ineffective or conditional will in God. Some theologians, he notes first, refuse to attribute an ineffective will to God because they deem such ‘to be an imperfection’. He responds that ‘an ineffective will is only an imperfection when it exists in one who is unable to procure that which he wills’. God, of course, is able to accomplish whatever he desires. Hence his will for certain outcomes remains ineffective merely by virtue of his own free decision not to achieve his desire.61 In other words, what trumps God’s (ineffective) desire for some end is not a force or forces outside of God, but God’s own effective desire for some other end.

‘Some say’, secondly:
that if God wants all to be saved on condition of faith and repentance, it follows that God’s decision concerning the salvation of men remains in suspense until he foresees who will fulfil that condition and who will not. Consequently, the reason he elects one man and not another lies in those men themselves; that is, God foresees that one man and not another will fulfil that condition of faith and repentance under which he wants all to be saved.
Baron again rejects the claim that a doctrine of a divine, ineffective will only properly fits in such a heterodox scheme of election. He argues: ‘Just as God from eternity wills to grant men salvation on condition of faith and repentance, so also from eternity, and without any foresight of human volitional consent, he resolves to grant certain men the most effective resources to fulfil that condition, and denies the same to other men.’ God, in other words, also has an effective will, by which he determines without regard to future human decisions that some men will indeed be saved and others will not. Baron concludes his defence of God’s ineffective, universal will to save by stressing again the proper relationship between divine election and human faith: ‘God has not elected any man to glory because he foresaw that that man would fulfil the condition of faith and repentance. On the contrary, he himself causes the condition to be fulfilled in a man because he has elected that man to glory.’62
_______________
27. Ibid., p. 29. For Baron’s argument regarding the necessity of explicit faith in Christ for salvation, see pp. 22–9.
28. Ibid., pp. 29–30, 48.
29. Ibid., p. 30, citing Prosper of Aquitaine, De vocatione omnium gentium, 2.1 (PL vol. 51, p. 686).
30. See Prosper, De vocatione, 2.2 (PL vol. 51, pp. 687–8).
31. Baron, Septenarius sacer, p. 30, citing Prosper, De vocatione, 2.1 (PL vol. 51, pp. 686–7).
32. Ibid., p. 30, citing Prosper, De vocatione, 2.1 (PL vol. 51, p. 687).
33. Ibid., p. 31.
34. Ibid., p. 35.
35. Ibid., pp. 35–8. In addition to the medieval scholastics Durandus of Saint-Pourcain, Duns Scotus and Gabriel Biel, Baron names the Jesuits Luis de Molina and Leonard Lessius as representatives of the doctrine that man can, by virtue of his natural abilities, render himself ‘disposed or prepared for grace’ (pp. 35–7). He names the Jesuits Francisco Suarez and Diego Ruiz de Montoya as representatives of the doctrine that man can, by virtue of his natural abilities, render himself at least ‘less indisposed to grace’ (pp. 37–8).
36. Ibid., pp. 36–7.
37. Ibid., p. 45.
38. Ibid., p. 40. Baron also references Prov. 1.24.
39. Ibid., p. 45.
40. Ibid., p. 46, citing Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 2a2ae, 2, 5, ad primum.
41. Ibid., p. 41.
42. Ibid., p. 31.
43. Ibid., p. 31.
44. Ibid., p. 47. Baron does not define these ‘external’ or ‘internal’ graces specifically; presumably he has in mind the general call of the gospel and some internal promptings of God’s Spirit towards repentance. He distinguishes these ‘assistances’ from the God’s ‘efficacious call’ to the elect.
45. Ibid., p. 47, paraphrasing the delegates’ 3rd and 4th positions on the 3rd and 4th articles; see Anthony Milton, The British Delegation and the Synod of Dort (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2005), pp. 253–4.
46. Ibid., p. 47, referencing the British delegation’s 6th and 7th positions on the 3rd and 4th articles at Dort; see Milton, British Delegation, pp. 255–6.
47. Ibid., p. 31.
48. Ibid., p. 31. See William Twisse, Vindiciae gratiae, potestatis, ac providentiae Dei (Amsterdam: Ioannem Ianssonium, 1632), lib. 1, pars 2, sect. 12.
49. Ibid., p. 34.
50. Ibid., pp. 33–4.
51. Ibid., p. 33.
52. Ibid., pp. 49–54.
53. Ibid., p. 49
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., p. 50.
56. Ibid., pp. 50–1.
57. Ibid., pp. 52–3, citing Zanchius, De natura Dei (Heidelberg: Iacobus Mylius, 1577), lib. 3, ca. 4, q. 3; Polanus, Syntagma theologiae christianae (Hanau: Wechelianis, 1609), lib. 2, ca. 19; Musculus, Loci communes (Erfurt: Georgium Bauuman, 1563), ca. De volunte Dei, ca. De remissione peccatorum.
58. Ibid., p. 53, citing Trelcatius, Institutio theologiae (London: Iohannis Bill, 1604), lib. 1, disp. De Deo.
59. Ibid., citing Pareus, Roberti Bellarmini … de gratia et libero arbitrio libri VI...explicati et castigati studio (Heidelberg: Iohannis Lancelloti, 1614), lib. 2, ca. 3.
60. Ibid., citing Chamier, Panstratiae Catholicae, sive, controversiarum de religione advresus Pontificios corpus (Geneva: typis Roverianis, 1626), tom. 3, lib. 7, ca. 6, and tom. 2, lib. 3, ca. 9, para. 19.
61. Ibid., pp. 53–4.
62. Ibid., p. 54.
Aaron Clay Denlinger, “Scottish Hypothetical Universalism: Robert Baron (c.1596–1639) on God’s Love and Christ’s Death for All,” in Reformed Orthodoxy in Scotland: Essays on Scottish Theology 1560–1775, ed. Aaron Clay Denlinger (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 87–94.

For more on Baron and the extent of the atonement, see here (link).

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May 11, 2013

Nathanael Hardy (1618–1670) on Love and Hate

More particularly in this ingeminated opposition, be pleased to observe,

The sin specified, in these words, 'He that hateth his brother.' [1 John 2:9–11]

The state of the sinner described in the rest of the words: and that

Imaginary, wherein he supposeth himself to be, 'He saith he is in the light.'

Real, in which indeed he is; set forth in several characters, in the end of the 9th, and the greatest part of the 11th. 'He is in darkness even until now;' and again, 'He is darkness, and walketh in darkness, and knoweth not whither he goeth, because that darkness hath blinded his eyes.'

1. The first of these is the hinge upon which the antithesis turneth, and therefore I shall be the more large in unfolding it. To which end I shall discuss it two ways, by way of restriction and by way of enlargement; and accordingly discover exclusively what hatred is not within the compass of this sin, and then extensively how far this hatred reacheth, which is here declaimed against.

The exclusive restriction of this hatred will appear in these ensuing propositions.

1. There is a positive and there is a comparative, there is an absolute and there is a relative, hatred. It is very observable, that Jacob's loving Rachel more than Leah is called in the very next verse hating Leah, Gen. xxix. 30, 31. That which we less love than another, we are said to hate in comparison of that love we bear to the other; and thus it is not sin but a duty to hate our brother, to wit, in comparison of Christ. It is our Saviour's own assertion, Luke xiv. 26, 'If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, his own life also, he cannot be my disciple:' an expression seemingly very harsh, but easily understood. If compared with the other evangelist, St. Matthew, chap. x. 37, where he brings in Christ, saith, 'He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me, and he that loveth son or daughter more than me, is not worthy of me.' We ought then to hate our nearest relations, that is, not love them more, nay, which is the meaning of the phrase, love them less than Christ. Hence it is, that when Christ's glory and truth cometh in competition with the dearest of our relations, we must neglect children, cast off parents, reject the wife of our bosom, rather than deny Christ; yea, w must be averse to them if they go about to direct us from Christ. Thus that devout Paula, as St Jerome [Hier. Ep. xxvii. c. 8.] saith, Nesciebat se matrem, ut Christi probaret ancillam, that she might approve herself Christ's handmaid, forgot that she was a mother. And that same father elsewhere asserteth it [Hier. Ep. i. ad Hetrod.], Pietatis genus est impium esse pro domino, it is a part of piety to be in some sense impious, and, out of love towards God, to hate our brother, and therefore this is not here to be understood.

2. It is one thing to hate our brother, and another thing to hate the sins of our brother; it is solidly determined by Aquinas [Aquin. 2da 2dæ Quest. 34. Art. iii.], love is due to my brother secundum id quod a Deo habet, in respect of that which is communicated to him by God, whether nature, or grace, or both; but it is not due to him secundum id quod habet a seipeo et diabolo, according to that which he hath from himself and the devil, to wit, sin and wickedness; and therefore it is lawful to hate my brother's sin, but not his nature, much less his grace. Laudabile odium odisse vitia, saith Origen [Orig. in Rom.], to hate evil is a commendable hatred, and that wherever we find it, not only in the bad but the good, the enormities of the one, but the infirmities in the other; not only in strangers and enemies, but kindred and friends, spying beams, nay, motes, in these as well as those, and abhoring them; we must hate this serpent wherever we find it, though in a garden, nay, though in our own habitations. Indeed, as Aquinas excellently, Hoc ipsum, quod in fratris amorem, this hatred of the vice in an effect of love to the person; so much is intimated when it is said, Lev. xix. 17, 'Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart, thou shalt in anywise rebuke him, and not suffer sin upon him.' By shewing hatred to his sin in rebuking, we shew our love to him; and if we wish good to him, we cannot but hate what we see evil in him. This hatred is so far from being sinful, that it is not only lawful and laudable, but excellent, not a wicked but a pious, yea, a perfect hatred. According to that of St. Austin [Aug. in Ps. cxxxix.], Perfectio odii est in charitate cum nec propter vitia homines oderimus, nec vitia propter homines amemus, it is at once the perfection of hatred and an argument of love, when we neither hate the man for the sin's sake, not yet love the sin for the man's sake, but fix our love on the man, and our hatred on the sin.

3. There is odium abominationis, and odium inimicitiæ, an hatred of aversion, and an hatred of enmity; by the one we fly from, by the other we pursue after. Look as in love there is a benevolence whereby we will good to, and a complacence whereby we take delight in, another; so in hatred there is a strangeness whereby we avoid the society, and an enmity whereby we seek the mischief, of another. The former of these is not forbidden, but required and practised. Godly David saith of himself, Ps. xxvi. 5, 'I hated the congregation of evil doers, and will not sit with the wicked;' and that of his practice was justifiable and imitable, since we must not only fly from the sin, but the sinner; yea, that we may shun the one, we must avoid the other. Timon was called μισάνθρωπος, a man-hater, because he kept not company with any man save Alcibiades [Cic. de Amicit], and we should all of us be haters of wicked men, shunning all needless converse and much more familiar acquaintance with them. It is St Paul's counsel to the Ephesians, chap. v. 11, 'Have no fellowship with the unfruitful works' (he meaneth workers [Operibus, i.e. operatoribus]) 'of darkness;' yea, it is the strict charge he layeth upon the Thessalonians, 2 Thes. iii. 6, 'Now we command you, brethren, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you withdraw yourselves from every brother that walketh disorderly.' We ought as much to hate familiarity with the wicked, as to tread upon burning coals, or go into an infected house; and therefore this kind of hatred is not here intended.

4. Once more, all hatred of [or?--Ed.] enmity, in respect of others, is not to be condemned, if they be enemies, not so much to us, as to the church, yea, God himself; and this not out of ignorance but malice, and so implacable. We may, we ought, to be enemies to them. Holy David hath set us a pattern hereof. When speaking to God he saith, Ps. cxxxix. 21, 'Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate thee? and am not I grieved with them that rise up against thee? I hate them with perfect hatred, I count them mine enemies.' Hence, no doubt, are those imprecations and curses with we meet with in the Psalms, Ps. Iix. 12, 13, lxviii. 1, 2, wherein we find that holy man wishing, not only disappointment to the hopes, infatuation to the counsels, but destruction to the persons of Zion's adversaries. And surely thus far we may and ought to imitate him, as in general to pray against, and wish the ruin of all the church's irreconcilable adversaries; though as to particulars we must take heed of going too far in this way, it being difficult if not impossible for us determinately to assert concerning any one that he is an implacable enemy of God and religion; and yet when we see one who with Julian hath professed himself to be a Christian brother, and so far apostatising as openly to prosecute Christianity with utmost fury, notwithstanding manifold convictions; or who still, pretending to be a brother, oppungneth (with no less virulency though more subtilty) the Christian religion in its orthodox profession, swallowing up her revenues, forbidding her public services, stopping the mouths of her preachers, suffering blasphemies and heresies to obscure her, plucking up the pillars which should uphold her, and persecuting all that embrace her; and all this against clear convictions, which he either hath, or might have, did he not shut his eyes; together with frequent and multiplied admonitions. Since we can have very little or no hopes of such a man's conversion, we may and ought to desire of God (if he will not please to convert him) to confound not only his devices but his person, and to cut him off from the land of the living; only we must take heed to the frame and temper of our spirit, that this our hatred of, and wishing ill to him, purely proceed from a love to God's church, and a zeal for his glory, not out of any personal or private respect to our own revenge.
Nathanael Hardy, The First General Epistle of St. John the Apostle, Unfolded and Applied (Edinburgh: James Nichol, 1865), 194–195.

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June 4, 2012

Nathanael Homes (1599–1678) on Christ's Universal Satisfaction

CHAP. VII.

Until men come to Christ by faith, they have not actually any saving benefit by Christ's death. Where is stated and discussed the Question about Universal Redemption, of the true intent and extent thereof.

To further clear our in-being in Christ, this Question must be handled. Two extremes of Opinions there are about the extent and intent of Christ's death and satisfaction, that widen the difference. Which we shall now speak to (as God shall assist) for the clearing of the point in hand; and I shall not be wholly singular, but keep company with some late learned. The one extreme of opinion extendeth and violently stretcheth the death and satisfaction of Christ so much too far, as that it thinks that thereby God for his part is actually reconciled to all men, and doth really discharge every man diving [sic] from all his sins, and that before faith comes. Only they confess, that they for their parts perceive not that benefit by it, whilst they have no faith to believe, that God doth so love them. Now from this extreme Opinion it would follow, that God should be actually reconciled to man before he did put on Christ; And that God should forgive a man's sins (which is justification) before he believed. Whereas the very elect themselves before their effectual calling are said to be a people not beloved, Rom. 9.25. And whilest they are without Christ to be without hope; as we heard afore out of Eph. 2.12.

The other extreme opinion contracteth the riches of Christ's satisfaction into too narrow a compass, as if none had any interest any way therein, but such as were elected from the foundation of the world, though by the Gospel every one be charged to receive the same. Now from this extreme it would follow, that a man under the Gospel should be bound in conscience to believe that which is untrue, and charged to take and receive that with which he hath nothing to do, namely, to believe, and take Christ as dying for him, when as Christ did not die for him; nor did he belong to Christ in that respect, according to their Opinion.

Some to take away this difficulty, answer thus. That it follows only from this Argument, that some under the Gospel are bound to believe an impossible thing. Answ. This solves not the knot. For, 1. I ask, will God condemn a soul for not believing that which is impossible to be had? 2. Why, say I, is it impossible for them to have Christ, but because as these men say, Christ never Intended, or extended his death so far?

Others answer to this difficulty thus. That they under the Gospel that shall never have Christ, are not bound by the voice of the Gospel to believe that Christ died for them; nor are they condemned for not believing that Christ died for them.

Answ. The contrary seems to be evident, John 3.16. God so loved the WORLD, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believes IN HIM should not perish. Greek, INTO HIM. And v. 18. He that believes on him, Gr. INTO HIM, is not condemned: but he that believes not is condemned already, because he has not believed IN (Gr. INTO) the name of the only begotten Son of God. See how God, 1. propounds his Son more generally, as sent to the WORLD, and as it is in v. 17. He sent not his Son into the WORLD to condemn the world, but that the WORLD might be saved. Then, 2. requires men particularly to believe IN or INTO his Son: as HE that believes in him, &c. Therefore to avoid both these rocks, the word of truth, by which faith is begotten, Eph. 1.13. must be sought into, to find a middle way, wherein to go safely, and not to split against either of the said two rocks of absurdities.

For the better and readier finding out this middle and safer way, we must be careful in the business of our redemption, clearly to distinguish between the satisfaction of Christ, absolutely considered, and the application of the same relatively to men in particular. The differences as, 1. That satisfaction absolutely considered, was once, and at once done for All; but the application of it to man, is still in doing. 2. Satisfaction absolutely considered, bringeth with it sufficiency to discharge all men's whole debt; The application of it adds unto it efficiency to make it effectual. 3. The satisfaction of Christ makes the sins of mankind only pardonable, fit for pardon, else God's Justice could not put up the wrong done to him by sin. The particular application maketh the sins of those to whom it is applied to be pardoned, actually and solemnly to be acquitted by pardon. So that in sum thus. Though all sins of all men are mortal in regard of the stipend due to them by the Law; yet all do not actually bring forth eternal death; because the gracious promise of the Gospel holding forth Christ, inhibits, supercedes, and stays the execution. So that all the sins of mankind are become venial in respect of the price paid by Christ unto his Father; so that in showing mercy to all, if such were his pleasure, his Justice should be no loser. But all do not obtain actual remission of sin, because most offenders do not take out, nor plead their pardon, as they ought to do, Ezek. 36. For all this will I be sought unto. And Isa. 55. Call upon the Lord while he is near: and then it follows, He will abundantly pardon. If Christ had not assumed our nature, and therein made satisfaction for the injury offered by us to God, God would not have come to a Treaty of peace with us, (as it is said, Isa. 1. Come now let us reason together,) no more then with the fallen Angels, whose nature his Son Christ did not assume, Heb. 2. and so were finally rejected. But this way being made through the flesh of Christ (as the Apostle speaks, Heb. 10.20.) God holdeth out unto men the golden Scepter of his Gospel; and thereby not only signifieth his pleasure of admitting them tin to his presence; and accepting their submission (which is a wonderful grace, and favour) but also sendeth an embassage unto them, entreating them that they would be reconciled unto him, 2 Cor. 5:20.

Hence is inferred against the first extremity of opinion (of which see before) that by virtue of Christ's satisfaction in our nature, God is made appeasable unto our nature; but is not actually appeased towards any man's person, until he hath received his Son, and put on him the Lord Jesus Christ.

Hence also is inferred against the second extremity of opinion (of which afore) that all may be said to have a common interest in the merits of Christ: howsoever all do not enjoy the benefit thereof, because they do not take it. The well-spring of life is set open to all, freely, Rev. 22.17. Whosoever will, let him take of the water of life freely. But many fetch not, having nothing to draw with, and the Well is deep. Faith is the only vessel whereby we are to draw all virtue from Christ; and that is to be fetched from the hearing of the word of truth, the Gospel of our salvation, Eph. 1.13. Rom. 10. which holdeth forth this bottom for every one to build his faith upon, thus.

What Christ hath provided for me, and the Gospel offers me, that I ought with all thankfulness to accept, and apply to my comfort. But Christ by his death, and obedience, hath provided a sufficient remedy for the taking away of sin, and the Gospel offereth it. Therefore I ought to accept it, and apply it to the comfort of mine own soul.

Now many hearing this Gospel of salvation, do either not regard it, or not believe it; or if in a sort believe it, that is the truth of it, yet embrace it not; but are so wedded to their sins, that they have no desire to be divorced from them: and therefore neglect the taking to themselves, and applying to their own souls this gracious offer made unto them.

Notwithstanding which neglect of their parts, we may truly say, [That good things were provided for them on Christ's part,] and that a rich price was put into the hand of a fool, howsoever he had no heart to use it, Prov. 17.16. Our Saviour by that which he performed on his part hath procured a Jubilee for all the sons of Adam, Luke 4. 18, 19. And the Gospel is the trumpet whereby he doth proclaim liberty to the Captives, and preacheth the acceptable year of the Lord. If (as Lev. 25.24. Exod. 21.5. Deut. 15.16.) for all this some are so well pleased with their captivity, that they desire no deliverance; this derogateth nothing from the generality of the freedom annexed unto that YEAR. If one say to his sin, or love of the world, his old Master, I love thee, I will not depart from thee, I will not go out free, then he shall be (as the servants so saying in the aforesaid texts) bored in the ear for a slave; and serve for ever. But that slavish disposition of his, maketh the extent of the priviledge of that year not a whit the straighter; because he was included within the general grant as well as others, howsoever he was not disposed to take the benefit of it. The King of heaven (saith our Saviour, Mat. 22.2.) is like unto a certain King that made a marriage, that is, a marriage-feast, as the Syriac משתותא signifies) for his Son, and sent forth his Servants to those that were bidden to that marriage feast with this message, [Behold I have prepared my dinner, my oxen, and fatlings are killed, and all things are ready, come to the wedding, v. 4.] But if we look to the event, They which were bidden made light of the invitation, and went their ways, one to his farm, another to his merchandise, v. 5. yet this neglect of theirs doth nothing [to] falsify the word of the King, which we have in v. 4. namely, That the dinner was prepared, and those unworthy guests were bidden thereunto. For (saith the Apostle, Rom 3.4.) What if some did not believe? shall their unbelief disanul the faith and truth of God? God forbid. Yea let God be true, and every man a liar, as it is written, That thou mayest be justified in thy sayings, and overcome when thou judgest. Just as the Lord speaketh by the Prophet, (Ezek. 18. 29, 30.) Let not the house of Israel say, the way of the Lord is not equal. For when he cometh to judge them every one according to his ways, Ezek. 33. 20. the inequality of the way will be found on their sides, not on his, Oh house of Israel, are not my ways equal; or are not your ways unequal, saith the Lord. So in that Ezek. 18. The Lord is righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works. Psal. 145.17. All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth. Psal. 25.10. When we were in our sins, it was his infinite mercy, that any remedy should be provided, for our recovery. And when the medicine is prepared, we are never the nigher to actual salvation, unless he be pleased out of his free mercy to apply the same unto us; that for the whole praise of our redemption from the beginning to the end, may be entirely attributed to the riches of his mercy, and nothing may be left to sinful flesh wherein to glory. The freeing of the people of the Jews from the captivity of Babylon, (Isa. 45.1, &c.) was a type of Christ's great[?] deliverance of us wrought by him. Cyrus King of Persia (who was Christus Domini, the Christ, or the annointed of God, and herein but a type or shadow of him that is Christus Dominus, Christ the Lord, the author of our redemption), publishes his general proclamation in this manner, [Who is there among you of all the people? the Lord his God be with him, and let him go up. 1 Chron. 25.33] Now it is true that they alone did follow this calling, whose spirit God had moved to go up, Ezra 1.5. But could they therefore, that remained still behind in Babylon (1 Chron. 4.23.) justly plead that the Kings Grant was not large enough? or that they were excluded from going up, by any clause contained therein? Just so the matter of our redemption purchased by our Saviour Christ, lieth open to all, all are invited to it, none that hath mind to accept it, is excluded from it. The beautiful feet of them that bring glad tidings of the Gospel of peace, do bring good news of great joy into every house wherein they tread, (Luke 1.79. Luke 10.5. Rom. 10.15.) The first part of their message being this, Peace be to this house. But unless God be pleased out of the abundance of his mercy to guide our feet into the way of peace, the rebellion of our nature is such, and so great, we run headlong into the ways of destruction and misery, and the ways of peace we do not know, Rom. 3. 16, 17. They have not all obeyed the Gospel, said the Apostle, Rom. 10.16. All are not apt to entertain the message of peace. And therefore though God's Embassadors make a true tender thereof to all to whom they are sent, yet the peace rested only upon the sons of peace. But if they meet with such as will not listen to this motion, their peace doth return again unto themselves, Luke 10.6. The proclamation of the Gospel, Rev. 22.17. runs thus: Let him that is athirst come. For him this peace especially is provided, because none but he will take the pains to come. But lest we should think this did any way abridge the largeness of that offer, a Quicunque vult is added in these words, And whosoever will, let him come and take of the waters of life freely. Yet withal, we must hold this, That it is God that worketh in us to will and to do of his good pleasure, Phil. 2.13. And though the call be never so loud, and so large, yet no man can come effectually, except God the Father draw him: as it is, John 6.44. For the universality of the satisfaction, nothing derogateth from the necessity of God's special grace in the application of it. Neither doth this specialty of grace in the application any whit abbrogate the generality of the satisfaction.

And therefore when men urge that argument out of John 17.9. Christ PRAYED not for the world, therefore he PAID not for the world; there are many considerable things may be replied unto.

For the consequence may be excepted against upon many good reasons. For though Christ did not pray for the world, yet he might pay for the world. Because this paying is a more general or common act, of satisfaction; his praying a more special and choice act of intercession: so that though both acts agree in this, that they be acts of Christ's Priesthood, yet in other respects are widely distinguishable. 1. Paying, that is, giving satisfaction, doth properly give content to God's Justice (as hath been shewed;) Praying, that is, intercession, doth solicite God's mercy. 2. This paying satisfaction containeth a preparation of the plaister of potion necessary for man's salvation; But praying by way of intercession, is the means of application of that remedy to the malady. 3. The paying satisfaction belongs to the common nature of mankind which Christ assumeth: when as praying intercession is a special priviledge vouchsafed to such particular persons only as the Father hath given to his Son Christ.

And therefore I think we may safely conclude from all these premises, That the Lamb of God offering up himself (cloathed with human nature) a sacrifice for the sins of the world, intended by giving satisfaction sufficiently to God's Justice, to make the nature of man (which he assumed) saveable, a fit subject for mercy, and to prepare a sovereign medicine for the sins of the whole world, which should be denied to none that mind to take the benefit thereof; howsoever he intended not, by applying this all-sufficient sacrifice, or satisfaction to every one in particular, to make it effectual unto the salvation of all, or to procure thereby, at the hands of the Father, actual pardon for the sins of the whole world. He applies this only effectually to them who making claim to the satisfaction, by promise, suing for the spirit and faith upon other promises, in prayer waiting for a gracious return until they have it. So that in one respect Christ may be said to die for all; and in another respect, not to die for all. Yet so as in respect of his merit, he may be accounted a kind of universal cause of the restoring of our nature, as Adam was the depraving of it. So that, to conclude, as far as I can discern, one did curiously hit the nail on the head, when he determined this matter on this wise.[See note below] The death of Christ is as it were a certain universal cause of salvation; as the sin of the first man was as it were a universal cause of damnation. But an universal cause must be applied to every one in special, that he may partake of the effect of the universal cause. The effect of the sin of the first man came upon every man by the original of corrupt flesh; and the effect of Christ's death reacheth to every one (whom it reacheth) by spiritual regeneration, by which, man is after a sort conjoined and incorporated to Christ. So he. We will only add this. That as the sin of Adam was an universal cause of eternal death unto mankind in general; but not to every particular man, unless original corruption were derived to him, as Christ's human nature in the very conception was exempted. So the satisfaction of Christ's death is for all mankind, but is not effectual to any particular man but to him to whom Christ's grace is derived.

Upon all it follows, That though the fallen Angels have no encouragement at all to hearken to the Gospel, there being nothing at all for them: yet all men to whom the Gospel shall come, have much encouragement to hearken to it, in this, That Christ took upon him the common nature of mankind, made it saveable, brought it nearer to salvation then the nature of lapsed Angels. And more particularly that it is said indefinitely, Christ died for sinners, for ungodly, for enemies. And yet more particularly in the Text; that him that cometh to him, he will in no wise cast out. I say they have encouragement to attend to the Gospel, there to find an effectual testimony of Christ's dying for them, by drawing them to believe it; and not to stand off, or fall on, upon notions of their own (of Christ dying FOR ALL, or if not for ALL, then NOT FOR ME) before we consult with the effectual voice of the word of the Gospel. It is not left with, or to, or in our wit and endeavors to dispute our selves into Christ by Syllogisms, yea groundless Syllogisms, but we waiting on the Gospel; Christ effectually draws us, and takes us into himself. Sure enough Christ died for that soul that hangs upon this breast of the Gospel without separation, that Christ died for sinners.
Nathanael Homes, "Christ's offering himself to all Sinners, and Answering all their Objection," in The Works of Dr. Nathanael Homes (London: Printed for the Author, 1651), 12–16. [Some spelling changes and corrections have been made]

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Note: It appears that Homes is quoting Thomas Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles, 4.55.29.) here, and he includes the Latin citation in the margin. Several Internet sources have this as the Latin:

Mors enim Christi est quasi quaedam universalis causa salutis: sicut peccatum primi hominis fuit quasi universalis causa damnationis. Oportet autem universalem causam applicari ad unumquemque specialiter, ut effectum universalis causae percipiat. Effectus igitur peccati primi parentis pervenit ad unumquemque per carnis originem: effectus autem mortis Christi pertingit ad unumquemque per spiritualem regenerationem, per quam homo Christo quodammodo coniungitur et incorporatur.

One source translates it as follows:

"For the death of Christ is, so to say, a kind of universal cause of salvation, as the sin of the first man was a kind of universal cause of damnation. But a universal cause must be applied specially to each one, that he may receive the effect of the universal cause. The effect, then, of the sin of the first parent comes to each one in the origin of the flesh, but the effect of the death of Christ comes to each one in a spiritual regeneration in which the man is somehow conjoined with Christ and incorporated into Him."

See also the post at Calvin and Calvinism, which includes Homes' [or Holmes'] section on "the proportion between Election and Redemption."

March 28, 2011

John Mayer (1583–1664) on 1 Tim. 2:4–6

Vers. 4. Who would that all men should bee saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth. For there is one God, and one Mediator betwixt God and man, &c.
A great question here offereth it selfe how it can be said that God would that all men should be saved, when as it is certaine that most men shall be damned? for God is omnipotent and how then should it happen unto any otherwise that God willeth? Saint Augustine in divers places answereth diversly hereunto. First, that hee willeth the salvation of all that are saved, so that none are saved, but such as hee willeth should bee saved. And thus these words are a fit reason of praying for all, because by our praying the Lords will may be inclined to save those, who unlesse he be willing, cannot be saved.

Secondly, in the same booke he saith, that by all men, all sorts of men are to be understood, according to that which went before, for Kings and for those that are in high place; for if it should seem strange that the Apostle should bid to pray for such, as most abhorring from Christian humility, being in so great sublimity, pompe, and secular pride, he resolveth us here, that God would that all sorts of men should bee saved, Kings and private persons, noble and ignoble, high and low, learned, and unlearned, strong and weake, witty and dull, rich and poore, males and females, &c.

Thirdly, God would, that all men should be saved, because he requireth of all, that they walke in the way of good workes, promising salvation to all that doe so, and threatening destruction to such, as doe not. So that, as that master, who biddeth all his servants worke in his vineyard, promising them a reward, if they so doe, and that after they have laboured a while there, they shall take their rest, and feast with him, but if any doth not so, he shall grind perpetually in the milne, may well be said to will, that all should have rest and joy: so may it rightly be said of the Lord, promising to the obedient, and threatening the disobedient. And much like unto this is the solution brought by him in another place. Because we know not who shall be saved, and yet are commanded to preach salvation to all, thus being set a worke to labour and desire the salvation of all, Gods Spirit working this desire in our hearts; this our willing and desiring to save all is said to be Gods willing of the same, who worketh this will in us, as Rom. 8.26. the Spirit is said, to make request, when we make request by the assistance of the Spirit. These Expositions of Saint Augustine are followed by most Expositors. Bullinger followeth the first, Calvin the second, and Thomas Aquinas, Cajetan, and others the third, calling the will of God here spoken of, the will of the signe, and not of his good pleasure.

But none of all these doe so well agree with this place, as to satisfie about this question. For touching the first, what is this to the moving of us to pray for all men, that none can be saved, but they whom God willeth, seeing he willeth not, neither decreeth the salvation of all, this should rather make us not to pray, than to pray for all men. Againe, though God would that some of all sorts should be saved, yet what is this to ground our praying upon for such and such particular Kings and men in authority over us, whom haply he will not have saved, though some of their ranke shall be saved? And lastly, if it be expounded by the will of the signe, but not of his decree, what were this wlse, but to oppose the wils of the same God one against another? and to teach that he maketh shew of that, which he never intended? Howsoever therefore in speaking of these things before, Text 21. I have rested upon these distinctions, yet now I have thought good to inquire a little further, what more may be said herein. There is then another Exposition, understanding by Gods will, his delight and desire, out of the infinite goodnesse and benignity of his nature: For this is, that all and every one should be saved, according to the reason by and by rendred, for there is one God, who created and made all men, and therefore as they are his owne creatures, his will is, that they should all be saved, and not one of them damned. For this is also added by Saint Peter, God is patient towards all men, not willing that any should perish, but all come to repentance. And by the Prophet Ezechiel the Lord professeth, I will not the death of him that dyeth, wherefore turne yee and live: these words, I will not, are by Tremellius rendred, non delector, I am not delighted, and in the originall, it is לא אהםצ, I love not. If Gods will then be considered in it selfe without respect unto wilfull and obstinate sinning, it is, that all should be saved: but because he is most just, and so cannot but will, and accordingly punish them with destruction, and this will is called by some his antecedent will, the other of damnation, his consequent will, as it is in Damascen, whose words are these; We must not be ignorant, that God precedently would that all should be saved, and attaine to his kingdome, for he made us not for punishment, but to be partakers of his goodnesse, as he is good: but he will have sinners punished, as he is just. That is therefore called his first and precedent will and acceptation, which is of himself; but the second his sequent will or permission, being of us.

First therefore, and of his infinite goodnesse, God would that we should all be saved, but when we will not, but harden our selves in our sinnes, he will and resolveth to damne such as are thus hardened therefore. Agreeably hereunto speaketh Ambrose [marginal note references some Latin in Ambrose on Matt. 23:27], God will that all should be saved, but so, as if they come unto him, for he willeth not so, that the unwilling should be saved, but he would so have them saved, as if they themselves would. And this seemeth to be grounded plainly upon that speech of our Saviour Christ, How oft would I have gathered you together, and yee would not? If it be demanded, cannot God make all men willing, if it pleaseth him, and how become they willing, that are willing? is it not of him? seeing it is of him then, that some are willing and some not, how can mans unwillingnesse be said to be the cause of his damnation? and not Gods will and decree indeed the cause as of the salvation of some, so of the damnation of others? I answer, as before upon Rom. 9. Gods electing of some to salvation and his reprobating of others, is not as of himself and of his owne good nature he is moved to doe, for so he inclineth to be alike gracious to all: but mankinde becommeth sinfull, that was at the first made holy, and being thus sinful, here commeth in his choosing of some yet out of his infinite mercy to salvation, others being rejected in his justice to damnation, after which he inclineth or not inclineth mens wils accordingly, so that some will and some will not turne, and so such as will not he damneth, and yet is truly said not to will the death of any, because of himselfe he hath no delight or pleasure herein, neither commeth it first of his will, but of mans owne corruption, which he cannot but in justice thus punish. This point is more largely handled, Rom. 9. Text 21. and therefore I say no more here, but referre the reader thither. It is enough to shew it to be good and acceptable to God to pray for all that he is best pleased with, and preferreth the salvation of all, as he at the first made all, and since sent his Sonne into the world to give himselfe, as a ransome for all. But how can it be thus said either, seeing that if the ransome be payed for all, all are not delivered? To this it is generally answered, that Christs giving of himselfe to the death was a ransome sufficient to save all men, according to the signification of the word αντίλυτρον, used to set forth the ransoming of captives, when one is given to death for the delivering of another. For Christ alone was worth all the world, and his death equivalent to the dying of all men by everlasting death. When therefore he gave himselfe to the death for us, he suffered on his part so much as was sufficient to save all men, that neither on the part of God, nor of Christ Jesus there might be any want, but the want might be altogether in themselves in such as are damned. Christ dyed for all, the Gospel is preached to all, and all enjoy the holy Sacraments, which are the meanes of salvation; but such, as are not hereby moved to faith and repentance, shall perish not withstanding through their owne default...

...Note, how free God is from being the cause of any mans destruction: for he hath done so much, as the Prophet Esay speaketh, that he challengeth his people, saying, O house of Israel, what could I have done more, that I have not done. The fault of mans ruine is in himselfe onely, and the perversenesse of his owne will. For though he hath no power of himself to doe good, yet he may refraine, from being obstinate, wilfull and refractary in his sinning, which whilst he doth not, it is just with God to condemne him, though it even grieveth him so to doe.
John Mayer, A Commentary Upon the New Testament, vol. 1 (London: Printed by Thomas Cotes, for John Bellamie, and are to be sold at his shoppe in Cornehill, at the sign of the three Golden Lyons, neere the Royall Exchange, 1631), 495–498. It's interesting to note that while Mayer limits the "world" of John 3:16 to the elect, he still teaches that Christ ransomed all men according to other passages.
Q. but as we are all sinners, are we all again delivered without exception, because thou sayest, that he hath redeemed all mankind?

A. He hath paid a price sufficient to redeem all, neither doth he exclude any from the benefit thereof, but only such as exclude themselves.
Mayers Catechism Abridged (London: Printed for John Marriot, and are to be sold at his shop in S. Dunstans Church-yard in Fleetstreet, 1639), A6v.

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November 11, 2010

Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) on Simultaneous Love and Hate

This idea of loving and hating a person at the same time but in different respects is very old in church history, at least going back to Augustine. Here's the same idea in Aquinas:
It is our duty to hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his being a man capable of bliss. And this is to love him truly, out of charity, for God's sake [Debemus enim in peccatoribus odire quod peccatores sunt, et diligere quod homines sunt beatitudinis capaces. Et hoc est eos vere ex caritate diligere propter Deum].
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II–II, Q. 25, art. 6.

See also this excellent quote by the Puritan Thomas Manton on the same idea for a comparison. The slogan "love the sinner but hate the sin" is a distortion of the ancient truth that we are to both love the sinner and hate the sinner at the same time but in different respects.

March 15, 2010

Theophilus Gale (1628–1678) on God’s Intention in the Means of Salvation

God's Providential Will is that, whereby he is said to will and intend an end, when he in his providence, either gracious or common, affords such means which have an aptitude to produce it. As where God sends his Gospel, he may be said to really intend the salvation of those to whom it is sent, albeit they are not all saved; because he vouchsafeth them those means which have a real aptitude to produce the same, were they but really embraced and improved. In this regard Davenant and others affirm, that Christ's death is, παν φά-μαχον, an universal remedy applicable to all, and that God, by his Voluntas Providentia (as Aquinas styles it) intended it as such. This intention or will of God is measured by the nature of the means, and therefore reducible to God's Legislative Will, which gives constitution and measure to all the means of man's salvation.
Theophilus Gale, The Court of the Gentiles (Printed by H. Hall, for Tho. Gilbert, 1677), Part IV, Book II, 357. Or see Theophilus Gale, The Court of the Gentiles. Part IV. Of Reformed Philosophie. Wherein Plato’s Moral and Metaphysic or Prime Philosophie is reduced to an useful Forme and Method (London: Printed by J. Macock, for Thomas Cockeril, at the Sign of the Atlas in Cornhil, near the Royal Exchange, 1677), 357 (II.v.4).

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March 28, 2009

Lawrence Proctor on Amyraut’s “Equally for All”

78. In this way, Amyraut could say that Christ died equally for all. In the statement that Christ died pro omnibus equiliter (explained Daillé, Apologiae ii 632), the theologians of Saumur meant the adverb to signify that there is none for whom Christ did not die; it does not mean that all are equal in affection or will of God in giving Christ to die. Cf. Drost, Specimen 25: Amyraut and Testard explained the death of Christ for all equally in terms of sufficiency … Amyraut explained the two uses of the adverb in De Grat (Gen) 223.
Lawrence Proctor, The Theology of Moïse Amyraut Considered as a Reaction Against Seventeenth-Century Calvinism (PhD diss., University of Leeds, 1952), 376n78. Long ago, Aquinas said, “Christ’s merit bears the same relation to all men in point of sufficiency, not in point of efficacy [quod meritum Christi quantum ad sufficientiam aequaliter se habet ad omnes, non autem quantum ad efficaciam].”—Thomas Aquinas, QDeVer.Q29.A7.Rep4. John Stalham (d. 1681), a high Calvinist, described Paul Testard’s view this way: “he [Testard] maintaineth that Christ died for all, and every singular, but he will not assert, that he died æque or alike for every one; Christ died (he saith) for all, to prepare an apt and sufficient remedy, and for the elect, to apply to them, what he had prepared for all.” See also Donald Davis Grohman on Testard’s view, in The Genevan Reactions to the Saumur Doctrine of Hypothetical Universalism: 1635–1685 (PhD diss., Knox College, Toronto, 1971), 46.


Original Source 1:

Daille, in Apologiae ii 629–33, wrote:
Sextus a Synodo damnatus error eorum est, “qui impetrationis & applicationis distinctionem usurpant, ut incautis & imperitis hanc opinionem instillent, Deum quantum ad se attinet, omnibus hominibus ex aequo ea beneficia voluisse conferre, quae per mortem Christi acquirumtur; Quod autem quidam prae aliis participes fiant remissionis peccatorum, & vitae aeternae, discrimen illud pendere ex libero eorum abritrio, se ad gratiam indifferenter oblatam applicante, non autem ex singulari misericordiae dono efficaciter in illis operante, ut prae aliis gratiam illam sibi applicent. Nam isti dum simulant se distinctionem hanc sano sensu proponere, populo permiciosum Pelagianismi venenum conantur propinare.” Accusator ait fratres profiteri se ab hoc istorum, quos Synodus damnat, “dogmate alienos esse.” Ego vere alienos esse credo; & aliud de iis suspicari, quam quod ipsi profitentur, non a charitate modo Christiana, sed & a veritate ipsa alienum esse certo scio. Mox addit Exercitator, “plaerisque Synodi Patribus illam impetrationis & applicationis distinctionem eatenus quoque displicuisse, quatenus ejus membra dispescuntur objectis, & impetrationis beneficiorum objectum statuitur universale, applicationis particulare;” & no jubet consulere judicia singulorum Theologorum, quae una cum Actis Synodi in altera voluminis parte publicata sunt. Ego respondeo fuisse quoque ex illis Theologis, quibus haec distinctio eatenus non displiceret; ut ex eorum quoque judiciis eidem volumini insertis liquet. Caeterum non hic quid singuli senserint, sed quid universi decreverint, quaerimus. Id autem universit decreverunt, quod nuper recitavimus, non aluid. Quod singulorum judicia spectemus, cum ea tametsi hac in parte inter se diversa, minime prohibuerint, quo minus alii alios ferrent, fatisque haberent, quod consentirent in hoc uno ab universis probato articulo; est quod sequamur praeclarum egregiae moderationis exemplum, ut fratres alii alios etiam aliter de hac distinctione, & aliis ejusdem generis sentientes, mutua charitate feramus; neu si plures in unam sententiam conveniamus, alios ideo, quod pauciores sint, spernendos, & in nostra verba perfas, nefasque adigendos putemus. Quod Exercitator deinceps fratrum sententiam cum Arminianorum dictatis contendit, vultque aliquem inter eos in quibusdam consensum esse; respondeo dum is in iis, quae sunt a Synodo rejecta, nullus sit, id totum perinde esse, & ad Arminianorum apologiam potius, quam ad fratrum criminationem pertinere. Itaque caetera quidem mittimus, ea vero expendemus, quae sunt a Synodo damnata; quale illud est quod primo statim loco Exercitator memorat, “Deum quantum ad se attinet hominbus ex aequo ea beneficia voluisse communia esse, quae per mortem Christi acquiruntur.” Id vero si eo sensu intelligit, quo & ab Arminianis dicitur, & a Synodo rejicitur, ut scilicet omnibus antecedentis voluntatis momentis Deus ex aequo “omnes homines salvari” velit, nulloque alios prae aliis amore complexus fuerit; nego id fratribus sine horrenda & immani sycophantia tribui posse; qui clare diserteque & nunc antehac non semel, sed saepissime, passimque testati sunt, se credere Deum ex omnibus illis hominibus, quos in se aequiliter corruptos, perditosque primo (ut si dicam) momento respexit, dilexitque, quosdam sequente aeternitatis momento ab aliis mera voluntate elegisse, & peculiari gratia, quam certo sequutura esset salus, donare decrevisse. Fratres vero, non homines, sed belluas esse necesse fuerit, si quos peculiari singularique amore prae caeteris a Deo dilectos fatentur, Deum cum his caeteros omnes mortales ex aequo amasse, ac salvos fieri voluisse dixerint. Neque est quod accusator sese id demonstratum dedisse putet. Numquam fecit, numquam faciet. Neque ii Dei gratia sunt fratres, qui tam stulta, tamve ασυςατα simul doceant. Si qui ex iis olim dixerunt Deum ex aequo voluisse homines omnes servari, id de primo illo dilectionis divinae momento, de quo monui, dixerunt, quo primum lapsi homines ei obversabantur. De sequentibus, absit ut dixerint, ut cogitarint, ut vel unquam somniaverint. Et si quis Christum “pro omnibus aequaliter mortuum” dixit, is intellexit neminem esse, pro quo non sit mortuus; quo sensu interdum sumi adverbium illud aequaliter ipse Exercitator, cum libet, notat; non significavit pari in omnes affectu, pari in omnes Dei voluntate Christum esse mortuum. Quod vero decretum electionis posterius censetur decreto redemptionis, eo quidem efficitur, ut in primo (ut dixi) divinae in homines benevolentiae momento, nondum potior eluxerit in electos, quam in caeteros amor; non efficitur, ut ne in sequenti quidem momento, quo eos caeteris praetulit, potior fuerit. Beneficia quidem ex aequo omnibus proponi fateor, a quibus scilicet nemo excluditur, si crediderit, ad quae omnes sub fidei conditione invitantur; parem esse in omnes amoris ac voluntatis in Deo gradum, nego. Ex quibus postremo liquet vanum & falsum esse quod accusatator ex futilibus istis praemissis tandem concludit, “consensum” esse (inter fratres & Arminianos) in universalitate miserationis (sic ille vocat Dei de hominibus servandis voluntatem) & “redemptionis.” Ita-ne vero? An ergo Deum ex mera voluntate certos quosdam homines elegisse ad fidem salutemque, vel sentiunt Arminiani, vel non sentiunt fratres? Atqui hoc & illi respuunt, & hi credunt, ac tenent; Ergo, ne hic quidem est inter eos consensus. De Christi sacrificio Exercitator, quod secundo loco ponit, non disputat foelicius. Neque enim vel Deum, vel Christum pari in omnes eos, pro quibus oblatum est, affectu atque amore fuisse fratres putant; quod putant tamen Arminiani.
Joannis Dallaei, Apologia pro synodis Alensonensi et Carentonensi. Tomus Secundus: In quo Gratia Dei uiversalis, quam Fridericus Spanhemius suis Exercitationibus oppugnavit, Theologorum Veterum cxx, & Recentiorum LXIII, auctoritate defenditur. (Amstelodami: Joannis Ravensteynii, 1655), 629–33.

Here is a ChatGPT, Copilot, and Google Translate combination:
The sixth error condemned by the Synod is that of those “who make use of the distinction between impetration and application in order to instill in the incautious and unskilled the opinion that, as far as God is concerned, He has willed to bestow the benefits acquired through Christ’s death equally upon all men; and that the reason why some rather than others become partakers of the remission of sins and eternal life depends on their free will, by which they apply to themselves the grace offered indifferently, rather than on the singular gift of mercy effectively operating in them, causing them to apply that grace to themselves rather than others. For these, while pretending to propose this distinction with a sound sense, are attempting to poison the people with the pernicious poison [venom] of Pelagianism.” The accuser [Spanheim] says that the brothers profess to be “free from this doctrine of those whom the Synod condemns.” I truly believe they are foreign to it, and to suspect otherwise about them than what they themselves profess is certainly contrary not only to Christian charity but to truth itself. The Exercitator [Spanheim] immediately adds, “and most of the Fathers of the Synod also disapproved of that distinction of impetration and application, inasmuch as its members differ in their objects, and the object of impetration of benefits is established as universal, and of application as particular;” and he orders us to consult the judgments of individual theologians, which have been published together with the Acts of the Synod in the other part of the volume. I respond that there were also theologians among them to whom this distinction was not so displeasing, as is evident from their judgments included in the same volume. However, what we seek here is not what individuals thought but what all collectively decreed. And what they collectively decreed is what we recently recited—nothing else. Even if we consider the judgments of individuals, although they differed among themselves in this part, they did not forbid others to tolerate them, and it was enough that they agreed on this one article approved by all; it is something we follow as a clear example of excellent moderation, so that brothers, even if they feel differently about this distinction and others of the same kind, we bear with mutual charity; nor if many agree on one opinion, should we despise others because they are fewer, and compel them to our words by any means necessary. As for the Exercitator’s subsequent attempt to compare the brothers’ opinion with Arminian doctrines and claim that there is some agreement between them in certain points, I respond that, since there is no agreement in what the Synod rejected, the whole matter is irrelevant and serves more as an apology for the Arminians than as a charge against the brothers. Therefore, we set aside other matters and consider only what the Synod condemned. Among these is what the Exercitator first mentions: “that, as far as God is concerned, He willed the benefits acquired through Christ’s death to be common to all men equally.” If he understands this in the sense in which it is stated by the Arminians and rejected by the Synod—namely, that in terms of antecedent will, God equally wills “all men to be saved” and has embraced no one with greater love than another—I deny that this can be attributed to the brothers without horrendous and monstrous slander. The brothers have clearly and repeatedly testified, not once but very often and everywhere, that they believe God, out of all those men whom He first regarded as equally corrupt and lost, has, by His mere will, chosen some over others in the following moment of eternity and decreed to grant them special grace, which would certainly lead to salvation. The brothers, however, must be beasts, not men, if they confess that God loved some with special and singular love over others and then said that God loved all mortals equally and wished them to be saved. Nor is there any reason for the accuser to think he has demonstrated it. He never did, and he never will. Nor are they brothers by the grace of God who teach such foolish and absurd things at the same time. If any of them once said that God willed all men equally to be saved, they meant it only concerning that first moment of divine love, about which I have spoken, when fallen men first appeared before Him. But concerning later moments, far be it from them to have said, thought, or even dreamed such a thing. And if anyone has said that Christ “died equally for all,” he meant that there is no one for whom He did not die—which is a sense in which even the Exercitator, when it suits him, acknowledges the adverb “equally” is sometimes used. He did not mean that Christ died for all with the same affection and will. As for the decree of election being posterior to the decree of redemption, this indeed results in the fact that, in the first moment of divine benevolence toward men (as I have said), a greater love had not yet appeared for the elect than for others; but it does not follow that in the subsequent moment, when He preferred them above others, this love was not greater. I acknowledge that the benefits are offered equally to all, so that no one is excluded if he believes, and all are invited under the condition of faith. But I deny that there is an equal degree of love and will in God toward all. From this, it finally becomes clear that the accuser’s ultimate conclusion, drawn from such flimsy premises—namely, that there is “agreement” between the brothers and the Arminians concerning the universality of God’s mercy (which he calls God’s will to save men) and “redemption”—is vain and false. Is it really so? Do the Arminians hold, or do the brothers deny, that God, by His mere will, has chosen certain individuals for faith and salvation? On the contrary, the Arminians reject this, while the brothers believe and hold it. Therefore, there is no agreement between them on this point either. As for the sacrifice of Christ, which the Exercitator discusses in the second place, he does so no more successfully. For the brothers do not believe that either God or Christ had the same affection and love toward all for whom the sacrifice was offered—whereas the Arminians do believe this.
Original Source 2:

Drost, in Specimen 25, wrote:
Non miramur synodum Alenconensem imprimis Amyraldum rogasse, quid significaret illud: “Christum mortuum esse aequaliter pro omnibus” 1). Hoc autem Amyraldus et Testardus ita explicuere 2): Christus mortuus est pro omnibus sufficienter, pro electis vero tantum efficaciter. Christus voluit, ut crucis suae sacrificium abundantissime sufficeret ad totius mundi peccata expianda. Efficacitatis vero et fructus illius mortis electi tantum participes fiunt.” Hac explicatione contenta rogavit tamen synodus, ut hacce formula discendi uti nollent, quae aliis lapis offensionis esse posset; idem de aliis formulis quibusdam rogavit; de ipsius autem systematis et doctrinae orthodoxia non dubitavit, Amyraldumque igitur et Testardum, ut supra jam vidimus, honorifice dimisit.
Arent Dionysiuszoon Drost, Specimen Ethico-Theologicum de Moyse Amyraldo, ethices christianae doctore, quod annuente summo numine […] (Amstelodami: apud Fratret Koster, 1859), 25.

Copilot translation of Drost:
We do not wonder that the Alençon Synod especially asked Amyrald what he meant by saying: “Christ died equally for all.” This Amyrald and Testard explained in this way: “Christ died sufficiently for all, but effectively only for the elect. Christ wanted the sacrifice of his cross to be abundantly sufficient to atone for the sins of the whole world. However, the efficacy and fruit of that death are only shared by the elect.” Content with this explanation, the synod nevertheless asked them to avoid using this phrase, which might be a stumbling block for others; similarly, they asked to avoid certain other expressions. However, the synod did not doubt the orthodoxy of their system and doctrine, and therefore, as we have seen above, they honorably dismissed Amyrald and Testard.
ChatGPT translation of Drost:
We are not surprised that the Synod of Alençon first asked Amyraldus what was meant by the phrase: “Christ died equally for all” (1). However, Amyraldus and Testardus explained it as follows (2): Christ died sufficiently for all, but effectively only for the elect. Christ willed that the sacrifice of His cross would be abundantly sufficient to atone for the sins of the entire world. As for the efficacy and the fruits of that death, only the elect become partakers of them.” Though content with this explanation, the synod requested that they would not use this formula for teaching, as it could be a stumbling block to others. The synod made the same request concerning some other formulas. However, it did not doubt the orthodoxy of the system and doctrine, and therefore, as we have already seen, the synod dismissed Amyraldus and Testardus with honor.
Original Source 3:

Amyraut, in De Grat. 222–23, wrote:
Tertium denique quod Vir doctus ait, illud est. “Repetit, inquit,” nobis “etiam Amyraldus ista locutione paruin caute dogma suum, Deum aequali amore in homines ferri.” Atque ad eam rem citat locum e Tractatus de Praedestinatione, & decretum Patrum Alenconiensium. At vehementer errat cum putat φιλανθροπιαν illam communem suisse a Patribus Alenconiensibus reiectam, cum hoc a me postularunt ut ne discerem Christum esse aequaliter pro omnibus mortuum. Illud enim aequaliter duo significat. Nimirum rei ipsius communitatem indifferentem denotat; ut in illis Ciceronis verbis de Clodio; “Quanquam haec quidem iam tolerabilia videbantur, etsi aequaliter in Rempublicam, in priuatos, in longinquos, in propinquos, in alienos, in suos irruebat.” Id enim nihil aluid sibi vult, nisi hominis istius surorem adeo late perugatum esse in omnes, ut eius nemo suerit expers omnino. Deinde significat item rei vel causae ipsius vehementiam aequabilem, atque similem in omnibus; ut siquis dicat omnes electos suisse aequaliter dilectos a Deo ab aeterno. Quum igitur Christum pro omnibus aequaliter esse mortuum, dici possit priore sensu, posteriore minime, (alia est enim amoris vehementia quae Deum eo impulit ut vellet Filium tradere ad mortem pro electis, quam pro caeteris hominibus) Patres illi non existimarunt e re esse, ut vel priore illo sensu diceretur, ne quis qui in calumniam pronus esset, id acciperet quasi dictum posteriore. Rursus, mortem Christi pro omnibus aequaliter oppertitam esse, dupliciter dici potest. Vel enim id dicitur respectu modi conditionis, iuxta quem Christi mors ad omnes pertinet sub fidei conditione; vel dicitur respectu modi absoluti, secundum quem Christi mors pertinet ad unos eos qui actu credunt. Priore sensu verum est Christum esse mortuum aequaliter pro omnibus; posteriore, falsum. Ne quis igitur item eorum qui ex ea locutione occasionem arripuerant obtrectandi doctrinae de Gratia Universali, denuo in eum scopulum inueherentur, Synodus pro sapientia sua existimauit esse satius, si abstineretur ab omnibus ab eo verbo, ne vero sensu enuntiatum, mala interpretatione in sequiorem inflecteretur. Verum de his pluribus alias. Nunc nobis sufficit ostendisse, amorem illum peculiarem, quo Deus electos suos complexus est, ut in salute donanda eorum singularem quandam rationem haberet, non prohibuisse quominus in eo negotio reliquos mortales communi φιλανθροπια prosequeretur.
Mose Amyraldo, Specimen animadversionum in Exercitationes de gratia universali (Salmurii: apud Joh. Lesnerium, 1648), 222–23; italics original.

ChatGPT translation:
Finally, the third point that the learned man makes is this. “Amyraldus,” he says, “has somewhat incautiously repeated his doctrine in this phrase, namely, that God is carried toward men with equal love.” And to support this claim, he cites a passage from the Treatise on Predestination and the decree of the Fathers of Alençon. But he is gravely mistaken in thinking that the Fathers of Alençon rejected this common philanthropia, for what they actually required of me was that I should not say that Christ died equally for all.

For the word equally has two meanings. First, it denotes an indifferent universality of the thing itself, as in these words of Cicero regarding Clodius [Orations: Pro Milone (In Defence of Titus Annius Milo)]: “Although these things now seemed tolerable, yet he rushed equally upon the Republic, upon private individuals, upon those far and near, upon strangers and his own” [76. “…although he attacked with equal fury the republic, and private individuals, and men who were at a distance, and men who were near, people who had no connection with him, and his own relations;…,” trans. C. D. Yonge; Quamquam haec quidem iam tolerabilia videbantur, etsi aequabiliter in rem publicam, in privatos, in longinquos, in propinquos, in alienos, in suos inruebat]. This means nothing other than that the madness of that man had spread so widely to all that no one was entirely untouched by it.

Second, equally can also signify the uniform and similar intensity of the thing or cause in all cases. For instance, one might say that all the elect were equally loved by God from eternity. Since, then, it may be said that Christ died equally for all in the first sense but not in the second—because the intensity of the love that moved God to deliver His Son to death for the elect is different from that for the rest of mankind—the Fathers did not think it advisable to use the phrase even in the first sense, lest someone inclined to misinterpretation should take it as if it were meant in the second sense.

Again, the statement that Christ underwent death equally for all can be understood in two ways. Either it is said in reference to the conditional mode, according to which Christ’s death pertains to all under the condition of faith, or it is said in an absolute mode, according to which Christ’s death pertains only to those who actually believe. In the first sense, it is true that Christ died equally for all; in the second, it is false.

Therefore, lest any of those who had previously seized upon this phrase as an opportunity to oppose the doctrine of Universal Grace should again stumble over it, the Synod, in its wisdom, judged it better to avoid the use of this term altogether, so that a statement made in a true sense might not, through a faulty interpretation, be twisted into a false one.

But of these matters, more shall be said on another occasion. For now, it suffices for us to have shown that the particular love by which God has embraced His elect, so that He has a special regard for them in granting salvation, has not prevented Him from pursuing the rest of mankind in this matter with common philanthropia.