Lawrence Proctor on Amyraut’s “Equally for All”

78. In this way, Amyraut could say that Christ died equally for all. In the statement that Christ died pro omnibus equiliter (explained Daillé, Apologiae ii 632), the theologians of Saumur meant the adverb to signify that there is none for whom Christ did not die; it does not mean that all are equal in affection or will of God in giving Christ to die. Cf. Drost, Specimen 25: Amyraut and Testard explained the death of Christ for all equally in terms of sufficiency . . . . Amyraut explained the two uses of the adverb in De Grat (Gen) 223.

Lawrence Proctor, The Theology of Moïse Amyraut Considered as a Reaction Against Seventeenth-Century Calvinism (PhD diss., University of Leeds, 1952), 376n78. Long ago, Aquinas said, “Christ’s merit bears the same relation to all men in point of sufficiency, not in point of efficacy [quod meritum Christi quantum ad sufficientiam aequaliter se habet ad omnes, non autem quantum ad efficaciam].”—Thomas Aquinas, QDeVer.Q29.A7.Rep4. John Stalham (d. 1681), a high Calvinist, described Paul Testard’s view this way: “he [Testard] maintaineth that Christ died for all, and every singular, but he will not assert, that he died æque or alike for every one; Christ died (he saith) for all, to prepare an apt and sufficient remedy, and for the elect, to apply to them, what he had prepared for all.” See also Donald Davis Grohman on Testard’s view, in The Genevan Reactions to the Saumur Doctrine of Hypothetical Universalism: 1635–1685 (PhD diss., Knox College, Toronto, 1971), 46.

Original Source 1:

Daille, in Apologiae ii 629–33, wrote:

Sextus a Synodo damnatus error eorum est, “qui impetrationis & applicationis distinctionem usurpant, ut incautis & imperitis hanc opinionem instillent, Deum quantum ad se attinet, omnibus hominibus ex aequo ea beneficia voluisse conferre, quae per mortem Christi acquirumtur; Quod autem quidam prae aliis participes fiant remissionis peccatorum, & vitae aeternae, discrimen illud pendere ex libero eorum abritrio, se ad gratiam indifferenter oblatam applicante, non autem ex singulari misericordiae dono efficaciter in illis operante, ut prae aliis gratiam illam sibi applicent. Nam isti dum simulant se distinctionem hanc sano sensu proponere, populo permiciosum Pelagianismi venenum conantur propinare.” Accusator ait fratres profiteri se ab hoc istorum, quos Synodus damnat, “dogmate alienos esse.” Ego vere alienos esse credo; & aliud de iis suspicari, quam quod ipsi profitentur, non a charitate modo Christiana, sed & a veritate ipsa alienum esse certo scio. Mox addit Exercitator, “plaerisque Synodi Patribus illam impetrationis & applicationis distinctionem eatenus quoque displicuisse, quatenus ejus membra dispescuntur objectis, & impetrationis beneficiorum objectum statuitur universale, applicationis particulare;” & no jubet consulere judicia singulorum Theologorum, quae una cum Actis Synodi in altera voluminis parte publicata sunt. Ego respondeo fuisse quoque ex illis Theologis, quibus haec distinctio eatenus non displiceret; ut ex eorum quoque judiciis eidem volumini insertis liquet. Caeterum non hic quid singuli senserint, sed quid universi decreverint, quaerimus. Id autem universit decreverunt, quod nuper recitavimus, non aluid. Quod singulorum judicia spectemus, cum ea tametsi hac in parte inter se diversa, minime prohibuerint, quo minus alii alios ferrent, fatisque haberent, quod consentirent in hoc uno ab universis probato articulo; est quod sequamur praeclarum egregiae moderationis exemplum, ut fratres alii alios etiam aliter de hac distinctione, & aliis ejusdem generis sentientes, mutua charitate feramus; neu si plures in unam sententiam conveniamus, alios ideo, quod pauciores sint, spernendos, & in nostra verba perfas, nefasque adigendos putemus. Quod Exercitator deinceps fratrum sententiam cum Arminianorum dictatis contendit, vultque aliquem inter eos in quibusdam consensum esse; respondeo dum is in iis, quae sunt a Synodo rejecta, nullus sit, id totum perinde esse, & ad Arminianorum apologiam potius, quam ad fratrum criminationem pertinere. Itaque caetera quidem mittimus, ea vero expendemus, quae sunt a Synodo damnata; quale illud est quod primo statim loco Exercitator memorat, “Deum quantum ad se attinet hominbus ex aequo ea beneficia voluisse communia esse, quae per mortem Christi acquiruntur.” Id vero si eo sensu intelligit, quo & ab Arminianis dicitur, & a Synodo rejicitur, ut scilicet omnibus antecedentis voluntatis momentis Deus ex aequo “omnes homines salvari” velit, nulloque alios prae aliis amore complexus fuerit; nego id fratribus sine horrenda & immani sycophantia tribui posse; qui clare diserteque & nunc antehac non semel, sed saepissime, passimque testati sunt, se credere Deum ex omnibus illis hominibus, quos in se aequiliter corruptos, perditosque primo (ut si dicam) momento respexit, dilexitque, quosdam sequente aeternitatis momento ab aliis mera voluntate elegisse, & peculiari gratia, quam certo sequutura esset salus, donare decrevisse. Fratres vero, non homines, sed belluas esse necesse fuerit, si quos peculiari singularique amore prae caeteris a Deo dilectos fatentur, Deum cum his caeteros omnes mortales ex aequo amasse, ac salvos fieri voluisse dixerint. Neque est quod accusator sese id demonstratum dedisse putet. Numquam fecit, numquam faciet. Neque ii Dei gratia sunt fratres, qui tam stulta, tamve ασυςατα simul doceant. Si qui ex iis olim dixerunt Deum ex aequo voluisse homines omnes servari, id de primo illo dilectionis divinae momento, de quo monui, dixerunt, quo primum lapsi homines ei obversabantur. De sequentibus, absit ut dixerint, ut cogitarint, ut vel unquam somniaverint. Et si quis Christum “pro omnibus aequaliter mortuum” dixit, is intellexit neminem esse, pro quo non sit mortuus; quo sensu interdum sumi adverbium illud aequaliter ipse Exercitator, cum libet, notat; non significavit pari in omnes affectu, pari in omnes Dei voluntate Christum esse mortuum. Quod vero decretum electionis posterius censetur decreto redemptionis, eo quidem efficitur, ut in primo (ut dixi) divinae in homines benevolentiae momento, nondum potior eluxerit in electos, quam in caeteros amor; non efficitur, ut ne in sequenti quidem momento, quo eos caeteris praetulit, potior fuerit. Beneficia quidem ex aequo omnibus proponi fateor, a quibus scilicet nemo excluditur, si crediderit, ad quae omnes sub fidei conditione invitantur; parem esse in omnes amoris ac voluntatis in Deo gradum, nego. Ex quibus postremo liquet vanum & falsum esse quod accusatator ex futilibus istis praemissis tandem concludit, “consensum” esse (inter fratres & Arminianos) in universalitate miserationis (sic ille vocat Dei de hominibus servandis voluntatem) & “redemptionis.” Ita-ne vero? An ergo Deum ex mera voluntate certos quosdam homines elegisse ad fidem salutemque, vel sentiunt Arminiani, vel non sentiunt fratres? Atqui hoc & illi respuunt, & hi credunt, ac tenent; Ergo, ne hic quidem est inter eos consensus. De Christi sacrificio Exercitator, quod secundo loco ponit, non disputat foelicius. Neque enim vel Deum, vel Christum pari in omnes eos, pro quibus oblatum est, affectu atque amore fuisse fratres putant; quod putant tamen Arminiani.

Joannis Dallaei, Apologia pro synodis Alensonensi et Carentonensi. Tomus Secundus: In quo Gratia Dei uiversalis, quam Fridericus Spanhemius suis Exercitationibus oppugnavit, Theologorum Veterum cxx, & Recentiorum LXIII, auctoritate defenditur. (Amstelodami: Joannis Ravensteynii, 1655), 629–33.

Here is a ChatGPT, Copilot, and Google Translate combination:

The sixth error condemned by the Synod is that of those “who make use of the distinction between impetration and application in order to instill in the incautious and unskilled the opinion that, as far as God is concerned, He has willed to bestow the benefits acquired through Christ’s death equally upon all men; and that the reason why some rather than others become partakers of the remission of sins and eternal life depends on their free will, by which they apply to themselves the grace offered indifferently, rather than on the singular gift of mercy effectively operating in them, causing them to apply that grace to themselves rather than others. For these, while pretending to propose this distinction with a sound sense, are attempting to poison the people with the pernicious poison [venom] of Pelagianism.” The accuser [Spanheim] says that the brothers profess to be “free from this doctrine of those whom the Synod condemns.” I truly believe they are foreign to it, and to suspect otherwise about them than what they themselves profess is certainly contrary not only to Christian charity but to truth itself. The Exercitator [Spanheim] immediately adds, “and most of the Fathers of the Synod also disapproved of that distinction of impetration and application, inasmuch as its members differ in their objects, and the object of impetration of benefits is established as universal, and of application as particular;” and he orders us to consult the judgments of individual theologians, which have been published together with the Acts of the Synod in the other part of the volume. I respond that there were also theologians among them to whom this distinction was not so displeasing, as is evident from their judgments included in the same volume. However, what we seek here is not what individuals thought but what all collectively decreed. And what they collectively decreed is what we recently recited—nothing else. Even if we consider the judgments of individuals, although they differed among themselves in this part, they did not forbid others to tolerate them, and it was enough that they agreed on this one article approved by all; it is something we follow as a clear example of excellent moderation, so that brothers, even if they feel differently about this distinction and others of the same kind, we bear with mutual charity; nor if many agree on one opinion, should we despise others because they are fewer, and compel them to our words by any means necessary. As for the Exercitator’s subsequent attempt to compare the brothers’ opinion with Arminian doctrines and claim that there is some agreement between them in certain points, I respond that, since there is no agreement in what the Synod rejected, the whole matter is irrelevant and serves more as an apology for the Arminians than as a charge against the brothers. Therefore, we set aside other matters and consider only what the Synod condemned. Among these is what the Exercitator first mentions: “that, as far as God is concerned, He willed the benefits acquired through Christ’s death to be common to all men equally.” If he understands this in the sense in which it is stated by the Arminians and rejected by the Synod—namely, that in terms of antecedent will, God equally wills “all men to be saved” and has embraced no one with greater love than another—I deny that this can be attributed to the brothers without horrendous and monstrous slander. The brothers have clearly and repeatedly testified, not once but very often and everywhere, that they believe God, out of all those men whom He first regarded as equally corrupt and lost, has, by His mere will, chosen some over others in the following moment of eternity and decreed to grant them special grace, which would certainly lead to salvation. The brothers, however, must be beasts, not men, if they confess that God loved some with special and singular love over others and then said that God loved all mortals equally and wished them to be saved. Nor is there any reason for the accuser to think he has demonstrated it. He never did, and he never will. Nor are they brothers by the grace of God who teach such foolish and absurd things at the same time. If any of them once said that God willed all men equally to be saved, they meant it only concerning that first moment of divine love, about which I have spoken, when fallen men first appeared before Him. But concerning later moments, far be it from them to have said, thought, or even dreamed such a thing. And if anyone has said that Christ “died equally for all,” he meant that there is no one for whom He did not die—which is a sense in which even the Exercitator, when it suits him, acknowledges the adverb “equally” is sometimes used. He did not mean that Christ died for all with the same affection and will. As for the decree of election being posterior to the decree of redemption, this indeed results in the fact that, in the first moment of divine benevolence toward men (as I have said), a greater love had not yet appeared for the elect than for others; but it does not follow that in the subsequent moment, when He preferred them above others, this love was not greater. I acknowledge that the benefits are offered equally to all, so that no one is excluded if he believes, and all are invited under the condition of faith. But I deny that there is an equal degree of love and will in God toward all. From this, it finally becomes clear that the accuser’s ultimate conclusion, drawn from such flimsy premises—namely, that there is “agreement” between the brothers and the Arminians concerning the universality of God’s mercy (which he calls God’s will to save men) and “redemption”—is vain and false. Is it really so? Do the Arminians hold, or do the brothers deny, that God, by His mere will, has chosen certain individuals for faith and salvation? On the contrary, the Arminians reject this, while the brothers believe and hold it. Therefore, there is no agreement between them on this point either. As for the sacrifice of Christ, which the Exercitator discusses in the second place, he does so no more successfully. For the brothers do not believe that either God or Christ had the same affection and love toward all for whom the sacrifice was offered—whereas the Arminians do believe this.

Original Source 2:

Drost, in Specimen 25, wrote:

Non miramur synodum Alenconensem imprimis Amyraldum rogasse, quid significaret illud: “Christum mortuum esse aequaliter pro omnibus” 1). Hoc autem Amyraldus et Testardus ita explicuere 2): Christus mortuus est pro omnibus sufficienter, pro electis vero tantum efficaciter. Christus voluit, ut crucis suae sacrificium abundantissime sufficeret ad totius mundi peccata expianda. Efficacitatis vero et fructus illius mortis electi tantum participes fiunt.” Hac explicatione contenta rogavit tamen synodus, ut hacce formula discendi uti nollent, quae aliis lapis offensionis esse posset; idem de aliis formulis quibusdam rogavit; de ipsius autem systematis et doctrinae orthodoxia non dubitavit, Amyraldumque igitur et Testardum, ut supra jam vidimus, honorifice dimisit.

Arent Dionysiuszoon Drost, Specimen Ethico-Theologicum de Moyse Amyraldo, ethices christianae doctore, quod annuente summo numine […] (Amstelodami: apud Fratret Koster, 1859), 25.

Copilot translation of Drost:

We do not wonder that the Alençon Synod especially asked Amyrald what he meant by saying: “Christ died equally for all.” This Amyrald and Testard explained in this way: “Christ died sufficiently for all, but effectively only for the elect. Christ wanted the sacrifice of his cross to be abundantly sufficient to atone for the sins of the whole world. However, the efficacy and fruit of that death are only shared by the elect.” Content with this explanation, the synod nevertheless asked them to avoid using this phrase, which might be a stumbling block for others; similarly, they asked to avoid certain other expressions. However, the synod did not doubt the orthodoxy of their system and doctrine, and therefore, as we have seen above, they honorably dismissed Amyrald and Testard.

ChatGPT translation of Drost:

We are not surprised that the Synod of Alençon first asked Amyraldus what was meant by the phrase: “Christ died equally for all” (1). However, Amyraldus and Testardus explained it as follows (2): Christ died sufficiently for all, but effectively only for the elect. Christ willed that the sacrifice of His cross would be abundantly sufficient to atone for the sins of the entire world. As for the efficacy and the fruits of that death, only the elect become partakers of them.” Though content with this explanation, the synod requested that they would not use this formula for teaching, as it could be a stumbling block to others. The synod made the same request concerning some other formulas. However, it did not doubt the orthodoxy of the system and doctrine, and therefore, as we have already seen, the synod dismissed Amyraldus and Testardus with honor.

Original Source 3:

Amyraut, in De Grat. 222–23, wrote:

Tertium denique quod Vir doctus ait, illud est. “Repetit, inquit,” nobis “etiam Amyraldus ista locutione paruin caute dogma suum, Deum aequali amore in homines ferri.” Atque ad eam rem citat locum e Tractatus de Praedestinatione, & decretum Patrum Alenconiensium. At vehementer errat cum putat φιλανθροπιαν illam communem suisse a Patribus Alenconiensibus reiectam, cum hoc a me postularunt ut ne discerem Christum esse aequaliter pro omnibus mortuum. Illud enim aequaliter duo significat. Nimirum rei ipsius communitatem indifferentem denotat; ut in illis Ciceronis verbis de Clodio; “Quanquam haec quidem iam tolerabilia videbantur, etsi aequaliter in Rempublicam, in priuatos, in longinquos, in propinquos, in alienos, in suos irruebat.” Id enim nihil aluid sibi vult, nisi hominis istius surorem adeo late perugatum esse in omnes, ut eius nemo suerit expers omnino. Deinde significat item rei vel causae ipsius vehementiam aequabilem, atque similem in omnibus; ut siquis dicat omnes electos suisse aequaliter dilectos a Deo ab aeterno. Quum igitur Christum pro omnibus aequaliter esse mortuum, dici possit priore sensu, posteriore minime, (alia est enim amoris vehementia quae Deum eo impulit ut vellet Filium tradere ad mortem pro electis, quam pro caeteris hominibus) Patres illi non existimarunt e re esse, ut vel priore illo sensu diceretur, ne quis qui in calumniam pronus esset, id acciperet quasi dictum posteriore. Rursus, mortem Christi pro omnibus aequaliter oppertitam esse, dupliciter dici potest. Vel enim id dicitur respectu modi conditionis, iuxta quem Christi mors ad omnes pertinet sub fidei conditione; vel dicitur respectu modi absoluti, secundum quem Christi mors pertinet ad unos eos qui actu credunt. Priore sensu verum est Christum esse mortuum aequaliter pro omnibus; posteriore, falsum. Ne quis igitur item eorum qui ex ea locutione occasionem arripuerant obtrectandi doctrinae de Gratia Universali, denuo in eum scopulum inueherentur, Synodus pro sapientia sua existimauit esse satius, si abstineretur ab omnibus ab eo verbo, ne vero sensu enuntiatum, mala interpretatione in sequiorem inflecteretur. Verum de his pluribus alias. Nunc nobis sufficit ostendisse, amorem illum peculiarem, quo Deus electos suos complexus est, ut in salute donanda eorum singularem quandam rationem haberet, non prohibuisse quominus in eo negotio reliquos mortales communi φιλανθροπια prosequeretur.

Mose Amyraldo, Specimen animadversionum in Exercitationes de gratia universali (Salmurii: apud Joh. Lesnerium, 1648), 222–23; italics original.

ChatGPT translation:

Finally, the third point that the learned man makes is this. “Amyraldus,” he says, “has somewhat incautiously repeated his doctrine in this phrase, namely, that God is carried toward men with equal love.” And to support this claim, he cites a passage from the Treatise on Predestination and the decree of the Fathers of Alençon. But he is gravely mistaken in thinking that the Fathers of Alençon rejected this common philanthropia, for what they actually required of me was that I should not say that Christ died equally for all.

For the word equally has two meanings. First, it denotes an indifferent universality of the thing itself, as in these words of Cicero regarding Clodius [Orations: Pro Milone (In Defence of Titus Annius Milo)]: “Although these things now seemed tolerable, yet he rushed equally upon the Republic, upon private individuals, upon those far and near, upon strangers and his own” [76. “…although he attacked with equal fury the republic, and private individuals, and men who were at a distance, and men who were near, people who had no connection with him, and his own relations;…,” trans. C. D. Yonge; Quamquam haec quidem iam tolerabilia videbantur, etsi aequabiliter in rem publicam, in privatos, in longinquos, in propinquos, in alienos, in suos inruebat]. This means nothing other than that the madness of that man had spread so widely to all that no one was entirely untouched by it.

Second, equally can also signify the uniform and similar intensity of the thing or cause in all cases. For instance, one might say that all the elect were equally loved by God from eternity. Since, then, it may be said that Christ died equally for all in the first sense but not in the second—because the intensity of the love that moved God to deliver His Son to death for the elect is different from that for the rest of mankind—the Fathers did not think it advisable to use the phrase even in the first sense, lest someone inclined to misinterpretation should take it as if it were meant in the second sense.

Again, the statement that Christ underwent death equally for all can be understood in two ways. Either it is said in reference to the conditional mode, according to which Christ’s death pertains to all under the condition of faith, or it is said in an absolute mode, according to which Christ’s death pertains only to those who actually believe. In the first sense, it is true that Christ died equally for all; in the second, it is false.

Therefore, lest any of those who had previously seized upon this phrase as an opportunity to oppose the doctrine of Universal Grace should again stumble over it, the Synod, in its wisdom, judged it better to avoid the use of this term altogether, so that a statement made in a true sense might not, through a faulty interpretation, be twisted into a false one.

But of these matters, more shall be said on another occasion. For now, it suffices for us to have shown that the particular love by which God has embraced His elect, so that He has a special regard for them in granting salvation, has not prevented Him from pursuing the rest of mankind in this matter with common philanthropia.