John Calvin (1509–1564) on Hosea 11:4

The Prophet states, first, that this people had not been severely dealt with, as either slaves, or oxen, or asses, are wont to be treated. He had said before, that the people of Israel were like a heifer, which shakes off the yoke, and in wantonness loves only the treading of corn. But though the perverseness of the people was so great, yet God shows here that he had not used extreme rigour: I have drawn him, he says, with human cords and lovely bands. By the cords of man, he means humane government. “I have not,” he says, “treated you as slaves, but dealt with you as with children; and I have not regarded you as cattle, I have not driven you into a stall; but I have only drawn you with lovely bands.” The sum of the whole is, that the government which God had laid on the people was a certain and singular token of his paternal favour, so that the people could not complain of too much rigour, as if God had considered their disposition, and had used a hard wedge (as the common proverb is) for a hard knot; for if God had dealt thus with the people, they could have objected, and said, that they had not been kindly drawn by him, and that it was no wonder if they did not obey, since they had been so roughly treated. “But there is no ground for them,” the Lord says, “to allege that I have used severity: for I could not have dealt more kindly with them, I have drawn them with human cords; I have not otherwise governed them than as a father his own children; I have been bountiful towards them. I indeed wished to do them good, and, as it was right, required obedience from them. I have at the same time laid on them a yoke, not servile, nor such as is [393] wont to be laid on brute animals; but I was content with paternal discipline.” Since then such kindness had no influence over them, is it not right to conclude that their wickedness is irreclaimable and extreme?

He then adds, I have been to them like those who raise up the yoke upon the cheeks. “I have not laden you,” he says, “with too heavy burdens, as oxen and other beasts are wont to be burdened; but I have raised up the yoke upon the cheeks. I have chosen rather to bear the yoke myself, and to ease these ungodly and wicked men of their burden.” And God does not in vain allege this, for we know that when he uses his power, and vindicates his authority, he does this not to burden the people, as earthly kings are wont to do; but he bears the burden which he lays on men. It is no wonder then that he says now, that he had lifted the yoke upon the cheeks of his people, like one who wishes not to burden his ox, but bears up the yoke himself with his own hands, lest the ox should faint through weariness.

He afterwards adds, And I have made them to eat in quietness, or, “I have brought meat to them.” Some think the verb אוכיל, aukil, to be in the future tense, and that אוכיל, aukil, is put for אאכיל; aakil; that is, I will cause them to eat; and that the future is to be resolved into the past: and it is certain that the word אט; ath, means tranquil sometimes. Then it will be, “I have caused them quietly to eat.” But another exposition is more commonly received; as the word אט, ath, is derived from נטה, nathe, to raise, it is the same as though the Prophet had said, that meat had been brought to them.

God then does here in various ways enhance the ingratitude and wickedness of the people, because they had not acknowledged his paternal kindness, when he had himself so kindly set forth his favour before their eyes; I have, he says, extended meat to them; that is, “I have not thrown it on the ground, nor placed it too high for them; they have not toiled in getting it; but I have, as it were, brought it with mine own hand and set it before them, that they might eat without [394] any trouble.” In short, God declares that he had tried in every way to find out, whether there was any meekness or docility in the people of Israel, and that he had ill bestowed all his blessings; for this people were blind to favours so kind, to such as clearly proved, that God had in every way showed himself to be a Father.

John Calvin, “Commentaries on the Twelve Minor Prophets. Volume 1: Hosea,” trans. John Owen, in Calvin’s Commentaries, 22 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996), 13:392–94; Hos 11:4.

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Henry Boynton Smith (1815–1877) on the Term “Decree”

§ 2. Of the Terms used to denote the Doctrine.

The term purpose is equivalent to the term decrees. The word decree is in some respects unfortunate, because misunderstood so frequently. Decree is used ordinarily, and in Scripture, in the sense of edict or law, that which God commands. But the theological usage takes the word not in the sense of command or approbation on God’s part, but of what He permits or determines to be done as a whole plan. It does not imply moral approval on the side of God, or fate or necessity on the side of the act, but it does imply certainty. Of the general decree of God, predestination is a part. The decree of God embraces all that occurs; predestination is technically a part of the divine decree, and is used of that which relates to moral beings, and especially to their final condition (although predestination really applies to every event of their history as well as to their final destiny). As thus used it implies that man’s final state is involved in God’s plan, yet never without respect to what has gone before, rather as being the sum of what has gone before. Predestination contains the end only as containing the sum total of what has gone before.

Henry Boynton Smith, System of Christian Theology (New York A.C. Armstrong, 1884), 117.

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Edward Polhill (1622–1694) Distinguishing Between the Decrees of God as Related to His General Promise

3. As to the third act of reprobation, the thing decreed is eternal damnation; hence reprobates are said to be made for the day of evil. Neither can any man doubt that there is such a decree; for God doth actually condemn them in time, and both reason tells us, that whatsoever God doth, even in his judgments, he doth it volent; and scripture tells us, that whatsoever he doth, he doth it according to the counsel of his own will; wherefore both assure us that there is such a decree. But you will say, doth not that promise [whosoever believeth shall be saved] both import God’s will, and extend even to reprobates, and how then can God decree their damnation? Which way can both these wills stand together in the heart of God? I answer: It is true that the promise doth both import God’s will, and extend to reprobates; nevertheless it very well consists with the decree of damnation, and this will appear by a double distinction.

1. Let us distinguish the decrees of God: some of them are merely productive of truths, others are definitive of things which shall actually exist. The first are accomplished in connexions, the last in events. To clear it by scripture instances: the decree, that David should be king of Israel, was definitive of a thing; but the decree, that if Saul obeyed, his kingdom should have continued, (1 Sam. 13:13,) is but productive of a truth. The decree that David should not be delivered up by the men of Keilah, was definitive of a thing; but the decree, that if he had staid there they would have delivered him up, (1 Sam. 23:12,) was but productive of a truth. The decree, that Jerusalem should be burnt with fire, was definitive of a thing; but the decree, that if Zedekiah did go forth to the king of Babylon it should not be burnt, (Jer. 38:17,) was but productive of a truth. Moreover, that there are decrees definitive of things, is proved by the events; that there are decrees productive of truths, is proved by the connexions; if there be no such connexions, how is the Scripture verified? but if there be, how are these things connected? There is no natural connexion between Saul’s obedience and his crown; David’s stay, and the Keilites treachery; Zedekiah’s out-going, and Jerusalem’s firing: wherefore these connexions do flow out of God’s decrees as productive of truths. Now, to apply this distinction to our present purpose: The decree of damning the reprobate for final sin is definitive of a thing; but the decree imported in the general promise, is but productive of a truth, viz., That there is an universal connexion between faith and salvation; such a connexion, that reprobates themselves, if believers, should be saved. Now these two decrees may very well stand together; for decrees definitive of events, contradict not decrees productive of truths, unless the event in the one decree contradict the truth in the other. Wherefore if (which is not) there were a decree of damning reprobates, whether they did believe or not, it could not stand with the general promise; for the event of that decree would contradict the truth of the promise. But the decree (such as indeed it is) of damning reprobates for final sin, may well consist with the general promise; for the event of that decree no way crosses the truth of the promise. Reprobates are damned for final sin, that is the event of one decree; and reprobates, if believers, shall be saved; that is the truth of another: both which may well consist together.

2. Let us distinguish the objects of these decrees; the objects stand not under the same qualifications as to both of them. The decree of salvation upon gospel terms respects men as lapsed sinners; but the decree of everlasting damnation respects them as final sinners; and so there is no inconsistency between them.

Thus much, by way of answer to the objection: yet withal, before I pass on to the next thing, suffer me a little to stand and adore the stupendous abyss of the divine decrees. The elect arrive at heaven, yet by the way see hell flaming in the threatening: the reprobate sink to hell, yet by the way see heaven opening in the promise. The elect cannot live and die in sin, but they will be sub gladio; the reprobates cannot repent and return, but they will be sub corona. Tremble, work and watch, O saints, for the Holy One thunders out from heaven in that sacred sentence, “If you live after the flesh you shall die.” Repent, return and believe, O sinners! for the divine philanthropy woos you in those real undissembled offers of mercy, “Whosoever believes shall be saved; Whosoever forsakes his sins shall find mercy.” Here, O here, is πολυποίκιλος σοφία, the manifold wisdom of God; a fit reserve for the apocalypse of the judgment day, whose clear light will display these wonderful consistencies before men and angels.

Edward Polhill, “The Divine Will Considered in Its Eternal Decrees,” in The Works of Edward Polhill (London: Thomas Ward and Co., 1844), 131–32.

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