On Penal Substitution

I was interacting with a guy on Gene Cook’s blog who thought that some who maintain that Christ died for the entire human race must also deny penal substitution by implication. Perhaps some of my readers may find my response helpful.

The following material is from one of my posts to him:

Actually, I think it would be good for you to reflect on the notion of a “Penal Substitution.” Those two words are significant. First of all, let me say that Christ’s work was more than a penal substitution, but it was not less than a penal substitution. This is somewhat beside the point, but I think it’s useful for us to reflect on other achievements of Christ’s cross-work than merely emphasizing the penal substitutionary nature of it. I think you would agree with me that no single atonement view (whether the governmental, moral example, or Christus Victor view, etc.) fully captures the totality of what Christ did. Nevertheless, his work was not less than penal and not less than substitutionary. So, let’s reflect on those two notions.

Second, his work was a penal satisfaction, and not a commercial transaction. Therefore, the focus is on the person suffering and not the thing “paid.” Here’s what I mean. In a commercial transaction, the focus is on the thing paid. For instance, let’s say a man named Bilbo eats at a restaurant and his bill comes to 40 dollars. Frodo hears that Bilbo does not have the money to pay and decides to step in and pay the bill. The restaurant will therefore not pursue Bilbo for the 40 dollars. The thing has been paid. Bilbo merely comes to a mental awakening to the fact that his bill has been paid by another (Frodo) and is thankful. Whether he’s thankful and acknowledges it or not, no one pursues him for the money. It’s paid in full and there are no further obligations.

A penal payment, on the other hand, is not like this. Consider the following scenario: Frodo is put in jail for committing a certain crime X for 10 years. Frodo is really innocent but suffers in jail for the full 10 years. Afterwards, it is discovered that Bilbo has really committed crime X and not Frodo. Even though Frodo has already suffered for 10 years, the state captures Bilbo and makes him suffer the same 10 years in jail, despite the fact that Frodo has already suffered the amount of time required. Can you see the difference? The focus in this penal transaction is on the person paying and not the thing paid.

Next, or thirdly, let’s consider the substitutionary aspect of Christ’s work. Let’s suppose that Bilbo commits crime X but denies it, and yet Judge Gandalf rightly finds him guilty, but Frodo loves Bilbo and agrees to suffer for crime X. Judge Gandalf is under no obligation to accept Frodo’s willingness to suffer in his stead, but graciously allows the arrangement under some conditions. Judge Gandalf allows Frodo to suffer for X but will not release Bilbo from his penal obligations unless he confesses to committing crime X and joins Aragorn’s army within a span of time. Even though Frodo has suffered for crime X in his innocence, Bilbo may still be charged with the crime and not be released unless he fulfills the judges aforementioned conditions. There is no injustice if Bilbo suffers for crime X even though Frodo has suffered for it, since it’s not the same person “paying twice.” Injustice would occur if the same person suffered twice for the same crime, but there is no injustice if person 1 (Frodo) suffers for person 2 (Bilbo) and person 2 (Bilbo) remains under penal obligations (i.e., remains under penal wrath, so to speak) unless he fulfills certain conditions.

There is graciousness in (1) the judge even allowing for a substitute and in (2) allowing the suffering of Frodo to be credited to Bilbo when the conditions are met. Both acts are gracious since it’s a penal substitution. If it was a commercial transaction, Bilbo, whether he’s thankful or not, could claim that it’s his right to be released since the thing has already been paid by Frodo.

However, this commercial presentation is not what we find in scripture regarding Christ’s work. We find that it’s penal (not commercial) and that it’s substitutionary (entirely an act of grace with no obligation to release upon the thing being suffered). If Christ suffers for someone and yet that same person suffers for their own sins, there is no “double jeopardy.” It’s not the same person suffering twice, but two different people suffering. God has added conditions to His gracious scheme in order for the guilty party to be released from their penal obligations. If one does not meet the conditions (i.e., repent and believe), then they are still held accountable to suffer for their crime (hell).

Thus, I (as one who maintains that Christ suffered for the entire human race) really hold to a penal substitution and not a commercial transactionalism. Even though Christ’s work is analogically compared to various commercial transactions in scripture for the sake of illustration, it is not an univocal comparison. Christ’s satisfaction is not literally commercial, but penal in nature. If one pushes the commercial analogies so far as to make them literal, then I believe that one will arrive at a pound for pound (or a so-much-suffering-for-so-much-sin) viewpoint, such that Christ was wounded measurably for the amount of the elect’s sins alone which were transferred to him. This view has been called “Equivalentism” historically.

Here’s how one hyper-Calvinist named John Stevens put his view:

Therefore if we suppose anyone to stand in the place of one lost sinner, we are not in so doing, to imagine, that such a substitute must, on that account, suffer as much as though he represented all lost sinners. The greater the guilt, the greater the punishment: the greater the number of sinners, the greater the measure of guilt. It must therefore follow that, if more sinners had been saved, the sorrows of the Saviour must have been proportionally increased.

Cited in Robert W. Oliver’s History of the English Calvinistic Baptists 1771–1892 (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 2006), 209.

John Owen even spoke of a certain “weight and pressure” in Christ’s sufferings (i.e., his suffering was proportioned to the amount of the elect’s sins “imputed” to him). This shows that he was taking his commercialistic categories seriously. I used to hold to a form of Equivalentism since I used to conceive of Christ’s work as a commercial transfer rather than a penal imputation.

I would also argue that if only the sins of the elect were imputed to Christ, then his suffering is not sufficient for all. And, if it is not really sufficient for all, then the gospel offer is insincere, or not well-meant. God says to the unbeliever through the external gospel proclamation that, “if you believe, you will be saved.” Such a conditional promise presupposes an ample sufficiency in Christ’s satisfaction for the covering of the sins of all that hear the external call, whether elect or not, even as, by analogy, the lifted up serpent in the wilderness was able to heal all those bitten, if they would only but look through faith to the sincere promise of God.

God’s name is besmirched if his gospel offer is made to be insincere by the theological systems of men that undercut Christ’s sufficient suffering. That’s no small charge.